Opinion
Civil No. 3:03-CV-2103-H
January 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed November 21, 2003; Plaintiffs Response, filed December 11, 2003; and Defendant's Reply, filed December 29, 2003. Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff s case. Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the Opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Donnell Linthecome ("Linthecome") brought the instant case on September 16, 2003, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination by his employer, the Internal Revenue Service of the Department of the Treasury ("IRS" or "agency"). (Compl. at 7-11). Linthecome claims that the IRS discriminated against him when they denied him a promotion in 1996 and subsequently retaliated against him for filing a complaint of discrimination when they "did not issue to Plaintiff a final decision with his appeal rights after Step 4 of Plaintiff's grievance." (Compl. at 10).
Defendant John W. Snow, Secretary, Department of the Treasury ("Defendant"), argues that Plaintiff is estopped from bringing the instant case because Plaintiff has "previously filed a complaint in Federal District Court, Dallas Division, on the same issues as those contained in the instant complaint." (Mot. at 1). The Court dismissed the complaint in the previous action, Linthecome v. O'Neill, 266 F. Supp.2d 514 (N.D.Tex 2001) (Solis, J.), because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Linthecome v. O'Neill, 45 Fed. Appx. 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished table decision).
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Linthecome's suit is barred by both the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Mot. at 3-8). For an action to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, "1) the parties must be identical in both suits, 2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, 3) there must have been a final judgment on the merits, and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both cases." Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983). A dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction is not a final adjudication on the merits as required for the doctrine of res judicata to act as a bar. See Home Builders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1998). When the plaintiff is a federal employee, a decision that the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies is a decision that the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. See Randel v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998); Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1997). Because Judge Solis dismissed Linthecome's first suit due to Linthecome's failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the instant case.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when "1) the issue under consideration is identical to that litigated in the prior action, 2) the issue was fully and vigorously litigated in the prior action, 3) the issue was necessary to support the judgment in the prior case, and 4) there is no special circumstance that would make it unfair to apply the doctrine. Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999). "Collateral estoppel applies to questions of jurisdiction." May v. Kennard Independent School District, No. 9:96-CV-256, 1996 WL 768039, *3 (E.D.Tex. Nov. 22, 1996) (Hannah, J.) (citations omitted). "The dismissal of a suit for want of jurisdiction, prior to a decision on the merits, does not bar another suit under the doctrines of preclusion if the jurisdictional defect is remedied." Id.(citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-88 (1961); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 508-09 nn. 19, 21a (D.C. Cir. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982); FED.R. CIV.P. 41(b)).
In the instant case, Linthecome argues that since the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his first case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, he has "filed an administrative complaint with the Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury," and an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). ( See Pl.'s Response at 2-3). Linthecome argues that these actions remedy the jurisdictional defect of his first case such that the instant case is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ( See id. at 3). The Court does not agree.
In the Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing Linthecome's first case, Judge Solis was specific in the procedures Linthecome needed to follow to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Linthecome, 266 F. Supp.2d at 517-18. Judge Solis determined that Linthecome must appeal the decision the IRS made during the negotiated grievance procedure to the EEOC to exhaust his administrative remedies. See id. at 518. Judge Solis's decision on the issue of how Linthecome could exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus give the Court subject matter jurisdiction, has a preclusive effect on this Court under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Court cannot and will not now review Judge Solis's determination of the proper procedure for Linthecome to follow to give the Court jurisdiction.
Linthecome has not offered any argument that the "administrative complaint" he filed with the IRS subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's decision in his first case was an appeal of the agency's decision made during the negotiated grievance procedure, nor has he offered any argument that his appeal to the EEOC was an appeal of the agency's decision made during the negotiated grievance procedure. Indeed, the evidence Linthecome offered in support of his Response shows that Linthecome's appeal to the EEOC is nothing more than a repeat of the actions Judge Solis found insufficient to establish exhaustion in Linthecome's first case. See Pl.'s Response, Exh.10 ("Thus, we find that the present complaint was properly dismissed for stating the same matter that had previously been decided by the agency [in the negotiated grievance procedure]."); Linthecome, 266 F. Supp.2d at 517-18. The Court has no evidence before it to support a finding that Linthecome has remedied the defects in subject matter jurisdiction that existed in his first suit before Judge Solis, and therefore the Court has no reason not to give Judge Solis's decision in that case full preclusive effect in the instant case. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case because Linthecome has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Linthecome, 266 F. Supp.2d 514. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
In light of the above decision, the Court need not address the other argument in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.