Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GC037200, Jan A. Pluim, Judge.
Klika, Parrish & Bigelow and Franklin T. Bigelow, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Mark M. O’Brien for Defendants and Respondents.
WILLHITE, J.
This appeal is from an interlocutory judgment following a bench trial in a partition action. Plaintiffs Shwu-Jen Lin and her husband, Hong-Chuan Lin, the appellants in this appeal, brought the action against Jane’s brother, Ing-Jieh Jeng. As did the parties at trial, we refer to plaintiff Shwu-Jen Lin as “Jane,” and to defendant Ing-Jieh Jeng as “Jack.”
In the partition complaint, Jane and her husband alleged that they owned an undivided 85 percent interest in a single family residence located at 1025 Geranio Drive in Alhambra, California, and that Jack owned an undivided 15 percent interest. Jane and her husband sought a partition by sale.
Jane and Jack have five surviving siblings, all of whom joined in a complaint in intervention in the partition action disputing Jane and her husband’s claim to an 85 percent interest in the Alhambra property. They each claim a one-seventh interest in the Alhambra property for themselves, alleged that Jack likewise had a one-seventh interest, and alleged that Jane and her husband shared a joint one-seventh interest. One of the surviving siblings and intervenors, sister Shwu-Huey Jeng, is now the sole resident of the property. We will refer to her as “Shwu-Huey.”
The other four surviving siblings and intervenors are brothers: Ing-Song Jeng, Ing-Ming Jeng, Ing-Yann Jeng, and Ing-Pei Jeng. At trial, brother Ing-Song Jeng was referred to as “Raymond,” and we will use that designation. As necessary, we will refer to the other surviving brothers individually by their first hyphenated names. One other brother, Ing-Lei Jeng, was deceased at the time of trial. In the record, he is referred to as “Larry,” and we will use that designation as well. The parents are also deceased, and their names do not appear in the record. We will refer to them as “the parents.”
The trial court’s interlocutory judgment decrees that Jack, Jane and her husband hold title to the Alhambra property as trustees of a resulting trust. The beneficiaries of the resulting trust are Jane, Jack, and the other surviving siblings, who own equitable interests in the property as tenants in common as follows: Jane, 15.45 percent; Jack, 28.45 percent; Shwu-Huey, 1.90 percent; and Raymond, Ing-Ming, Ing-Yann, and Ing-Pei, 13.55 percent. The court directed that the property be sold and the proceeds divided among the beneficiaries according to their ownership percentages, with specified reimbursements to Jane and her husband for certain contributions to costs relating to the residence.
Jane and her husband appeal from the interlocutory judgment. They contend that: (1) substantial evidence did not rebut the presumption created by Evidence Code section 662 that they owned an 85 percent interest in the Alhambra property, as reflected in the grant deed; (2) the trial court erred in creating a resulting trust; (3) the court erred in creating beneficial interests contrary to the title of record; and (4) in calculating the reimbursements to which they were entitled, the court erred in disregarding the report of the certified public accountant which was presented to the court by stipulation. As explained below, we affirm the interlocutory judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. The Witnesses
The witnesses at the bench trial were Jane, her husband (Hong-Chuan Lin), Jack, Raymond, Shwu-Huey, and certified public accountant Phillip Thong. We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.
II. The Purchase of the Rosemead House
After immigrating to the United States from Taiwan, the parents decided to purchase a house on Brighton Street in Rosemead, California. This house was the predecessor property to the Alhambra property that is the subject of this case. Jane, who was a real estate agent, helped in the purchase of the Rosemead house, which was completed in 1981. The persons who lived in the house were the parents, Jack, Larry, and Shwu-Huey.
According to Jane, the parents did not have credit, and Jack had just arrived from Taiwan. Thus, Jane obtained the loan for the purchase of the Rosemead house. However, because the mother insisted that Jack also be named on the loan, both Jack and Jane signed the loan documents. Also at the parents’ request, Jack and Jane took title to the house as tenants in common, each with a 50 percent interest, even though Jane paid no money for the purchase, and never made a loan payment. Soon after the purchase, Jane quitclaimed her interest in the house to Jack, because she did not own the house and had simply arranged the loan.
According to Jack, he made all the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the Rosemead house. In late 1982, he married and moved out, but continued to make all the payments.
III. Sale of the Rosemead House and Purchase of the Alhambra House
The parents decided to sell the Rosemead house, and found another house that they wished to buy on Geranio Drive in Alhambra. This is the property that is the subject of the present case. At the parents’ request, Jane arranged the sale of the Rosemead house and the purchase of the Alhambra house, which were completed in January 1984.
