Opinion
Civil Action 00-D-1313-E
June 26, 2001
Kathryn Dickey, Montgomery, AL., for Plaintiff.
John W. Sheffield, Christopher W. Deering, Johnston, Barton, Procter Powell, Birmingham, AL., for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, which was filed April 12, 2001. Plaintiff Diane Lilly filed a Response April 30, and Defendant issued a Reply May 7. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
"Defendant" or "Hardee's."
"Plaintiff" or "Lilly."
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The court construes the evidence and makes factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely determines whether there is more than "some metaphysical doubt" about whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Diane Lilly worked for Hardee's from July 1978 until September 1998. She was the general manager of a restaurant in Lafayette for two years and the general manager of a restaurant in Opelika from 1994 until her termination. The store was generally profitable, Lilly worked long hours, and some of Lilly's employees liked her very much.
Lilly, who is a black female, took pregnancy leave in late 1997. Some time earlier in the year, Mark Britton assumed the position of Hardee's district manager, and he oversaw ten separate stores within the district. Lilly believes that Britton supervised her more closely than her fellow general managers after she returned in late May 1998.
On August 19, 1998, Britton wrote up Lilly for numerous problems at her restaurant. These problems included deficiencies in or with: payroll, staffing, cleanliness, customer satisfaction, office organization, overproduction, employee morale and performance, and tardiness in reporting to work. Britton placed her under a 30-day counseling period and warned that she would be terminated if the store's problems persisted. Britton returned to the store August 22 and noticed continued problems with service, staffing, and cleanliness. He also observed that Lilly reported to work late. He fired Lilly September 12.
IV. DISCUSSION
Lilly brings claims under Title VII and Section 1981, alleging that she was illegally terminated because of her race and/or her sex. Hardee's denies these allegations.
The ultimate issue is whether Britton acted with a discriminatory intent. A plaintiff may prove her case with direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence. "Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, proves the existence of discrimination without inference or presumption."Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998). Lilly claims she has produced direct evidence of racial animus from the fact that Charles Darnell, a district manager of some unidentified district, told her that "the company needed to hire more white general managers." Lilly claims she has produced direct evidence of sexual animus from the following: (1) Britton told her that "pregnant women are lazy" and "they don't do their jobs"; (2) Britton partially criticized Lilly's performance because she let a "pregnant cashier" work the drive-through window; and (3) Britton told her that "he hate(s) to terminate males" because they are "heads of their household." Britton made this first statement in early 1998, the second in August 1998, and the last in early March 1997.
Lilly Aff. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 11; Lilly's Dep. at 203. Lilly's deposition also reflects that Britton may have said that "all women are lazy when they're pregnant." (Id. at 204.) This discrepancy in testimony does not affect the court's analysis.
Resp. at 7 (unnumbered).
Mot. at 2-3; Pl. Ex. 7.
The court finds that none of these statements constitute direct evidence. Darnell did not terminate Lilly, and so his statements, at most, might be considered circumstantial evidence. See Hamilton v. Montgomery County Ed. of Educ., 122 F. Supp.2d 1273, 1279 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Similarly, Britton's statements are probative only if one infers: (1) that Britton treated pregnant women disparately because of their gender, rather than his perception that they are lazy; and (2) that Britton's reluctance to terminate males influenced his decisions regarding females. Because the inference would have to be drawn, the statements are not direct evidence.
Lilly has only indirect of discrimination, and so theMcDonnell-Douglas framework governs. A plaintiff must first offer evidence that raises an inference of discriminatory intent. In discriminatory discharge cases, this generally requires showing that: (1) Plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) Plaintiff was qualified for the job from which she was discharged; (3) Plaintiff was discharged in fact; and (4) that her former position was filled by someone not in the protected class, or that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside her class. See Moore v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 1412, 1417-19 (M.D. Ala. 1997), 178 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) (table); Givhan v. Electronic Eng'rs, Inc., 4 F. Supp.2d 1331, 1339 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
If the plaintiff carries her burden, then the defendant has the exceedingly light burden of proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show that the employer's proffered reasons are a pretextual cover for discrimination. See Meeks v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994).
If the employee does not offer sufficient evidence showing that each and every proffered reason is pretextual, then summary judgment is mandatory. See Chatman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997)). If the employee meets this burden, however, then summary judgment is generally inappropriate, and the trier of fact may then infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence and the falsity of the employer's explanation.See id. at 1025 n. 11.
Lilly has raised an inference of race and sex discrimination. She is a black woman, who was terminated and replaced by a white man. She was a general manager for several years, and evidence of such a long tenure can support an inference that she was at least minimally qualified for the position. See Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1386 n. 7 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Burney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 196 F.R.D. 659, 670 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (discussing burden of production).
Hardee's then proffers a long list of reasons for its decision. The `Employee Performance Record' prepared by Britton on September 12, 1998 states that the problems with staffing, office cleanliness, and customer satisfaction had continued. According to Britton, "This effect[s] the overall performance of this unit" and "impacts guest relations." it is perfectly legitimate to fire someone for failing to perform up to snuff.
