Opinion
12 Civ. 1356 (AT)
12-29-2014
KIAZA LOCCENITT, Plaintiff, v. P.A. PANTEA, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER :
Plaintiff pro se, Kiaza Loccenitt, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant, Nicholas Pantea, P.A., deprived Loccenitt of hearing aid batteries and medical attention. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2012, Loccenitt, an inmate at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island, sued "P.A. Pantea," the prison's purported "acting physician," for deliberate indifference, medical negligence, and cruel and unusual punishment. Compl. 1, 3, ECF No. 2, Loccenitt v. Pantea, No. 12 Civ. 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Loccenitt II"). Loccenitt alleges that since December 2011, his repeated requests for hearing aid batteries have gone unanswered. Id. at 2, 3. As a result, Loccenitt filed several grievances. Id. at 3. Pantea "got mad because he was the object" of the complaints. Id. Pantea promised Loccenitt that he would never medically treat him, even if Loccenitt were "deaf, blind[,] or sick." Id.
Loccenitt claims that he suffered "constant migraines and headaches" due to his hearing loss. Loccenitt II Compl. 3. In addition, Loccenitt "g[ot] in trouble" because he was unable to hear officers' commands. Id. As compensation, Loccenitt seeks ten million dollars. Id. at 5.
On February 3, 2012, about three weeks before filing this action, Loccenitt commenced a separate lawsuit against the City of New York and numerous corrections officials for denying his right to freely exercise his religion. See Compl. 3, ECF No. 2, Loccenitt v. City of New York, et al., No. 12 Civ. 0948 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Loccenitt I"). Loccenitt alleged violations under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l, and New York Corrections Law § 610. Loccenitt I Am. Compl. 10, ECF No. 7. In December 2013, Loccenitt and the defendants agreed to a settlement. Loccenitt I Settlement, ECF No. 43. In relevant part, the Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance (the "Stipulation"), dated January 2014, provides:
In consideration for [$500], plaintiff agrees to dismiss and discontinue, with prejudice, all claims against the City Defendants, and any officers or employees thereof, and to release the City Defendants, their successors and assigns, and all past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents of the City of New York from any and all liability, claims, and/or rights of action that were or could have been asserted, alleging a violation of plaintiff's civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this Stipulation, including all claims for costs, expenses and attorneys' fees.Id. at 2, 3. Loccenitt also signed a release (the "Release"), dated December 25, 2013, containing this same provision. Id. at 4. On January 6, 2014, the Honorable Laura T. Swain so ordered the parties' agreement. Id. at 3.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may consider only the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, matters of which a court can take judicial notice, or documents that the plaintiff knew about and relied upon. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). A court must accept allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
A court will "liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nonetheless, courts "cannot invent factual allegations that [the pro se plaintiff] has not pled." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Indeed, the pleadings must still contain factual allegations that raise a "right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
II. Settlement Release
Defendant moves to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Stipulation and the Release that Plaintiff signed in Loccenitt I. Loccenitt II Mot. to Dismiss Mem. 1, ECF No. 36. It is axiomatic that "a district court may rely on matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that "[a] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court . . . to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Both the Stipulation and the Release appear on the public docket. Therefore, the Court may consider these documents. See Smith v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 3303, 2013 WL 5434144, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (finding that Stipulation and Release appearing on public docket in separate action "must" be "consider[ed]" in deciding the motion to dismiss); Waters v. Douglas, No. 12 Civ. 1910, 2012 WL 5834919, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that "[p]ublicly filed stipulations of settlement are subject to judicial notice").
Courts construe settlement agreements and releases "according to general principles of contract law." Collins v. Harrison-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002). This rule applies even in cases involving pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Duran v. J.C. Refinishing Contracting Corp., 421 F. App'x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2011). Under New York contract law, "[w]here the language of the release is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language employed." Wang v. Paterson, No. 07 Civ. 2032, 2008 WL 5272736, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2008) (quoting Shklovskiy v. Khan, 709 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)); see also Peterson v. Regina, 935 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that "courts must look to the language of a release—the words used by the parties—to determine their intent, resorting to extrinsic evidence only when the court concludes as a matter of law that the contract is ambiguous"). Indeed, "a release that is clear and unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be enforced." Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 F.3d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Skluth v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 559 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)); see also HOP Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund, 678 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that "[w]ith unambiguous contracts, a party's subjective intent and understanding of the terms is irrelevant").