The purchase price for the Alhambra house was approximately $113,000. The down payment was $51,209, comprised of contributions from certain family members, as follows: the mother contributed $30,023 (approximately 59 percent); Jack contributed $16,981 (approximately 33 percent); Shwu-Huey contributed $2,138 (approximately 4 percent); and Jane contributed $2,067 (approximately 4 percent).
The purchase loan was approximately $62,000, at a variable rate of interest. The loan was signed by Jane and her husband, and by Jack and his then-wife.
The grant deed for the Alhambra property listed Jane and her husband as owners in joint tenancy of an undivided 85 percent interest, and Jack and his then-wife as owners in joint tenancy of a 15 percent interest. Jack later divorced, and his wife quitclaimed to him her interest in the property.
The family members who lived in the house were the parents, Larry (the now-deceased brother), and Shwu-Huey (the sister who is now the sole resident of the house).
In February 1998, the property was refinanced through a loan obtained by Jane and Jack. Approximately $24,000 was paid to retire the original loan. Jane paid Jack around $12,000 (which was 15 percent of the total loan,) and paid Shwu-Huey $16,795 as repayment for a loan Jane had obtained from the mother.
Apparently, a prior refinancing occurred, but specifics of that transaction do not appear in the record.
After the refinance, the monthly mortgage payment was $800, which Jane paid to the lender. Jack would write Jane a check each month for $120, 15 percent of the mortgage payment. In addition, as explained below, Jane received “rent” from Shwu-Huey.
IV. “Rent” and Other Payments
According to Jane’s trial testimony, beginning in January 1984, the parents, Larry, and Shwu-Huey were to pay rent to Jane for living in the Alhambra house, with the checks written to Jane by Shwu-Huey. Before 1985, there was no formal lease and Shwu-Huey paid rent in amounts as instructed by Jane. Jane calculated the rent by setting it at around $200 less than the monthly mortgage payment. For the first six months, the monthly rent was $532.68. Thereafter, the rent increased because the variable interest rate on the original purchase money loan increased.
In 1985, Jane (as landlord with husband Hong-Chuan Lin) prepared a written lease, later signed by the parents, Larry, and Shwu-Huey, which called for monthly rent of $579.35 beginning in January 1985. This $579.35 payment continued until January or February 1998, when the property was refinanced, after which Jane reduced the rent to $200 a month. Shwu-Huey paid at that rate until March 2006, and afterward stopped paying. Shwu-Huey continues to live in the house. Shortly before trial, Jane had served her with a 60-day notice to quit.
Jane testified that although she was listed on the grant deed as an 85 percent owner, she was responsible for only one-third of the property tax. The arrangement was that Shwu-Huey would write a check for the property tax, and then Jane would pay Shwu-Huey back. Shwu-Huey would then take a deduction from the rent.
Jane did not consider the payments made by Shwu-Huey to be payments toward the mortgage; she considered them to be rent paid to her. Jane alone took the mortgage interest deduction for tax purposes, and never told any of her brothers that she was collecting rent. Jane did not issue receipts for the payments made to her, and did not keep track of the amounts she was paid by Shwu-Huey.
Shwu-Huey testified that Jane told her that the amounts she was paying were for rent. However, Shwu-Huey never told her parents the payments were rent, because they did not understand United States law.
According to Shwu-Huey, from 1984 through 1998, she paid Jane $579.35 a month (Jane denied that the $579.35 rate began in 1984). Beginning in February 1998, Shwu-Huey paid Jane rent of $200 a month. She stopped making that payment in April 2006.
V. The Brothers’ Financial Assistance to Shwu-Huey
Although Jane knew that Shwu-Huey was not employed, she testified that she did not know whether her brothers were contributing money so that Shwu-Huey could make the payments. She later testified that she did know that the brothers were providing some financial assistance to Shwu-Huey, and that she considered her own assistance to be her reduction of the monthly rent to around $200 less than the mortgage payment.
Jack testified that at the mother’s request, he set up a joint checking account for himself and Shwu-Huey so that Shwu-Huey could write checks for living expenses and make payments to Jane for the mortgage. In 1984, when the Alhambra house was purchased, the mother asked five of the six brothers (excluding Larry) to contribute at least $100 a month to the account. On average, Jack contributed about $100 a month from 1984 until the father died in 1988. In 1989, the mother asked the five contributing brothers to contribute at least $150 a month. Jack believed that all the brothers did so. Jack continued to contribute to the account until 2006, and believed that his brothers continued their contributions also.
