Opinion
Cause No. IP 00-493-C-M/S
March 28, 2001
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs Peg and Joseph Longstreth filed an amended complaint alleging various causes of action against defendants Hamilton County Board of Commissioners, Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, Cary Milligan, The Richmond Art Museum, and John Doe. Ms. Longstreth alleged a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim under Indiana's Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), and claims under Indiana common law for fraud, intimidation, and official misconduct. Mr. Longstreth has also alleged a claim for loss of consortium and services. The governmental defendants ("defendants") have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Court has fully considered the parties' arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims. In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court DISMISSES plaintiffs' remaining state law claims against all defendants.
Defendants had initially filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on April 17, 2000. On May 14, 2000, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Because the same issues are addressed in both motions, the Court DENIES the defendants' April 17, 2000, motion as moot.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 21, 1998, someone robbed plaintiff Peg Longstreth several hours before her bridal shower was to be held. Amended Complaint ¶ 12. As a result, Longstreth filed a claim with her insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant Cary Milligan, an officer of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, was assigned to investigate the case. Id. ¶ 6, 14. Longstreth claims her problems began when Nationwide, in an effort to avoid paying the claim and to subject Longstreth to criminal prosecution, provided information to Milligan. According to Longstreth, both Nationwide and Milligan knew or should have known that her claim was valid and that any criminal prosecution of her was without merit. Id. ¶ 15.Agents of defendant Richmond Art Museum also knowingly provided false information to Milligan during his investigation, including falsely reporting that Longstreth had refused to return art to the museum and failed to give the museum an accounting of that art. They also told Milligan that they had been trying for some time to contact Longstreth to locate items that she had on consignment from the museum. Id. ¶ 16. The effect of the actions by the museum was to leave the false impression that Longstreth had engaged in duplicitous conduct with the museum, and constituted probable cause upon which Longstreth was charged and arrested. Id. Longstreth was eventually charged with two felony counts of fraud and one misdemeanor count of false crime reporting, all of which were eventually dismissed. Id. ¶ 18.
II. STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits the dismissal of a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." United States v. Clark County, Indiana, 113 F. Supp.2d 1286, 1290 (S.D. Ind. 2000). When considering a motion under this rule, the Court must examine the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. Id. Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiffs cannot establish any set of facts which would entitle them to the relief sought. The Court shall accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
III. DISCUSSION A. MS. LONGSTRETH'S FEDERAL CLAIM
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal cause of action for "the deprivation, under color of [state] law, of a citizen's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1997). Section 1983 is not itself a font for substantive rights; instead it acts as an instrument for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Id. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law. Stevens v. Umstead, 131 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1997). The first step in any § 1983 analysis is to pinpoint the specific constitutional right that was allegedly violated. Id.
Although not clear from her amended complaint, it appears that Ms. Longstreth bases her civil rights claim upon a theory of malicious prosecution. See Plaintiffs' Second Response Brief at p. 17 (stating that while the Longstreths have not "actually sued Det. Milligan for malicious prosecution, they have alleged that Det. Milligan, in concert with others, caused a wrongful prosecution of Ms. Longstreth with knowledge that the prosecution was without merit (i.e., without probable cause)"). Ms. Longstreth asserts that defendants' conduct violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
1. Fifth Amendment Claim
The Court can quickly dispose of Ms. Longstreth's Fifth Amendment claim because that amendment only applies to actions of the federal government. Boczar v. Kingen, 1999 WL 33102132, *10 (S.D. Ind. August 12, 1999) ( Fifth Amendment only applies to actions taken by the federal government, not state or local governments). Because there are no such allegations of wrongdoing by the federal government in the amended complaint, any claim based upon that Fifth Amendment is DISMISSED.
2. Claims Against Defendant Hamilton County Sheriff's Department And Defendant Milligan In His Official Capacity
It is well settled that the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior because municipalities are not vicariously liable for the unconstitutional torts of their employees. Williams v. Heavner, 217 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, Ms. Longstreth must show defendants' actions resulted from a municipal policy of violating citizens' constitutional rights. Id. "The case law has identified three instances in which a municipality can be said to have violated the civil rights of a person because of its policy: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority." Vela v. Village of Sauk Village, 218 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs concede that the claims against the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners must be dismissed.
Ms. Longstreth has alleged no facts supporting any of these theories. Without citation to any authority, she urges that because Milligan's actions continued from February through June 1998, the Court should reasonably infer that his conduct amounted to a custom of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department. The Court disagrees. Ms. Longstreth has pointed to no facts — other than the alleged actions of Milligan — to support a claim that the Sheriff's Department had a policy of violating citizens' constitutional rights. As a result, all § 1983 claims against the Sheriff's Department are DISMISSED. In addition, because Ms. Longstreth's federal claim against Milligan in his official capacity is really a claim against the Sheriff's Department, the Court also DISMISSES that claim. See Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1999) (official capacity suit seeking damages is simply an action against the municipality for which the officer is an agent).
