Summary
In Lockwood, the motion was made after the trial on the merits was completed; the only thing that remained was the separate sentencing hearing. Because the sentencing proceedings had not yet begun, no disruption would have been caused had the trial judge conducted an inquiry into any claim that defense counsel had inadequately prepared for the pending sentencing hearing.
Summary of this case from Haugabook v. StateOpinion
No. 91-2937.
November 12, 1992.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Indian River County, L.B. Vocelle, J.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
We affirm appellant's convictions but remand for resentencing. We agree with appellant that the trial court failed to conduct the proper inquiry after appellant attempted to discharge counsel immediately after trial, but before sentencing. While a defendant is not entitled to any specific outcome, he is entitled to a proper resolution of his motion to discharge counsel, especially here, where his counsel joined in the motion. See Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 185, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988); Gurchick v. State, 439 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
Our remand is without prejudice to appellant's right to seek a new trial on any grounds, that issue necessarily dependent to some extent on the outcome of appellant's effort to discharge trial counsel. We do note, however, that there is no procedural bar to appellant raising claims of ineffective assistant of counsel in a motion for new trial. Cf. Combs v. State, 403 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2258, 72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982).
ANSTEAD, DELL and FARMER, JJ., concur.