Opinion
October 14, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff's expert's opinion testimony was properly admitted because the assumptions upon which a hypothetical question was based were fairly inferable from the plaintiff's testimony and the defendant's records (see, Tarlowe v Metropolitan Ski Slopes, 28 N.Y.2d 410, 414; Richardson, Evidence § 370 [Prince 10th ed]; see also, 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 682 [Chadbourn rev 1979]). Inasmuch as the element of proximate causation was established through the testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, the defendant's contention that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case is without merit (see, Lipsius v White, 91 A.D.2d 271, 277). Despite conflicting testimony from the plaintiff's and the defendant's experts, the resolution of those conflicts was a matter for the jury (see, Dunaway v Staten Is. Hosp., 122 A.D.2d 775; Taype v City of New York, 82 A.D.2d 648, 650-651).
On these facts, we cannot conclude that the verdict was against the weight of the credible evidence (see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499). Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Rubin and Spatt, JJ., concur.