Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-11458-GAO
July 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
The plaintiff, Norman L. Longval, alleges that the defendants, twelve employees of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11(H)-(I). The allegations pertain to an incident in which the plaintiff was sprayed with a chemical agent while he was an inmate at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center ("SBCC") in Shirley, Massachusetts. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint.
Background
At all times material to the complaint, Longval was an inmate at SBCC. Compl. ¶ 1, 16. He claims that on November 11, 1998, he was ordered by prison guards to return his food tray and that he responded by placing his tray at the bottom of his cell door and lying face-down on his bed with his hands behind his back. He alleges that while he was on the bed he was sprayed in the face with a chemical agent. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 23, 24. At the time, the water in the cell block was turned off because the inmates flooded the block earlier in the day by continually flushing the toilets. Compl. ¶ 22. Longval alleges that the chemical agent was on his skin and in his eyes for approximately eight hours before he was permitted to wash it off, causing him severe pain and permanent eye irritation. Compl. ¶ 63.
On December 23, 1998, Longval filed a complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law theories alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force during the November 11th incident. See Longval v. Maloney, et. al., Middlesex Super. Ct., C.A. No. 98-06239 (the "state suit"). In the state suit, Longval alleged that five of the twelve defendants named in this case, Maloney, Duval, DiPaolo, McCrosson, and Dewey, "permitt[ed] and encourag[ed]" the use of excessive force in the November 11 incident and that two unnamed defendants, labeled for their alleged roles in the incident as "Leader" and "Gasser," "intentionally employ[ed]" the excessive force. Defs.' Mot. to Dimiss, Ex. 1 at 4-5. The state court dismissed the two unnamed defendants for lack of service of process. On December 27, 2001, the state court denied the defendants' subsequent motion for summary judgment, and the record before this Court indicates that a trial has not yet been scheduled in the state suit.
On August 15, 2001, Longval filed the present complaint naming as defendants the five individuals named in the state suit and seven additional defendants. The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to violate Longval's Fourteenth Amendment right to access the court system and also violated his Eighth Amendment right by depriving him of water to wash the tear gas from his eyes. While the complaint in this case and the complaint in the state suit contain several identical factual allegations, Longval's opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss asserts that the legal claims in each action do not overlap. It is well established that pro se pleadings such as Longval's, "'however inartfully pleaded' are held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. . . .'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). In light of the representations made by Longval in his opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that the federal constitutional claims in the state suit are distinct from the federal constitutional claims in this case and declines the defendants' invitation to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case pursuant to the Colorado River abstention doctrine. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Longval alleges that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to access the courts "[b]y fabricating facts and falsifying their official reports to cover up" their alleged use of excessive force during the November 11 incident. Compl. at 17. Longval has a constitutional "right of access to the courts which must be adequate, effective and meaningful." Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford, 939 F. Supp. 921, 925 n. 11(D.Mass. 1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)). An attempt by individuals to conceal illegal conduct can provide the basis for a § 1983 claim "if the defendants' actions were [causally] connected to a plaintiff's failure to succeed in her lawsuit." Gonsalves, 939 F. Supp. at 925-26 (citing Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that the assessment of the claim must focus on the consequences of filing a false report and not the simple existence per se of a false report sitting in a file drawer somewhere)). "In such circumstances, the plaintiff has been deprived of property without due process by being deprived of the right to be awarded damages in a meritorious lawsuit as a result of the defendants' unconstitutional conduct." Gonsalves, 939 F. Supp. at 926 n. 15 (citing Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1989); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1983))).
Longval's Fourteenth Amendment claim is premature. Since Longval's state suit is still pending, he has not yet been deprived of his property right in a potential damages award in that case, nor is there any certainty that he will be. If Longval succeeds in the state suit, he will not have a viable due process claim based on a deprivation of access to the courts.
Eighth Amendment Claim
Longval alleges that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right "[b]y intentionally preventing [him] from accessing water to wash the chemical agent from his eyes, face and skin for several hours. . . ." Compl. at 17. Longval claims that he was exposed to the chemical agent shortly after 6:00 p.m. and that he "was not able to wash the . . . chemical agent from his eyes, face, arms and hands for more than 8 or so hours" due to the fact that the water in the unit had been shut off. Compl. ¶ 63. Longval further alleges that the water was "intentionally shut off to intensify the effects of the chemical agent. . . ." Compl. ¶ 64.
This allegation seems to contradict Longval's earlier assertion that the water in the block was turned off in the "early afternoon" because prisoners in the above block had flooded their cells by continuously flushing the toilets. Compl. ¶ 22.
In support of his claim, Longval cites the standards for the use of chemical agents as provided in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, which permit chemical agents to be used to assist in the use of force to secure an inmate but provide that "[p]rior to the use of chemical agent, the Medical Director or designee shall review the inmate's medical file to determine any medical issues that would constitute a contraindication for the use of chemical agent. The decision shall be documented on the 'Use of Chemical Agents' form (Attachment B) and signed by the Medical Director or designee." App. to the Compl. at 30. Longval asserts that he is 59 years old and suffers from various chronic medical problems, and that no such review of his medical file ever occurred. Compl. ¶ 58. Longval also attaches to the complaint a publication from the manufacturer of the chemical agent, which states that "the spray must be removed as soon as possible, preferably within fifteen minutes." App. at 36. The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting "deliberate indifference to a [prisoner's] serious medical need." DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). The deliberate indifference standard prohibits "conduct that offends evolving standards of decency in a civilized society." DesRosiers, 949 F.2d at 18. Under this standard, "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Evaluated under the pleading standard appropriate to Rule 12(b)(6), Longval has sufficiently alleged a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, and the motion to dismiss must be denied as to this claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
State Law Claims
Because of the existence of a state lawsuit addressing the same incident, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Longval's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim and denied as to the Eighth Amendment claim. The state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.