Opinion
No. CV03 0195843 S
August 31, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
At issue is a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant and heard by the court on August 30, 2004. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered personal injuries in an automobile accident on May 5, 2001 caused by the defendant's negligence. The complaint dated June 12, 2003 was served on the defendant on June 18, 2003. The complaint alleges that as the result of the accident the plaintiff suffered injuries to her cervical and lumbar spine, neck and back pain and a ruptured breast implant. The complaint further alleges that these injuries were first discovered on July 2, 2001.
The defendant's answer denied the allegations of negligence and injuries and asserted, by way of special defense, that the plaintiff's claim was barred by General Statutes § 52-584. That statute provides in relevant part:
No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . .
The plaintiff's reply denied the essential allegations of the defendant's special defense.
Connecticut Practice Book §§ 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact, a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact, together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., 193 Conn. 313, 317, 477 A.2d 1005 (1984). Summary judgment is "designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. City of New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 587 A.2d 829 (1989). "Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 236 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).
The issue the court must address is whether there is an issue of fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run in this case. The defendant appended to his motion extracts from the deposition of the plaintiff. In these extracts the plaintiff testified that immediately following the collision she experienced bruising on her chest as the result of contact with her seat belt. She also experienced pain and tenderness in her breasts. While the bruises faded after three weeks, the pain and tenderness continued until she was seen by a physician five or six weeks after the accident The plaintiff also testified that within three hours of the accident she experienced a headache, a stiff neck and back pain. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment the plaintiff filed her affidavit stating that she did not seek medical attention because she was "not experiencing any symptoms and was unaware that [she] had suffered any injuries." In her affidavit the plaintiff acknowledges that she suffered a stiff neck and back pain about three to four hours following the accident, but claims that at the time she thought those conditions were due to an awkward sleeping position rather than the accident. She claims that she first saw a physician on June 22, 2001, but did not become aware that she had been injured in the accident until July 2, 2001 when her physician obtained the results of a MRI exam showing bulging cervical discs.
The defendant contends that the statute of limitation began to run on the day of the accident, May 5, 2001 and therefore expired more than a month prior to the service of the complaint on the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until July 2, 2001 when the plaintiff became aware that her neck and back pain were the result of the bulging discs attributable to the trauma she endured in the collision. The plaintiff claims that it is a question of fact as to when the plaintiff actually discovered an actionable harm caused by the defendant's negligence and that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
The court disagrees. In Lagassey v. State, 268 Conn. 723, 748-49, our Supreme Court recently restated the legal standard to evaluate the timeliness of causes of action in negligence. The court held: "The limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on the date when the injury is first discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. See General Statutes §§ 4-148(a) and 52-584. In this regard, the term injury is synonymous with legal injury or actionable harm. Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the essential elements of a cause of action. A breach of duty by the defendant and a causal connection between the defendant's breach of duty and the resulting harm to the plaintiff are essential elements of a cause of action in negligence; they are therefore necessary ingredients for actionable harm. Furthermore, actionable harm may occur when the plaintiff has knowledge of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the nature and extent of an injury, and that the injury was caused by the negligent conduct of another. In this regard, the harm complained of need not have reached its fullest manifestation in order for the limitation period to begin to run; a party need only have suffered some form of actionable harm." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
These standards make it clear that all that is required to start the running of the statute is that the plaintiff discovers or that a reasonable person would have discovered that she was injured and that there is a causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injuries. The statute is not stayed until the plaintiff discovers the full extent of her injuries. In this case plaintiff alleges that her injuries were sustained when the defendant's vehicle struck her stationary vehicle in the rear and left side. The plaintiff was immediately aware of pain in her chest and breasts caused by the impact of the collision and her seat belt. The causal connection between that injury and the defendant's conduct was obviously apparent to her.
The court need not determine whether there is a real issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered that her back and neck pain were causally related to the collision with the defendant's motor vehicle. The plaintiff has offered no evidence to rebut her deposition testimony that she was aware that her chest and breasts were injured by her seat belt as a result of the collision. Those injuries, standing alone, are sufficient to constitute actionable harm and to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
David R. Tobin, Judge