Raymond testified that when the parents bought the Alhambra house, they asked the brothers to contribute money to help them make the mortgage payment. Raymond contributed $120 a month until his father passed away in 1988. Then Jack asked him to increase his payments to $150 a month, which he did until five years ago when he retired. He then resumed contributing $120 a month. Raymond made out the checks to Shwu-Huey, or left them blank for her to fill out. He did not specify what the contributions were to be used for, but understood it was for Shwu-Huey to pay the mortgage and living expenses.
Shwu-Huey testified that five of her brothers (excluding Larry) contributed money to her to pay Jane the mortgage and other expenses. She received $100 to $150 a month from Jack. At some point, she told Jack that she did not have enough money, and he loaned Shwu-Huey $10,000, after which she told him he did not have to contribute anymore. From Raymond, she received $120 a month; from Ing-Ming, she received $250 a month; and from Ing-Yann, she received $200 a month. Ing-Pei would contribute money on special occasions such as the Autumn Festival or New Years.
VI. Jane’s Explanation for Her Claim to an 85 percent Interest as Specified in the Grant Deed
In her trial testimony, Jane explained why she and her husband received an 85 percent interest in the grant deed for the Alhambra property, and why Jack (with his then wife) received a 15 percent interest, as follows.
When the Rosemead house was sold, the cash proceeds from the sale were about $50,000, which the mother instructed Jane to divide among the parents, Shwu-Huey, and Jack. But Jack initially refused to use any part of his share of the funds to purchase the Alhambra house. The mother then demanded that he pay an amount equal to 15 percent of the purchase price. Jack contributed that amount, $16,981. For that reason, the parents gave him a 15 percent interest as specified in the grant deed.
The mother also asked Jane to arrange a loan to cover the balance of the purchase price, about $62,000. Jane did so. In exchange for Jane obtaining the loan and for signing it (along with her husband), the mother gave Jane and her husband the remaining 85 percent interest in the house.
Similarly, Jane’s husband, Hong-Chuan Lin, testified that in early 1983 or 1984, the parents asked him and Jane for help in obtaining a loan for the purchase of the Alhambra house. They said that in exchange, he and Jane would receive an 85 percent ownership interest.
VII. The 1998 Document and 2006 Letters Contradicting Jane’s Claim to an 85 percent Interest
Jane’s testimonial claim to an 85 percent interest in the Alhambra property was contradicted by certain written communications to her surviving brothers.
In January or February 1998, in response to inquiries from her brothers as to the distribution of shares in the Alhambra property, Jane prepared a written document in Chinese, which set forth the way the property was to be divided as of 1998. The document stated that: (1) four brothers – Larry, Raymond, Ing-Ming, and Ing-Yann – were to share a 48 percent interest; (2) Jane and her husband were to receive a 33 percent interest; (3) Jack was to receive a 15 percent interest; (4) sister Shwu-Huey was to receive a 4 percent interest; and (5) brother Ing-Pei’s share was to be determined.
At trial, Jane first testified that these percentages reflected the way her parents told her that the property was to be divided. She then testified that her parents did not tell her that the property was to be divided in this manner, but that these were “the percentage[s] as far as my parents knew.” She explained: “When they [were] alive, they know that’s their percentage, but they didn’t tell me when they passed away, I should distribute it this way.” Jane then denied that the document set forth her belief as to how her parents wanted the property divided. Rather, the percentages of ownership listed in the document set forth “what [Jane] was willing to do.” But Jane was no longer willing to divide ownership in these percentages.
In a letter to Jack (with copies sent to the other surviving brothers) dated February 4, 2006, Jane wrote that based on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the Rosemead house and purchase of the Alhambra house, Jack received a 15 percent interest in the Alhambra house, and Jane and her husband received a 33 percent interest. Jane wrote that when the Alhambra property was sold, she and her husband would take 33 percent, and withhold 20 percent long term capital gain for filing the tax return. At trial, Jane conceded that in this letter, she was stating that she and her husband owned only one-third (33 percent), not 85 percent, of the Alhambra house.
In March 2006, Jane wrote a letter to her surviving brothers in which she stated that each of her brothers was entitled to 10.4 percent of the property, for a total of 52.5 percent, and that Jack was entitled to 15 percent.
In February 2006, Jane also wrote a letter to Raymond (with a copy to Jack) in which she stated that she decided to claim an 85 percent interest in the property when she learned that Jack wanted to sue her and had told Shwu-Huey not to pay the $200 rent. At trial, Jane testified that she changed her mind about how the property should be divided after gathering all the cancelled checks, bank statements, and tax returns showing how much she had paid over the years in relation to the property. She also testified that her parents wanted the property to pass only to her and Jack, and did not want the other siblings to have a share.
