Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10152.
June 24, 2009.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John W. Wolfe, Judge, Trial Court No. 3PA-07-2713 CR.
David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Jarom B. Bangerter, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
A jury convicted Christopher E. Lingenfelter of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. Lingenfelter appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude that both of Lingenfelter's convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
AS 11.61.110(a)(5).
AS 11.56.700(a)(1).
Factual background
At trial, the State presented evidence that the Alaska State Troopers responded to a report of a disturbance between Lingenfelter and his mother. When the troopers arrived, they could hear a female screaming, and they saw Lingenfelter run into the woods. Trooper Shayne Calt ran after Lingenfelter into the woods, and Trooper Jacob Covey followed. Trooper Calt chased Lingenfelter about 200 yards into the woods, yelled at him to stop, and identified himself as a trooper.
Lingenfelter stopped running, abruptly turned around, and faced Trooper Calt with his hands clenched into fists at chest level in a "fighting stance." He yelled, "Come on, motherfucker," at Trooper Calt. Lingenfelter walked towards Calt with his fists still out. Calt told Lingenfelter to stop and get down on the ground. Lingenfelter yelled, "Shoot me." Trooper Calt continued to tell Lingenfelter to stop. Lingenfelter ignored Trooper Calt and kept walking toward him. Calt tasered Lingenfelter, who fell to the ground.
While Lingenfelter was on the ground, Trooper Calt attempted to handcuff him. When Calt tried to handcuff Lingenfelter, Lingenfelter clenched his fists and pulled his hands together underneath him. When Calt was able to get his arm under Lingenfelter's and pry it up to handcuff it, Lingenfelter would pull it free and yank it back under him. While Calt was struggling with Lingenfelter, Trooper Covey arrived to assist Calt.
Despite the fact that he had two troopers on his back, Lingenfelter kept trying to stand up to dislodge the officers. Several times Lingenfelter almost succeeded in standing. Lingenfelter "was combative, fighting, [and] resisting" the troopers. Trooper Calt testified Lingenfelter "was actively fighting against [the troopers' efforts] to handcuff him." The officers finally succeeded in handcuffing him and taking him into custody.
Discussion
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court views the evidence and the reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. The court upholds the verdict if reasonable jurors could conclude the defendant's guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The credibility of the witnesses is an issue for the jury and should not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence presented below.
See Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).
Id.; Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App. 1994).
See Simpson, 877 P.2d at 1320-21; Daniels v. State, 767 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Alaska App. 1989).
The State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to convict Lingenfelter of disorderly conduct
The State charged Lingenfelter with disorderly conduct under AS 11.61.110(a)(5), which states "[a] person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, . . . in a public or private place, the person challenges another to fight or engages in fighting other than in self-defense[.]"
Lingenfelter argues on appeal that the evidence does not show he intended to challenge the trooper to fight. Lingenfelter also argues that even if the words he used could be considered "fighting words" or a challenge to fight, it was not reasonable for the trooper to interpret Lingenfelter's conduct as a challenge to fight.
The State presented evidence at trial that after running into the woods with two troopers chasing him, Lingenfelter stopped, turned, and said "Come on, motherfucker." Lingenfelter had his fists raised and was in an "aggressive combative stance." He then started walking toward the trooper and told the trooper, "Shoot me." He continued his aggressive advance despite Trooper Calt's repeated commands to stop. Trooper Calt perceived the need to taser Lingenfelter when he was twelve feet away to stop him from attacking, and Lingenfelter struggled with the troopers even after he had been tasered. Based on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, reasonable jurors could conclude the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Lingenfelter committed the crime of disorderly conduct by challenging another to fight. His words constituted a challenge to fight and his conduct reasonably could have been interpreted to be taking the steps necessary to complete his challenge.
See Dorman, 622 P.2d at 453; Simpson, 877 P.2d at 1320.
The State presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to convict Lingenfelter of resisting arrest
Under the Alaska statutes, "[a] person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest if, knowing that a peace officer is making an arrest, with the intent of preventing the officer from making the arrest, the person resists personal arrest or interferes with the arrest of another by . . . force[.]" Force is defined as "any bodily impact [or] restraint . . . or the threat of imminent bodily impact . . . [or] restraint[.]"
AS 11.56.700(a)(1).
AS 11.81.900(b)(27).
Lingenfelter argues that his conduct is analogous to the conduct we found insufficient to support a conviction for resisting arrest in Howard v. State, Nicholai v. State, and Eide v. State.
101 P.3d 1054 (Alaska App. 2004).
Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion Judgment No. 5120 (Oct. 4, 2006), 2006 WL 2847853.
168 P.3d 499 (Alaska App. 2007).
In Howard, when the defendant was told to turn around to be placed under arrest during a traffic stop, he turned and ran into the woods. As Howard turned to run, the trooper got a quick grasp on Howard's jacket or cuff, but Howard was able to pull away. Citing commentary to the Hawaii statute on which Alaska's resisting arrest statute was based, we held the contact between Howard and the trooper did not constitute "force" under AS 11.56.700(a)(1). Howard's conduct of pulling his sleeve from the grasp of the trooper as he turned to run away constituted "mere non-submission" rather than resisting arrest by the use of force.
Id.
Id. at 1058-59.
Relying on our Howard analysis, we concluded there was insufficient evidence of the use of force to constitute resisting arrest in Nicholai v . State . In that case, Nicholai tried to pull his hands away when the trooper attempted to handcuff him. Because Nicholai did not engage in forcible resistance, we concluded the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the resisting arrest verdict.
Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion Judgment No. 5120 at 5, 2006 WL 2847853 at *3 (quoting Howard, 101 P.3d at 1058-59).
Id.
Id.
In Eide, we held that Eide's conduct of jerking away from a trooper, "turtling," and announcing that he was not going to go with the trooper did not constitute resisting arrest. We applied the "mere non-submission" standard and found that Eide's "passive positioning" did not constitute resisting arrest.
Id.
We conclude that the facts of Lingenfelter's case differ significantly from those in Howard, Nicholai, and Eide. The evidence in Lingenfelter's trial, view ed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, showed that Lingenfelter challenged the trooper to fight and aggressively approached him. After the trooper used the taser, Lingenfelter physically resisted the troopers' efforts to handcuff him by repeatedly pulling his arms under him, trying to stand up, and trying to dislodge the troopers from his back. The troopers testified that Lingenfelter was "combative" and "was actively fighting against [their efforts] to handcuff him." The evidence therefore supported a reasonable conclusion by the jury that Lingenfelter's resistance was forcible and not "mere non-submission."
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.