Def. Ex. 14 to Lilly's Dep.
The issue, then, is whether Lilly can show that all these reasons are merely pretextual covers for discrimination. This is done by pointing to "`such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons . . . that a reasonably factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.'"Hamilton, 122 F. Supp.2d at 1281 (quoting Combs, 106 F.3d at 1539). The court finds that Lilly has met her burden with respect to her claim of sex discrimination, but not race discrimination.
Lilly has produced insufficient evidence of racial animus for a jury to find in her favor. Almost all of her attempts to show pretext amount to quarrels with the wisdom of Britton's decision. Such arguments fail, however, for courts are not super-personnel boards, and we do not second-guess the business judgments made by employers. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Moreover, Lilly admits that at least some of Britton's criticisms are valid. For example, the store, at minimum, had staffing problems the day she was fired. An employee who admits failing to meet her employer's expectations usually negates any inference of discrimination, see Pearson v. Prime Healthcare Corp., 2000 WL 33224801 at *5 (M.D. Ala. 2000), aff'd, ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. 2001) (table), and an employee who cannot knock down all of the employer's proffered reasons cannot avoid summary judgment, see Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037 (citingCombs, 106 F.3d at 1543).
Lilly's Dep. at 151.
Lilly attempts to show pretext from several other facts, but none of them are persuasive. First, Darnell's statements about wanting to hire white managers are wholly irrelevant to an analysis of Britton's actions, given that Darnell was not Lilly's supervisor, and she does not argue that he influenced Britton's decision. See Pearson, supra at *4 ("to the extent the comment has probative value, it is rendered a nullity by the fact that [the speaker] played no role in [the supervisor's] decision to terminate.")
Second, although Lilly has tried to show that Britton enforced the work rules selectively because he did not terminate Pat Patterson, who is a white male, Lilly has not shown that she is similarly-situated to Patterson in all relevant respects. To pick one example from among many, Lilly's store had more customer complaints than any other store in the district during 1997. Employers may take different actions against employees believed to have different work records, yet not run afoul of workplace employment laws. See, e.g., Jordan v. Warehouse Servs., Inc., 81 F. Supp.2d 1257, 1268-69 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (granting summary judgment when employee did not point to other workers with similar performance records who were retained).
Reply at 5; Def. Ex. 24 to Lilly's Dep.
Third, Lilly argues that Britton is biased because he hired one of his friends to replace her, he did not post the vacancy, and he passed over a black female who says she would have been interested in the job and claims to have been the most qualified for it. There are numerous problems with this argument, and the court will address only some of them here. The first problem is that even the plaintiff concedes that she believes Britton forced her out and chose Patterson because Patterson is Britton's friend. This is tantamount to saying that Britton acted on a reason that is race-neutral, although, perhaps, distasteful. Cf.Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (an "employer may fire an employee for . . . a bad reason. . . .") Moreover, the failure to post merely raises an inference of discrimination. This inference, however, can be rebutted.See, e.g., Dowell v. Prime Healthcare Corp., 2001 WL 611198 at *7-11 (M.D. Ala. 2001). For the reasons explained above, Hardee's has done so.
Core Aff. ¶ 2.
The court has carefully considered Lilly's remaining arguments. Most appear more properly calculated for use in a case alleging retaliation or disability discrimination. Overall, the court has been able to isolate nothing more than scattered pieces of circumstantial evidence of racial animus, here and there, that are insufficient to allow a rational jury to find in Lilly's favor. Accordingly, the motion is due to be granted on this count. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (metaphysical doubt);Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1025 n. 11 (insufficient evidence of pretext); Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 954 (11th Cir. 1991).
The sex discrimination claim, however, will go to the jury. Statements by an employer are strong circumstantial evidence because they reflect directly on the employer's state of mind. Although Britton never made any race-based statements, he made several statements suggesting a prejudice against women. One such statement, in fact, was in Lilly's evaluation written merely two weeks before she was fired. Amazingly, Britton's declaration does not deny that sex was a factor in Lilly's termination, and a rational jury could reasonably believe that an employer who says he is reluctant to fire males is unable to bracket an employee's sex when he evaluates his or her performance.
Bright line rules rarely surface in employment law, and the court's findings are limited to the factual record presented. On this record, it does not matter whether Britton proffered one reason for firing Lilly or twenty. It is a question of fact whether Britton fired Lilly for the neutral reasons he stated or because she is a woman. This question is reserved for the people of this community, and the court shall not invade that sacred province. See Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 1998), aff'g in relevant part 931 F. Supp. 773, 797 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (employer's use of racial epithets can undermine the proffered reasons for his adverse employment action); Daniel v. City of Lanett, 2000 WL 1863485 at *4-5 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (same for statements suggesting retaliatory animus).
V. ORDER
It is CONSIDERED and ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED on Count Two of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and DENIED in all other respects.