Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5122-13T2
04-15-2016
THOMAS LOGUE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE STATE POLICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent.
Castellani Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant (David R. Castellani, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jeff S. Ignatowitz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Rothstadt. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System, Docket No. 8-3723. Castellani Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant (David R. Castellani, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jeff S. Ignatowitz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Petitioner Thomas Logue, a former New Jersey State Trooper, appeals from the final determination of respondent, the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System's (Board), denying Logue's 2013 request to either reinstate his 2008 application for ordinary disability pension benefits or allow him to apply for deferred retirement benefits. The Board denied his application as a matter of law because it found Logue failed to timely pursue his original application by appearing for a required medical examination. The Board further found that, when Logue made his subsequent request to reopen his original application, he was no longer an in-service member of the pension system and was not "entitled to file for Deferred retirement since he was removed from employment for cause" in connection with an intervening criminal conviction. On appeal, Logue contends the decision to deny his request without a hearing was "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" because there were "issues of fact regarding the good cause standard" that had to be resolved. He also contends the Board's decision not to allow him to apply for deferred retirement benefits is unsustainable because his termination from the force "did not merit forfeiture of [his] pension rights."
We have considered Logue's arguments in the light of our review of the record and applicable legal principles. We affirm.
The facts surrounding Logue's employment and his application for retirement benefits are generally not in dispute. Logue became a State Trooper in 1987. On July 10, 2008, he submitted an application for ordinary disability retirement benefits, identifying August 1, 2008 as the effective date of retirement. The Division of Pensions and Benefits (Division) attempted to schedule a required independent medical examination (IME) for Logue from November 2008 through March 2009. Logue failed to appear for any scheduled appointments because, for the most part, he was advised by counsel not to attend. The Division wrote to Logue on June 29, 2009, notifying him of his obligation to appear for an IME and requesting that he advise if he was still interested in pursuing his application. The letter advised that, if he was not still interested, his file would be closed, leaving him with an option to re-file at a later date, but that a new application's earliest retirement date would be "the first of the month after it is received by the Division." Having received no response from Logue, the Division wrote to him in November 2010, giving Logue an additional forty-five days to arrange appear for an IME and advising that his file would be closed if he did not appear. Logue did not respond, and in January 2011 the Division notified him that his file was closed for non-compliance.
The IME is required by statute and regulation. See N.J.S.A. 53:5A-9(a); N.J.S.A. 53:5A-11; N.J.A.C. 17:1-7.10.
Counsel was representing Logue in the criminal matter that led to him being terminated from his employment, as discussed infra.
While Logue's application was pending, his employment was terminated as a result of criminal charges brought against him. Specifically, in July 2010 Logue pled guilty to a disorderly person offense that resulted in an order for the forfeiture of his public employment (Forfeiture Order), as his underlying offense was related to his position as a public employee. He was terminated the next day.
Logue pled guilty to a disorderly persons' theft offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3, after admitting to filling his personal vehicle with gas on numerous occasions from gas stations reserved for State owned vehicles.
Notwithstanding the Forfeiture Order and Logue's termination, he applied again for disability retirement benefits, approximately two-and-a-half years after the Division closed his 2008 file, this time indicating a retirement date of October 1, 2013. In connection with that application, Logue requested the Division either reactivate his 2008 application or relate his current application back to July 2008 as an application for "payment from the pension fund of all his aggregate contributions as Deferred Retirement Allowance." The Division denied the request on November 3, 2013, because Logue was no longer "in service." The Division further advised that if Logue sought to appeal that determination, he could not simultaneously pursue an application for deferred retirement pension benefits.
This type of retirement applies to officers who have worked for ten years, are under age fifty-five, and are separated from service for reasons other than misconduct. See N.J.S.A. 53:5A-28(a).
A "member" of the retirement system is defined as "any full-time, commissioned officer, non-commissioned officer or trooper of the Division of State Police of the Department of Law and Public Safety of the State of New Jersey enrolled in the retirement system." N.J.S.A. 53:5A-3(m). Membership "cease[s] upon retirement, withdrawal or death or if service is discontinued for more than 2 consecutive years." N.J.S.A. 53:5A-7. A "member in service" is defined by regulation as one who "was making pension contributions to the retirement system at the time of filing the application for a disability retirement allowance." N.J.A.C. 17:5-5.7(a)(1).
In response to a further inquiry by Logue, the Division clarified and explained its determination in a November 19, 2013 letter to Logue's counsel. In that letter, the Division made clear that only "in service" members of the fund could apply for disability retirement benefits, and that, as a result, Logue's August 27, 2013 application could not be accepted.