Here, the language in the Stipulation and the Release is unambiguous. See Tromp v. City of New York, 465 F. App'x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that a similarly worded release was "plain and unambiguous"). Plaintiff released the City of New York and its "past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents" from "any and all" claims "that were . . . asserted, alleging a violation of [Plaintiff's] civil rights . . . from the beginning of the world to the date of [the] Release." Loccenitt I Settlement 4; see also id. at 2. Plaintiff's claims fall within the settlement agreement's broad ambit. As a medical provider to inmates in the City of New York's custody, Pantea qualifies as a City agent. This action for deliberate indifference, medical negligence, and cruel and unusual punishment involves "civil rights" claims. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint in February 2012, almost two years before signing the Release, the prior settlement agreement bars this action.
Pantea is employed by Corizon, a private entity that the City contracts with to furnish medical services to inmates. Loccenitt II Mot. to Dismiss Mem. 4, n.2. But, in the Section 1983 context, Corizon acts as "the functional equivalent of the municipality." Bess v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 7604, 2013 WL 1164919, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (noting that Corizon "enjoys the benefit of the Monell requirements for the same reason it may be named as a defendant in a § 1983 suit"—"[i]n providing medical care in prisons, Corizon performs a role traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state"). Accordingly, Pantea, who is being sued under Section 1983 for his alleged role as the prison's "acting physician," is a City agent. Loccenitt II Compl. 3.
The plain language of the Stipulation and the Release does not limit the release of claims to only those "asserted" in Loccenitt I, but instead applies to "all [civil rights] claims . . . that were . . . asserted . . . from the beginning of the world to [December 25, 2013]." Loccenitt I Settlement 2, 4. Similar language has been held by courts to bar claims brought in separate actions, so long as those claims were raised prior to the date of release. See, e.g., Waters, 2012 WL 5834919, at *3 (concluding that claims were barred based on previously executed settlement that released the City of New York and its agents from "any and all" claims asserting a violation of plaintiff's civil rights "from the beginning of the world to the date of release). Had the parties wanted to limit the Release to the claims raised in Loccenitt I, they could have done so. Compare Orakwue v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 6183, 2013 WL 5407211, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2013) (releasing "the defendants, and any present or former employees and agents of [t]he City of New York or any agency thereof, from any and all liability, claims, or rights of action which were or could have been alleged in this action, including claims for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees"), with Loccenitt I Settlement 4 (releasing City defendants "from any and all . . . claims . . . that were or could have been asserted, alleging a violation of [Plaintiff's] civil rights and any and all related state law claims, from the beginning of the world to the date of this Release"). --------
In opposing Defendant's motion, Plaintiff alleges that he was "bamboozle[d]" into signing "a part of the agreement [he] did not agree to." Pl. Opp'n Mem. 4, ECF No. 39. Indeed, "a release is [only] binding on the parties absent a showing of fraud, duress, undue influence, or some other valid legal defense." Davis & Assocs., Inc. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Nonetheless, Plaintiff's argument founders because, first, his "assertion of trickery is conclusory." Waters, 2012 WL 5834919, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges no facts illustrating how he was misled. Second, if Plaintiff wishes to challenge the validity of the settlement agreement, he should do so in the original case before Judge Swain, not here. See Smith, 2013 WL 5434144, at *6 ("[I]f Smith wishes to press the claim that the settlement and Release were procured by fraud or some other illegal means, and so void the agreements, he must do so before Judge Baer . . . . Only if the Release were set aside in the other lawsuit could Smith bring his claims in this action.").
Finally, even though Plaintiff released the claims alleged in his February 22, 2012 complaint, he has not released any civil rights claims that have accrued since the date of release. Thus, if the hearing aid battery deprivation Plaintiff complains of persisted after December 25, 2013, Plaintiff, after exhausting his administrative remedies, may file a new lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. See Lewis v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 3266, 2011 WL 3273939, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011) (dismissing claims in a similar context "with prejudice").
The Clerk of Court is directed to: (1) terminate the motion at ECF No. 35; (2) mail a copy of this order and all unpublished decisions cited therein to Plaintiff pro se; and (3) close the case.
SO ORDERED. Dated: December 29, 2014
New York, New York
/s/_________
ANALISA TORRES
United States District Judge