VIII. Jack and Raymond’s Testimony Concerning Ownership of the Alhambra Property
Jack testified that he believed he owned a percentage of the Alhambra property, but he did not know how much. He did not see the grant deed giving him a 15 percent interest until the 1998 refinancing of the property.
He conceded that his parents never told him that they wanted his brothers or Shwu-Huey to have an ownership interest in the property. However, in December 1995, when his mother knew she was dying, she gave him a diamond ring and asked him to keep the house for Larry (who was then alive) and Shwu-Huey.
Raymond testified that his parents never told him that he would receive an interest in the Alhambra house. He considered his contributions not as an investment, but as helping provide his parents with a decent place to live. According to Raymond, his parents would be “shock[ed] to find out they [were] living in the place renting from” Jane and her husband. They believed that they were living in their own house. He “implore[d] the court to... protect my parent’s estate from... becoming the income property of” Jane and her husband. In his view, the home was the family home left to all the children, and he believed that his parents shared that view.
IX. Certified Public Accountant Phillip Thong
Before trial, by stipulation, the parties agreed to have Phillip Thong, a certified public accountant, prepare an audit report for submission to the court concerning the Alhambra property. The stipulated instructions directed Thong to “[u]se standard, recognized documents, such as cancelled checks, receipts, [check] registers or bank statements to tabulate and calculate payments made by each of the parties... for mortgage payments, taxes, and maintenance at” the Alhambra property. Thong was instructed to “[i]gnore all tabulations prepared by the parties” and to consider any sworn declaration of a party “only if it is supported by standard, recognized documents.”
Thong prepared an audit report dated March 12, 2008. Only Jane submitted records to Thong; none of the other siblings did so. Based on the information supplied by Jane, Thong calculated that Jane paid mortgage payments of $146,120.08, property taxes of $5,390.03, insurance of $455.22, and maintenance of $54, for a total of $152,019.33.
X. Argument and Oral Ruling
Following the presentation of evidence, counsel for Jane and her husband argued that under Evidence Code section 662, the ownership interests reflected in the grant deed – 85 percent for Jane and her husband, 15 percent for Jack – were presumed to reflect the full beneficial title, and that this presumption could only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. He argued that no such clear and convincing evidence had been presented. In particular, he pointed to the evidence showing that: (1) in the 1998 refinance, Jack received $12,000 in cash, which was 15 percent of the $80,000 loan; (2) after the 1998 refinance, Jack paid Jane $120 a month, which was 15 percent of the $800 monthly mortgage payment; (3) the remaining 85 percent of the monthly mortgage payment was paid to the lender by Jane; (4) although the brothers contributed funds to support Shwu-Huey, the parents never told the brothers that they would receive an interest in the property; (5) both Jane and Shwu-Huey characterized Shwu-Huey’s payments to Jane as rent, not mortgage payments, and the written lease so stated; (5) the letters Jane wrote stating that she had an ownership interest less than 85 percent were written in an effort to compromise when the lawsuit was filed; and (6) no one but Jane presented documentation to Phillip Thong to substantiate financial contributions.
The other siblings – Jack (defendant in the action) and Shwu-Huey, Raymond, and the other surviving brothers (the intervenors in the action) -- were represented by one attorney. He argued that the presumption of Evidence Code section 662 had been rebutted by Jane’s letters in which she claimed less than an 85 percent ownership interest, and admitted that her other siblings had varying ownership interests. Moreover, the ownership structure of the Rosemead house (the grant deed showing Jane and Jack as each owning 50 percent of the Rosemead property, although Jane conceded that she did not actually own such an interest) suggested that the family also did not consider the grant deed for the Alhambra house as the final word on ownership. Further, according to counsel, the evidence showed that the parents considered the house theirs.
Counsel also argued that a resulting trust can be created when the purchase price of property is paid by one person, but title is taken in another. Here, according to counsel, the evidence showed that the Alhambra property was purchased with a down payment supplied by contributions from the mother, Jack, Shwu-Huey, and Jane, but title was taken only in the names of Jane and Jack. Under these circumstances, the court would be justified in finding that a resulting trust was created.
The trial court orally ruled that clear and convincing evidence rebutted the presumption of Evidence Code section 662. The court found Jane and her husband were “inconsistent,” “self-serving,” “biased,” and not entitled to “much credibility.” On the other hand, the court found Jack and Raymond “honest” and “truthful” and entitled to “a lot of credibility.” The court announced that it found that Jack and the intervening siblings prevailed over Jane and her husband, and that the court was “prepared to make some sort of division of the property at this time.” The court’s subsequent comments suggested that it was inclined to divide the property, based on each party’s percentage contribution to the down payment for the purchase of the Alhambra residence. However, the court also intended to divide the parents’ interest in the residence in some fashion among the seven surviving children, taking into account contributions to the mortgage, and also to refund to Jane certain amounts for property taxes and mortgage payments since 2006. The court ordered both sides to brief the precise manner in which the shares and assets should be calculated, and scheduled another hearing for two days later.
The record on appeal reflects that a proceeding was held two days later, on June 26, 2008. However, the record contains no transcript of that proceeding.
XI. The Interlocutory Judgment
In its interlocutory judgment filed July 28, 2008, the court declared, in relevant part, that Jane, her husband, and Jack hold the Alhambra property as trustees of a resulting trust. The beneficiaries of the trust, and their corresponding equitable interests as tenants in common, are: Jane, 15.45 percent; Shwu-Huey, 1.90 percent; Jack, 28.45 percent; Raymond, Ing-Ming, Ing-Yann, and Ing-Pei, each 13.55 percent. The judgment orders Jane, her husband, and Jack to convey their title to the beneficiaries, and orders that the property be sold. Upon the sale of the property, Jane and her husband are to be reimbursed $22,400 for contributions toward encumbrances on the property, and $5,832 for property taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs. The remaining proceeds are to be distributed to the beneficiaries according to their respective interests.
Jane and her husband’s later motion for a new trial was denied, and they appeal from the interlocutory judgment.
DISCUSSION
Evidence Code section 662 codifies the “form of title” presumption found in common law, under which “the description in a deed as to how title is held is presumed to reflect the actual ownership interests in the property.” (In re Marriage of Brooks & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 184-185; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B Pt. 2 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 662, p. 210.) Section 662 provides: “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.”
All further undesignated section references are to the Evidence Code.
The statute applies when, as in the instant case, “there is no dispute as to where legal title resides but there is question as to where all or part of the beneficial title should rest.” (Murray v. Murray (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1067, italics in original.) The question “whether... the evidence offered to change the ostensible character of the instrument is clear and convincing is a question for the trial court to decide.” (Beeler v. American Trust Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 1, 7 [referring to common law presumption].) Thus, on appeal, we review the trial court’s determination that the section 662 presumption was rebutted for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 345 (Ruelas).)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the presumption of section 662 was overcome as to Jane and her husband’s claim to an 85 percent beneficial ownership interest in the Alhambra property. In her 1998 written communication to her brothers setting forth the distribution of the property, Jane claimed only a 33 percent ownership interest. Similarly, in her February 2006 letter to Jack, she claimed only a 33 percent interest. In her March 2006 letter to her brothers, she stated that four brothers were entitled to a total of 52.5 percent, and Jack was entitled to 15 percent, which would leave only 32.5 percent for Jane. Thus, Jane’s own communications with her brothers established that at least from 1998 to March 2006, she claimed only around a one-third interest in the property.
In a letter to Raymond in February 2006, Jane wrote that she decided to claim an 85 percent interest when she learned that Jack had told Shwu-Huey not to pay $200 rent, and wanted to sue Jane. In her trial testimony, Jane testified that she changed her mind about how the property should be divided after reviewing the documentation concerning the amounts she had paid in relation to the property over the years. Regardless of the explanation – spite or financial contribution – the court could reasonably infer that Jane’s claim to an 85 percent interest was based not on an understanding among her parents, herself, and her siblings, but upon her subjective view of how the property should be divided.
The evidence of the arrangement for the down payment, financing, and paying taxes and insurance for the Alhambra house strongly suggested that the grant deed was not intended to vest 85 percent of the beneficial title in Jane. The down payment of $51,209 was made by contributions from four family members: the mother ($30,023, approximately 59 percent), Jack ($16,981, approximately 33 percent), Shwu-Huey ($2,138, approximately 4 percent), and Jane ($2,067, approximately 4 percent). Jane and her husband testified that although they made only a 4 percent contribution to the down payment, the parents agreed to give them 85 percent ownership in exchange for obtaining and signing the purchase loan. The trial court, however, did not credit their testimony.
Moreover, although the parties apparently agreed that Jane would make mortgage payments to the lender (even though Jack was also liable on the original and refinanced loans), Jane received monthly “rent” payments from Shwu-Huey which covered all but approximately $200 of the monthly mortgage. Shwu-Huey, in turn, received the funds to make those payments through contributions from her brothers (with the exception of Larry). These financial contributions, according to Jack and Raymond, were solicited by the mother to pay the mortgage and other living expenses. Moreover, after the 1998 refinance, Jack contributed $120 a month directly to Jane as a partial mortgage payment. Thus, in substance, although Jane made the mortgage payment to the lender, she received substantial assistance from the brothers.