The requirement is set forth in N.J.S.A. 53:5A-9(a).
Logue appealed the Division's determination to the Board. On December 3, 2013, his attorney wrote to the Board arguing that the "unswerving, mechanistic application" of the controlling statutes and regulations imposed "unnecessary harm" upon Logue. Counsel further contended that the facts presented here — that Logue had already applied for benefits while he was in service — fell into the class of circumstances warranting the avoidance of the "harsh approach of literally applying" the legal requirements so that an equitable result could occur, especially since allowing Logue to pursue his application "would not in any way impair the physical integrity [of the system] or stress [it] beyond [its] fair legislative design."
The Board considered Logue's appeal at its January 14, 2014 meeting and issued a written decision on January 28 denying the appeal. Citing N.J.A.C. 17:5-5.7, and N.J.S.A. 53:5A-28, the Board concluded that the August 2013 application could not be considered because Logue was not in service when it was filed, and that he was not entitled to deferred retirement because he was terminated for cause on charges of misconduct, but that he was entitled to withdraw his "contributions remitted during his active membership." Logue appealed, seeking a hearing before an administrative law judge to resolve the dispute. The Board issued its final determination on May 20, 2014, denying the appeal and Logue's request for a hearing.
In its written decision, the Board reviewed the history of Logue's employment, his applications for disability and deferred retirement, and his termination as a result of the Forfeiture Order. It quoted each of the applicable statutes and regulations regarding a member's application for disability retirement benefits, and found that, while Logue was in service at the time of his original application, he failed to comply with the requirements for the IME, which ultimately warranted the closing of his file. The Board noted that the Forfeiture Order changed Logue's status such that he was no longer in service when he made his 2013 application. It then considered his application for deferred retirement benefits and quoted from the controlling statutes, observing that because Logue was removed for misconduct he was not entitled to deferred retirement. The Board concluded by stating that its determination was based on undisputed facts, allowing it to reach its decision on the basis of the "system's enabling statutes and without the need for an administrative hearing."
Logue filed a timely appeal from the Board's final decision.
The scope of our review on appeal from an administrative agency's final determination is limited. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). "An appellate court affords a strong presumption of reasonableness to an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (citation omitted). In reviewing administrative adjudications, we must undertake a "careful and principled consideration of the agency record and findings." Riverside Gen. Hosp. v. N.J. Hosp. Rate Setting Comm'n, 98 N.J. 458, 468 (1985). We may not simply rubber-stamp an agency's decision. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).
Moreover, while "[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference . . . we are not bound by the agency's legal opinions." Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., 422 N.J. Super. 227, 234 (App. Div. 2011) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). "An appellate court is 'in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue . . . ." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). With these considerations in mind, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008); see also Bueno, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 233-34.
Finally, in our review of pension disputes, we recognize that "the public pension systems are bound up in the public interest and provide public employees significant rights which are deserving of conscientious protection." Zigmont v. Bd. of Trs., 91 N.J. 580, 583 (1983). "[P]ension statutes are remedial in character and should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby." Klumb v. Bd. of Educ., 199 N.J. 14, 34 (2009) (citation omitted). They must also "be liberally construed in favor of public employees . . . [because] they constitute deferred compensation earned by the employee during his years of service." Widdis v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 238 N.J. Super. 70, 78 (App. Div. 1990) (citation omitted). To respect that service, a pension board must deal fairly with its members. See Fiola v. Dep't of Treasury, Div. of Pensions, Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 193 N.J. Super. 340, 351 (App. Div. 1984).
Applying these principles to our review, we conclude that Logue's arguments are without merit. The Board correctly applied the law, and its decision "is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
We feel constrained to note briefly that, to the extent Logue relies upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., 91 N.J. 62 (1982), to argue that the Board did not properly consider his application, his reliance is misplaced. As we have previously held, "Uricoli . . . 'appl[ies] only to those claims for benefits where the specific pension statute is silent respecting the effect of a conviction for a crime relating to the applicant's public office.'" In re Hess, 422 N.J. Super. 27, 33 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Borrello v. Bd. of Trs., 313 N.J. Super. 75, 78 (App. Div. 1998)). Where the statute is not silent and the misconduct involves the public employment, the forfeiture of deferred pension rights is automatic. Id. at 37. In Logue's case, the statute is not silent, as it expressly limits the right to a deferred pension to members who were not removed from their position "for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency." N.J.S.A. 53:5A-28(a). --------
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION