Opinion
No. 11-05-00278-CR
Opinion filed March 1, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Ector County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 05-1763.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., McCALL, J., and STRANGE, J.
OPINION
After waiving his right to counsel and to a jury trial, Steve Nuel Long entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of interfering with an emergency call, a Class A misdemeanor under TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.' 42.062 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The trial court convicted appellant and assessed his punishment at confinement in county jail for one year and an $800 fine. Based upon appellant's application for community supervision, the trial court suspended the imposition of confinement and placed appellant on community supervision for eighteen months. We affirm. In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in accepting appellant's guilty plea absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to counsel. The record shows that appellant waived his right to counsel and did not contest his guilt of this misdemeanor offense. Because appellant pleaded guilty and did not contest his guilt, the trial court was only required to determine whether appellant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; it was not required to admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Moreover, if a defendant in a misdemeanor case where guilt is not contested signs a written waiver of counsel in court and there is no contradicting evidence or any evidence that the defendant was coerced or intimidated, the record is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's waiver of counsel was valid. Hatten v. State, 89 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.). Although there is no reporter's record from the plea proceedings, the clerk's record contains a written waiver of rights signed by appellant, the prosecutor, and the presiding judge. According to the written waiver, appellant was duly admonished of his right to be represented by legal counsel and his right to have legal counsel appointed if he could not afford to employ counsel. The written waiver further states that the trial court told appellant of the disadvantages of representing himself and the advantages of having legal counsel. Appellant averred that he understood his right to counsel but that he wished to waive that right. Furthermore, the judgment reflects that appellant appeared in court, waived his right to counsel in open court, and then proceeded to plead guilty. There is nothing in the record that indicates appellant was coerced or intimidated or that his waiver of the right to counsel was not made knowingly or intelligently. Consequently, we cannot find that the trial court erred in accepting appellant's guilty plea. Appellant's issue on appeal is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.