Summary
finding plaintiff who signed stipulation of settlement intended to be bound
Summary of this case from McNamara v. Tourneau, Inc.Opinion
No. 04 Civ. 6735 (RCC).
September 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' motion to enforce a settlement agreement produced by court-endorsed mediation. For the reasons explained, Defendants' motion is granted.
I. Background
Pro se Plaintiff Stanley Little brought this employment discrimination action after being terminated by Greyhound Lines. At the time he commenced the lawsuit, Plaintiff was represented by Sheri Hatton, Esq. On February 25, 2005, at a hearing attended by defense counsel, Ms. Hatton, and Plaintiff, the Court granted Ms. Hatton's request to be relieved. At the same conference, the Court granted Plaintiff's request that the case be referred to the court's mediation program. See Mediation Referral Form, Ex. 2 to Colonna Decl. Pursuant to that referral, the Pro Se Office appointed attorney Alice Chan to represent Plaintiff throughout the mediation process.
On May 5, 2005, Ms. Chan requested and received certain documents from Defendants in preparation for the mediation. The mediation was conducted on May 25, 2005 by Richard Jeydel, Esq. Plaintiff, Ms. Chan, and defense counsel participated in the mediation. Mr. Jeydel successfully negotiated an agreement between the parties. Ms. Chan and defense counsel each signed the pre-printed form stating "FOLLOWING MEDIATION THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND WILL FILE APPROPRIATE PAPERS." Additionally, each counsel initialed the hand-written terms of their agreement. See Mediation Settlement Agreement, Ex. 3 to Colonna Decl.
The day following the mediation defense counsel submitted a more formal settlement agreement to Ms. Chan for her review. Defense counsel did not receive the document or any comments back from Ms. Chan. Rather, on June 1, 2005, Plaintiff wrote to the Court expressing his desire to continue the litigation because "unjust equity was presented during the litigation." Defendants now move to enforce the May 25, 2005 settlement agreement.
II. Discussion
"A settlement is a contract, and once entered into is binding and conclusive." Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432, (2d Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds by Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994). "To determine whether a settlement was agreed to, [the Court] look[s] first to the plain language of the agreement." Id. (citing Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895, 903 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The plaintiff in Janneh was proceeding pro se in his employment discrimination claim when he made a settlement offer and the defendant countered with an unsuccessful bid. Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434. At that time, the court appointed a lawyer to assist the plaintiff. Id. The lawyer successfully reached an agreement with the plaintiff's former employer. Id. Plaintiff's lawyer sent defense counsel a letter confirming the settlement and the plaintiff signed the letter indicating "I agree to settle my case for three thousand dollars." Id. Approximately two weeks after signing the settlement letter, the plaintiff informed the court he wanted a new lawyer. Id. The defendant subsequently moved to enforce the settlement agreement. Id. The plaintiff opposed the application, stating he "signed this agreement under civil pressure." Id. The court in Janneh found that the settlement letter "conveys a clear message of intention to settle." Id. at 436; see id. at 437 (remanding to district court with instructions to enforce the settlement letter).
There is similar intent to settle the litigation here. Little's mediation attorney and defense counsel each signed a settlement agreement that clearly indicated that the parties had reached a settlement through mediation. See Colonna Decl. Ex. 3; see also Janneh, 887 F. 2d at 436 (noting settlement letter indicated that the settlement marked the culmination of a negotiation process between the two counsel); cf. Winston v. Mediafare Entm't Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1986) (engaging in a distinct analysis to "determine whether the parties intended to be bound in the absence of a document executed by both sides"). The two attorneys also initialed the essential terms of the agreement. "If an attorney has apparent authority to settle a case, and the opposing counsel has no reason to doubt that authority, the settlement will be upheld." Janneh, 887 F. 2d at 436 (citing Fennel v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1989)). Further, Defendant forwarded a formalized agreement to Little's attorney the following day, and the mediator notified the court of the settlement soon thereafter. See Colonna Decl. Ex. 3 4; see also Janneh, 887 F. 2d at 436 (enforcing settlement letter even where seven months elapsed before defendant informed district court of the agreement).
Mr. Little's arguments regarding defense counsel's tardiness at the mediation and his authority to bind Greyhound are inapplicable in this determination. Mr. Little does not otherwise explain how the settlement reached after mediation has produced "unjust equity." See Janneh, 887 F.2d at 437 ("[Plaintiff's] contention that the agreement should be avoided because it was signed under `civil pressure' is frivolous. The record is devoid of any evidence that [defense counsel] or [defendant] improperly coerced [plaintiff].").
Accordingly, the May 25, 2005 settlement agreement is enforced. The parties are directed to execute the release within 10 days of entry of this order. Each side shall bear its own costs.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, Defendants' motion to enforce the May 25, 2005 settlement agreement produced after mediation is granted.
So Ordered.