Summary
In Luquire Ins. Co. v. Parker, 241 Ala. 621, 4 So.2d 259 (1941), plaintiff secured a judgment in an action for slander against the defendant corporation and also against its agent who had personally committed the alleged offense.
Summary of this case from E K Agency v. Van DykeOpinion
7 Div. 666.
October 16, 1941.
Appeal from DeKalb County Court; W. J. Haralson, Judge.
Wm. S. Pritchard and David R. Solomon, both of Birmingham, for appellant.
Where a corporation is sued in slander, and there is no evidence that any officer or director or other person in authority in the corporation ever knew that any word of the slander was uttered, the corporation is entitled to the affirmative charge. National L. I. Co. v. Abernathy, 206 Ala. 26, 89 So. 725; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala. 574, 43 So. 210, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 929, 124 Am.St.Rep. 90; McIntyre v. Cudahy Pkg. Co., 179 Ala. 404, 60 So. 848; Republic I. S. Co. v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 63 So. 328, L.R.A. 1915F, 516. In order to prove ratification by a corporation of slanderous words, the plaintiff must prove that the corporation had knowledge that those words were uttered. Choctaw C. M. Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383, 11 A.L.R. 1014; University Chevrolet Co. v. Bank of Moundville, 25 Ala. App. 506, 150 So. 557; Id., 227 Ala. 516, 150 So. 560.
W. Jay Tindle, of Fort Payne, for appellee.
Repetition of the slander is not a new cause of action, but is evidence of malice and an aggravation of the action. Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193, 37 A.L.R. 898. The law presumes malice if the words are actionable per se. Donaldson v. Robertson, 15 Ala. App. 354, 73 So. 223. The facts show an implied ratification. The correct rule of the liability of the corporation for slander uttered by its agent is stated in the dissenting opinion in National Life Insurance Co. v. Abernathy, 206 Ala. 26, 89 So. 725.
Action of slander brought by appellee against appellant, a corporation, and its agent alleged to have spoken the defamatory words.
There was judgment for plaintiff against both defendants. The corporate defendant alone appeals. The other defendant waives citation.
The cause was tried on Count F of the complaint which appears in the report of the case.
The liability of the corporate defendant is predicated upon a ratification of the words allegedly spoken by the agent to divers persons imputing dishonesty, or an offense involving moral turpitude.
In this, the complaint follows the Alabama rule touching the liability of a corporation for the slanderous words of its agent. National Life Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 206 Ala. 26, 89 So. 725; Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Taylor, 150 Ala. 574, 43 So. 210, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 929, 124 Am.St.Rep. 90; McIntire v. Cudahy Packing Co., 179 Ala. 404, 60 So. 848; Republic Iron Steel Company v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L.R.A.1915F 516.
No occasion is presented for a reconsideration of the soundness of this rule in principle, and the adoption of the prevailing rule insisted upon in dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Anderson concurred in by Justice Gardner. National Life Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, supra. See, also, 13 Am.Jur. p. 1053, § 1127, p. 1055, § 1128; 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 1280.
An essential element of ratification is knowledge on the part of a person with authority to ratify. Choctaw Coal Mining Co. v. Lillich, 204 Ala. 533, 86 So. 383, 11 A.L.R. 1014.
We find no evidence of ratification in the record. Granting that the agent, Allen, in checking up on policies taken over by his company, furnished to his company the information, including an affidavit from a policyholder, referred to in the letter, from the auditor made exhibit to the complaint, such communications are subject to the rule of qualified privilege, not presumed to be false or malicious. Ripps v. Herrington, ante, p. 209, 1 So.2d 899.
The complaint is not based on such communications, but upon words spoken to divers persons, slanderous per se, if untrue.
There is an entire absence of evidence that knowledge of such defamatory utterances ever came to the management of the company, some one in the position of an alter ego of the company in dealing with misconduct on the part of a corporate agent. It follows the appellant was due the affirmative charge as requested.
Other questions, which will probably not arise on another trial, need not be considered further than to say: On the whole record we are of opinion the ends of justice will be best subserved by the reversal and vacation of the judgment in its entirety that the cause be retried as against both defendants. City of Tuscaloosa et al. v. Fair, 232 Ala. 129, 167 So. 276.
It is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.
GARDNER, C. J., and FOSTER and LIVINGSTON, JJ., concur.