Opinion
Nos. 80-2112, 80-2153.
February 22, 1982.
ORDER
C.A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 80-2112, 651 F. 2d 214; No. 80-2153, 641 F. 2d 192.
By enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Act), Congress created a statutory basis for courts, in the exercise of their sound discretion, to award attorney's fees to private litigants who prevail in litigation under various civil rights laws. The Courts of Appeals responsible for interpreting the Act have differed as to the correct construction of more than one of its provisions. Because the two cases from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which the Court today declines to review present examples of this difference on the important issue of how to determine when a party "prevails" within the meaning of the Act, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.
The Act, codified as the last sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides for the discretionary award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in a lawsuit brought under one or more of eight specified statutes. The Senate Report accompanying the Act, S. Rep. No. 94-1011 (1976), provides that "[i]t is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [ 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."