3. Individual Capacity Claim Against Defendant Milligan
That leaves Ms. Longstreth's claim of malicious prosecution against Milligan in his individual capacity. To hold defendant Milligan liable in his individual capacity, Ms. Longstreth must show that he had some personal involvement or direct responsibility for the conditions of which she complains. Russell v. Mounsey, 1998 WL 456434, *4 (N.D. Ind. April 24, 1998). At the outset, the Court notes that "a malicious prosecution action against a police officer is `anomalous' . . . because the State's Attorney, not the police, prosecute a criminal action." Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996). In fact, to state a claim for malicious prosecution against police officers, a plaintiff generally must do more than merely allege that they arrested and detained him without probable cause. Rather, "he must allege that the officers committed some improper act after they arrested him without probable cause, for example, that they pressured or influenced the prosecutors to indict, made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor, testified untruthfully, or covered up exculpatory evidence." Snodderly, 229 F.3d at 901.
The Court notes that plaintiffs' complaint references the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the Supreme Court held that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be based on substantive due process (under the 14th Amendment), but declined to decide whether the Fourth Amendment could serve as the basis for such suits. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994). As some judges have recognized, "the tort of malicious prosecution fits uneasily within the Fourth Amendment. That amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures and has been held to prohibit arbitrary law-enforcement actions up until the time of arraignment. To justify a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, then, one has to extend the period of `seizure' past arraignment." Cervantes v. Jones, 188 F.3d 805, 808 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1999), citing Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the concept of a continuing seizure). For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that Ms. Longstreth had a right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution.
There are simply no allegations in plaintiffs' complaint that Detective Milligan did anything after Ms. Longstreth's arrest. In fact, the only allegations against him are as follows: (1) that he received information from Nationwide Insurance regarding Ms. Longstreth, and that he and Nationwide knew or should have known that her claim was valid and that any criminal prosecution of her was without merit; (2) that during his investigation, representatives of the Richmond Art Museum provided him with information that they knew to be false; (3) that along with John Doe, members of the Sheriff's Department, and employees of the Richmond Art Museum, Milligan made material misrepresentations of fact that he knew to be false with respect to the investigation of Ms. Longstreth's claim; (4) that along with members of the Sheriff's Department, Milligan expressed by words or action an intention to injure Ms. Longstreth or damage her property; unlawfully subject her to physical confinement or constraint; expose her to hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule; and/or falsely harm her credit or business reputation; (5) that he committed perjury, fraud, intimidation, and/or denied Ms. Longstreth equal protection under the laws of Indiana; and (6) that he was part of a group that aimed to falsely accuse, charge, and convict Ms. Longstreth of burglary and robbery, and as part of that group engaged in at least two incidents of racketeering activity, including fraud, official misconduct, intimidation, or perjury. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 15, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28-30.
At best, Ms. Longstreth has alleged that Milligan somehow played a role in effectuating her arrest. Nothing in the complaint, however, points to any conduct by Milligan after the arrest of Ms. Longstreth. Noticeably absent are any allegations that Milligan somehow exerted any pressure or influence over the prosecutor to indict her, that he made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor, or that he testified falsely at any subsequent proceeding. See Snodderly, 239 F.3d at 901-902, citing Reed, 77 F.3d at 1053 ("It is conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the first step towards a malicious prosecution. However, the chain of causation is broken by the indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the officers to the prosecutor."). Although Ms. Longstreth makes vague allegations of fraud and perjury, she provides no facts as to whom Milligan apparently made the representations or when he allegedly engaged in such conduct. Even under the notice pleading permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Longstreth has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for malicious prosecution against Detective Milligan. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss Ms. Longstreth's claim under § 1983.
B. REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS
Because the Court has dismissed Ms. Longstreth's federal claims under § 1983, original jurisdiction is now lacking and the Court may — pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) — properly dismiss plaintiffs' remaining state law claims against all defendants. Accordingly, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and hereby DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted earlier, the Court has DENIED defendants' April 17, 2000, motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as moot. The Court has instead considered defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint, which plaintiffs filed during the briefing of defendants' initial motion. Because plaintiffs concede that they do not seek to hold the Hamilton County Board of Commissioners liable in this action, the Court DISMISSES all claims against the Board. The Court has also determined that Ms. Longstreth has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the governmental defendants. Accordingly, it DISMISSES with prejudice Ms. Longstreth's § 1983 claims. Finally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court also DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiffs' remaining state law claims against all defendants.