Further, although Jane claimed an 85 percent ownership interest, she testified that from 1984 to 2006 she was responsible for paying only one-third of the property tax. During the same period, she paid “more than one third,” not 85 percent, or the insurance premiums.
From this evidence of the parents and siblings’ arrangements for buying, financing, and paying taxes and insurance on the house, the trial court could reasonably infer that although the parents vested 85 percent legal title in Jane and her husband, they did not intend for Jane and her husband to have 85 percent beneficial title.
Finally, the purchase of the Rosemead house corroborated the conclusion that the grant deed for the Alhambra house did not accurately reflect ownership of the beneficial interests. In the purchase of the Rosemead house, Jane arranged for the purchase money loan, but contributed no money for the purchase, and never made a loan payment. Yet the parents directed that the grant deed give her a 50 percent ownership interest in the house. At trial, Jane testified that she quitclaimed her interest to Jack (who was also named a 50 percent owner in the grant deed), because she did not own the house and had only arranged the loan. From this evidence, the court could reasonably infer that just as the grant deed for the Rosemead house did not accurately reflect the true ownership interests in the property, so, too, the grant deed for the Alhambra house did not accurately reflect the true ownership structure of that house.
In short, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the presumption of section 662 was rebutted.
Jane and her husband contend that Jane’s communications to her brothers in 2006 were offers to compromise, and were therefore inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1152, subdivision (a). They characterize those communications as having been sent in February and March 2006, two to three months before the start of the litigation “in an attempt to reach a resolution... as to the sale of the Property prior to the filing of any lawsuit.” Jane and her husband did not object during the testimony of Jane, Jack, and Raymond when the relevant details of Jane’s written communications were elicited. Thus, they have forfeited any objection to such testimony on appeal. (Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1226-1227, fn. 13.) In any event, even if the testimony concerning the 2006 letters, and the letters themselves, were inadmissible, the error was not prejudicial. Jane and her husband do not challenge the introduction of Jane’s 1998 communication to her brothers, in which she claimed only a 33 percent interest. This communication, combined with the other evidence discussed above, was more than sufficient to rebut the presumption that Jane and her husband held an 85 percent beneficial interest in the property. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that, in the absence of evidence concerning the 2006 communications, a different result would have been reached. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801-802 (Cassim) [harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies to civil cases].)
II. Resulting Trust
Appellants contend, in substance, that the trial court erred in creating a resulting trust. We disagree.
“When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made. ‘The trust that is “presumed to result” from this situation is termed a “resulting trust”; its purpose is to enforce the intentions of the parties. It is distinguished from a constructive trust, which is typically imposed to rectify fraudulent behavior.’ [Citation.] ‘A resulting trust differs from an express trust chiefly in that (1) it arises by operation of law, without an expressed intent, and (2) the resulting trustee ordinarily has no duty other than to transfer the property to the person entitled. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 342; see 12 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2008) § 34:121, p. 34-407 [“[a]lthough the resulting trust arises in various circumstances, the most common situation relevant to real property” is the purchase money resulting trust]; see also Bogert and Chester, Trusts & Trustees (3d ed. 2005) § 451, p. 286 [“resulting trust may be decreed under a variety of circumstances that do not involve purchase money resulting trusts”];) Although clear and convincing evidence is required in the trial court to support the creation of a resulting trust (Johnson v. Johnson (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 551, 556), on appeal we review the record for substantial evidence. (Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 345.)
Here, the evidence clearly supports the creation of a resulting trust. The grant deed stated that Jane and Jack were the legal owners of the Alhambra property. But the property was purchased through a down payment comprised of contributions not only by Jane and Jack, but also by Shwu-Huey and the mother. Further, the purchase was financed by a purchase money loan (which was later refinanced), the mortgage payments of which were intended to be paid by: (1) financial contributions made by Jack, Raymond, and the other surviving brothers to fund Shwu-Huey’s “rent” payments to Jane, and (2) a contribution by Jane, in the sense that she fixed the “rent” at around $200 less than the monthly mortgage payment and apparently paid the difference herself. This evidence was sufficient to support the court’s determination that when the Alhambra house was purchased, the participants – Jane, Jack, Shwu-Huey, and the parents – intended the legal title holders, Jane and Jack, to hold beneficial title for the siblings who participated in making the down payment, as well as those who were intended to participate in funding the mortgage payments.
III. The Division of Interests
Jane and her husband assert that in fashioning the interlocutory judgment, the court erred in allocating the respective beneficial interests of the parties. However, the record on appeal is inadequate for us to review this claim.
