Opinion
C/A No.: 1:19-1028-BHH-SVH
06-03-2019
Mario Antwan Lloyd, Plaintiff, v. Captain Robinson, Deputy Scott, Deputy Tipton, Deputy Roberts, Deputy McKeller, Deputy Sandova, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Mario Antwan Lloyd ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against several Charleston County Detention Center ("CCDC") employees, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at CCDC. [ECF No. 1 at 4]. In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that while housed in CCDC Special Management Unit ("SMU") from March 2, 2019, to March 17, 2019, defendants Roberts and Scott removed his personal belongings; defendants Sandova, McKeller, and Tipton punished him for speaking; and defendants Roberts, Scott, and Sandova unlawfully looked through his legal mail. Id. at 6-8. In addition, Plaintiff challenged various conditions of his confinement, asserted racial and gender discrimination, and alleged Robinson failed to respond to grievances. Id. He sought monetary damages and termination of the responsible parties. Id.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on April 8, 2019. [ECF No. 1]. On April 19, 2019, the court notified Plaintiff that, because he sued each of the defendants in his or her official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment barred his claims and his complaint was subject to summary dismissal. [ECF No. 7]. The court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure his pleading deficiency and alerted Plaintiff his amended complaint would replace his original complaint and, thus, should be complete in itself. Id.
On May 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. [ECF No. 9]. The amended complaint continued to name each defendant in his or her official capacity. Id. at 2-4. In addition, the amended complaint alleged only "cruel and unusual punishment, no shoes no mat no clothes no visits no phone legal call, going through my legal work." Id. at 6.
On May 8, 2019, the court notified Plaintiff his amended complaint was subject to summary dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment and for failure to plead sufficient facts and granted Plaintiff an opportunity to file a second amended complaint by May 28, 2019. [ECF No. 12]. Plaintiff did not respond to the court's notice. II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege he was injured by "the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws" by a "person" acting "under color of state law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Plaintiff fails to support his claim with any facts, let alone sufficient facts to state a plausible § 1983 claim.
Plaintiff's complaint is properly before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment provides, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
Because the defendants in this case are employees of a South Carolina county, when acting in their official capacities, they are considered an arm of the state and not a "person" within the meaning § 1983. See Pennington v. Kershaw Cnty., S.C., No. 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 2423120, at *4 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-10 and applying the Eleventh Amendment to a county as "a political subdivision of the State"); Chisolm v. Cannon, C/A No. 4:02-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *5-6 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2006) (finding Charleston County Detention Center entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. 1992) (employees of a county Sheriff are state officials); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[N]either a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983.").
A state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a district court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663. The State of South Carolina has not consented to be sued in this case. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e). Thus, as arms of the state, the named defendants, in their official capacities, are immune from Plaintiff's claims for damages. Thus, the only remaining claim is Plaintiff's request for prospective injunctive relief—i.e., termination of the responsible parties. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) ("a federal court [is permitted] to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment"). However, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against any of the defendants.
2. Conditions of Confinement
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment during his time in SMU because "no shoes no mat no clothes no visits no phone legal call, going through my legal work." [ECF No. 9 at 6]. Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, this right stems from and is properly evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 537 n.16 (1979); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are at least as great as Eighth Amendment protections available to prisoners. Martin, 849 F.2d at 870.
To assert a viable § 1983 claim against a particular public official, Plaintiff must allege a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct of which he complains and the official sued. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (holding a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) ("In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be 'affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.'") (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)); Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928 (finding for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights).
In addition, Plaintiff must show the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). To show deliberate indifference, a detainee must establish two requirements: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was "sufficiently serious," and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Objectively, the court must assess "whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's society chooses to tolerate." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Further, to challenge prison conditions, Plaintiff must show "evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions." Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions; it prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. If a prisoner has not suffered serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition, he simply has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Amendment."). Plaintiff has not alleged any injuries in either his original or amended complaint. [ECF No. 1 at 10; ECF No. 9 at 7].
Plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state sufficient facts and fails to allege how any defendant violated his constitutional rights or caused a resulting injury. Accordingly, the amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal. III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For these reasons, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss the amended complaint in the above-captioned case with prejudice and without the issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. June 3, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).