In its oral comments at the conclusion of evidence, the court suggested that it was inclined to divide the property based on each party’s percentage contribution to the down payment for the purchase of the Alhambra residence. However, the court also intended to divide the parents’ interest in the residence in some fashion among the seven surviving children, taking into account contributions to the mortgage, and also to refund to Jane certain amounts for property taxes and mortgage payments since 2006. The court ordered both sides to brief the precise manner in which the shares and offsets should be calculated, and scheduled another hearing for two days later at which the attorneys would appear and “talk about it” with the court. The court concluded its comments by stating: “Let’s think about it and come back to court, and... with two good advocates I’m sure we can get through this.”
The superior court case summary in the record on appeal reflects that a proceeding was held two days later, on June 26, 2008, at 10:30 a.m. However, the appellate record does not contain a transcript of that proceeding, a settled statement, or any other reference suggesting what happened. Although the record contains a copy of the brief submitted by Jane and her husbands’ attorney for the June 26, 2008 proceeding, it does not contain the brief, if any, filed by counsel for the other siblings. The next-dated document in the record is the interlocutory judgment, filed July 28, 2008.
In these circumstances, we deem the record inadequate to review Jane and her husband’s contentions concerning the allocation of interests. A judgment is presumed correct on appeal; if the record is inadequate, the appellant is deemed to have defaulted and the judgment is affirmed. (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416 (Gee).) Here, we are without a complete record of the arguments made by the parties regarding the issue of ownership shares, and the court’s reasoning on those issues. The absence of a complete record is particularly troublesome, because the trial record is disjointed and extremely complicated. Therefore, having failed to present a complete record on appeal, Jane and her husband have forfeited their contentions challenging the court’s ultimate determination of ownership interests as reflected in the interlocutory judgment. (See Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 [failure to provide transcript of hearing at which court rendered ruling constituted a forfeiture of any challenge to the ruling on appeal]; Gee, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416 [same].)
In any event, on the record presented, Jane and her husband’s specific challenges lack merit. According to their opening brief on appeal, the court fixed the interests of the parties by awarding the parents, Jack, Jane, and Shwu-Huey a percentage interest equal to their respective percentage of the down payment for the Alhambra home, and then awarding each surviving sibling a one-seventh share of the deceased parents’ interest. Jane and her husband identify three problems with the court’s allocation of interests.
First, they find an inconsistency in the way Jane and Shwu-Huey were treated. Shwu-Huey contributed approximately 4 percent of the down payment, and was given credit for that contribution in the interlocutory judgment. At trial, Jane testified that the money Shwu-Huey contributed to the down payment for the Alhambra house was a gift from the father. Jane contributed about 4 percent of the down payment, and was given credit for that contribution in the interlocutory judgment. But Jane claims that her parents gave her an 85 percent ownership interest. She asserts that “the Parents’ gift to the daughter who had done nothing to help acquire the house [Shwu-Huey] was honored and retained; while the Parents’ gift to the daughter who had obtained the mortgage by using her and her husband’s own credit [Jane], and paid that mortgage for 24 years, was thrown out!” (Underlining and emphasis in original.)
Of course, the trial court rejected Jane’s claim to an 85 percent interest because it did not credit her and her husband’s testimony that the parents had given them such an interest. We do not second-guess that determination on appeal. Moreover, as we have stated, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the presumption of section 662 was rebutted, that Jane was not entitled to an 85 percent interest, and that a resulting trust was created.
Second, Jane and her husband assert that when the court calculated Jack’s proportionate share of the Alhambra house, it gave him credit for his entire $16,981 contribution to the down payment, even though the evidence showed that in the 1998 refinance he received a payment of $12,000. Jane and her husband assert that Jack’s share of the Alhambra house should have been reduced proportionally. However, they do not elaborate on the claim—they fail to adequately cite to the record, fail to provide argument, and fail to cite any authority. We thus deem the issue forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) Moreover, we note that the premise of the argument appears mistaken. Jack’s contribution of $16,981 constituted approximately 33 percent of the $51,209 down payment, yet the interlocutory judgment awarded him only a 28.45 percent interest in the Alhambra house. Thus, apparently he did not receive full credit for his contribution to the down payment.
Third, Jane and her husband note that the court considered Jane’s written communications to her brothers as evidence that she did not own an 85 percent interest in the Alhambra house, but not as evidence proving that she owed the interest she claimed in the communications, around 33 percent. They ask: “How could the ‘compromise letters’ be ‘clear and convincing evidence’ in the one instance but not be ‘clear and convincing evidence’ in the other?” The answer, of course, is that the court was not required to take Jane’s communications at face value. The court could reasonably conclude, on the entire record, that the communications constituted admissions by Jane that she owned less than 85 percent, but at the same time conclude that Jane inflated the interest she claimed in the communications.
IV. Phillip Thong’s Report
Jane and her husband contend that the trial court erred in disregarding the audit report of Phillip Thong in calculating the offsets to which they were entitled for mortgage payments, property tax, insurance, and maintenance. Thong calculated that they paid $146,120.08 in mortgage payments, $5,390.03 in property taxes, $455.22 in insurance, and $54 in maintenance, for a total of $152,019.33. The interlocutory judgment, however, gives them an offset of $22,400 for “contributions toward encumbrances,” and $5,832 for “taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs,” for a total of $28,232. Jane and her husband complain that “[t]here is no explanation for [the offsets given by the court] other than the fact that it appears in the Interlocutory Judgment.”
We conclude that appellants have forfeited any challenge to the offsets in the interlocutory judgment. As we have already noted, the record on appeal is incomplete because it does not contain a full record of the June 26, 2008 proceeding at which the issues of distribution of interests and offsets were to be discussed. Therefore, like the court’s judgment on the distribution of interests, the court’s judgment on issue of offsets must be affirmed. (Gee, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.)
In any event, on the record presented, we reject the contentions made by Jane and her husband. To the extent they contend that they were entitled to offsets in the full amounts calculated by Thong, they are mistaken. Thong’s report was based solely on information supplied by Jane, and reflected only the amounts Jane paid. Jane did not keep track of the “rent” she was paid by Shwu-Huey, and did not issue receipts. Moreover, the court found Jane not to be a credible witness, and thus could reasonably suspect the accuracy of the records she presented to Thong. Further, the evidence established that Shwu-Huey’s monthly “rent” payments reimbursed Jane for all but around $200 of the monthly mortgage payments, that after the 1998 refinance Jack contributed $120 monthly to Jane for the mortgage, and that Jane was responsible for only one third of the property taxes and some percentage more than one third for the insurance. Thus, given that Thong’s report did not reflect a full accounting of all the siblings’ contributions relating to the Alhambra property, and given the court’s finding that Jane was not credible and kept no receipts, the court could reasonably conclude that Jane was not entitled to an offset for the entire amount set forth in Thong’s report.
That the parties stipulated to the appointment of Thong and to the presentation of his report did not mean that the court was required to credit Thong’s testimony or calculations. As with any other evidence presented at trial, the court was empowered to determine the weight, if any, to be given to Thong’s report and testimony.
To the extent appellants contend that the court erred in failing to consider Thong’s report at all, we find no prejudicial error. The trial record shows that Jane received at least $129,472.16 in payments from Jack and Shwu-Huey. Thong calculated that Jane paid a total of $152,019.33 in relation to the property (including mortgage, tax, insurance, and maintenance payments). As we have stated, Thong’s report did not reflect any payments received by Jane from Jack or Shwu-Huey. Thus, to determine the amount of the offset to which Jane was entitled, the amount contributed by Jack and Shwu-Huey must be deducted from Thong’s calculation of the amount paid by Jane.
According to Jane’s trial testimony, Jack made at least 59 payments of $120 to Jane. These payments were for his share of the monthly mortgage after the February 1998 refinancing. The total of such payments is $7,080.
Deducting the total amount that Jane received from Jack and Shwu-Huey ($129,472.16) from the total amount Thong calculated Jane paid ($152,019.33), the difference is $22,547.17. That figure is the approximate offset to which Jane is entitled based on the trial evidence credited by the trial court, if one considers Thong’s calculations as to the amount Jane paid. Yet, in the interlocutory judgment, Jane received a total offset of $27,232. Given that Jane received a greater offset in the interlocutory judgment than she would have been entitled to if the court had considered Thong’s report, we conclude that any error in the court’s disregarding the report was not prejudicial. (Cassim, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 801-802.)
DISPOSITION
The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Defendant Ing-Jieh Jeng and Intervenors Shwu-Huey, Ing-Song Jeng, Ing-Ming Jeng, Ing-Yann Jeng, and Ing-Pei Chang shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.
According to Jane’s testimony, beginning in January 1984, and until January 1985, Shwu Jen paid “rent” in amounts calculated by Jane. For the first six months, the monthly rent was $532.68. Thereafter, the rent increased because the variable interest rate on the original purchase money loan increased, but there was no evidence as to precisely how much it increased. Thus, conservatively calculating the rent at $532.68 for 12 months until January 1, 1985, the total is $6,392.16.
According to Jane’s testimony, since January of 1985, Shwu-Huey had paid approximately $116,000 in rent.
Adding these figures together, the total is $129,472.16.