Opinion
Civil No. 99-1613 (JRT/FLN)
September 30, 2002
Carolyn Guy, Schermer Guy, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
Frank Vogl and Sarah C. Madison, Best Flanagan, LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant.
MEMORDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Elaine Liljedahl ("Liljedahl"), a former employee of defendant Ryder Student Transportation Services ("Ryder"), is suing for age and disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 612, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. §§ 363.01, et seq., and the Minnesota Age Discrimination Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.81, et seq. This matter is now before the Court on Ryder's motion for summary judgment and Liljedahl's motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the Court now grants Ryder's motion and denies Liljedahl's motion.
BACKGROUND
Ryder is a bus company that provides transportation services for public school districts. Liljedahl was a contract manager at Ryder's Oakdale terminal for eleven years. In this job, she was responsible for the overall operations of the facility, including hiring, training, and monitoring bus drivers, maintaining safety standards, coordinating operations and maintenance, managing the facility's profitability, and maintaining good relations with customers. Oakdale's two largest customers were the North St. Paul School District and the St. Paul School District. Liljedahl's supervisor at Ryder was Bruce Dischinger.
Liljedahl was diagnosed with lung cancer in early December 1996, and had surgery to remove part of her lung on December 26, 1996. The surgery was apparently successful. Liljedahl was on paid leave from Ryder from approximately December 20, 1996 through March 2, 1997. On February 19, 1997, Liljedahl informed Dischinger by letter that she would be returning to work on March 3, 1997. The letter stated that she would be returning to work half time, which to her meant "as tolerated." (Vogl Aff. Ex. A60.) Liljedahl included a note from her physician, Dr. Nancy Nelson, which stated: "I have recommended [Liljedahl] return to work half time on March 3." (Guy Aff. Ex. 8.) Dr. Nelson has testified that this statement did not represent "any judgment about [Liljedahl's] work ability," and that Liljedahl herself requested the part time restriction. (Guy Aff. Ex. 3 ("Nelson Dep.") at 25-26.) A few weeks after Liljedahl returned to work, Ryder assigned another employee to assist her, who stayed at Oakdale through mid-June 1997.
Dr. Nelson diagnosed Liljedahl with emphysema in August 1996, several months before her cancer diagnosis. Liljedahl's complaint to the Minnesota Human Rights Department mentioned only cancer, and the only disease mentioned in her Amended Complaint before this Court is cancer.
In July 1997, Ryder received complaints from two of its customers about the Oakdale facility. One of these customers, the St. Paul School District, called the poor service in the previous year "unprecedented in the history of the St. Paul Public Schools transportation operations." That summer, Ryder conducted a driver survey at Oakdale, in which Liljedahl received scores ranging from 1.44 to 2.39, on a scale of zero to four, with four being the highest. In August 1997, Dischinger conducted an annual appraisal of Liljedahl. In this appraisal, Dischinger found that Liljedahl did not perform up to expectations in many areas, including recruiting, customer service, safety training, and relations with other employees. Dischinger also stated that Liljedahl had "difficulty accepting points of view that differ from [her] own," and that he didn't observe any efforts she made to improve her managerial skills. (Guy Aff. Ex. 3.) Finally, Dischinger noted that people inside and outside the company found Liljedahl to be "rude," "arrogant," "disrespectful," "not a team player," and other unfavorable characterizations. (Id.) Ryder imposed a 90-day probation period on Liljedahl, and required her to meet a number of objectives during that time. Dischinger asked Liljedahl to respond to the appraisal and to discuss any concerns she had. Liljedahl responded on August 27, 1997, and attempted to rebut the items raised in her appraisal. Ryder claims that this response was defensive and reflected a refusal to abide by the terms of Liljedahl's probation. Liljedahl contends that this memo constitutes a complaint about her treatment by Ryder, and a request for accommodation for her disability. On September 3, 1997, Ryder fired Liljedahl. After leaving Ryder, Liljedahl worked at several full-time jobs in which she requested no accommodations for any disability.
ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. Liljedahl's Federal Claims
The Court first notes that all of Liljedahl's claims under federal law are time-barred. The ADA, ADEA, and Title VII all require that charges of discrimination be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory event. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Liljedahl was discharged from Ryder on September 3, 1997, thus giving her until June 3, 1998 to file a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). It is undisputed that she did not file a charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights ("MDHR") until July 28, 1998, 328 days after she was discharged. Although it is unclear when Liljedahl filed her EEOC complaint, neither party disputes that it was filed after the MDHR charge. Liljedahl appears to concede that her federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and makes almost no argument on this point. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment for Ryder on Counts One and Two.
III. Age Discrimination Claims
Ryder argues that Liljedahl has not demonstrated a prima facie case of age discrimination. The Court agrees. Liljedahl has presented no evidence in support of her various age discrimination claims. Nor has she made any arguments in response to Ryder's motion on these claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Liljedahl's age discrimination claims present no genuine issue of material fact, and will therefore grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on Counts Three, Four, and Six.
IV. Disability Discrimination Claim under the MHRA
The thrust of Liljedahl's case involves her allegation that Ryder discriminated against her because she was disabled. Ryder seeks summary judgment on this claim, arguing that Liljedahl has not demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination. Liljedahl seeks partial summary judgment, asking the Court to determine as a matter of law that that she is disabled and that Ryder had a duty to provide her with a reasonable accommodation.
Discrimination claims under the MHRA are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Sprenger v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1111 (8th Cir. 2001); Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander Sons, Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995). Under this framework, Liljedahl must first establish a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. Sprenger, 253 F.3d at 1111. The burden then shifts to Ryder to rebut this showing with a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for its conduct. Id. The burden finally shifts back to Liljedahl, who can rebut Ryder's justification by showing it to be mere pretext. Id. To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the MHRA, Liljedahl must show that: (1) she is a "disabled" person within the statute's meaning; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job (either without reasonable accommodation); and (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances from which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996). Under the MHRA, a "disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment." Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 13. "Major life activities" include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, working, sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching. Taylor v. Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2000).
Ryder argues first that Liljedahl has not made out a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she has not established that she is disabled. Ryder also contends that plaintiff has not shown that her claimed disability, cancer, materially limits one of her major life activities.
The mere fact that a person suffers from cancer or another serious illness is not sufficient to establish that the person is disabled under the MHRA. See Demming v. Housing Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth, 66 F.3d 950, 955 (8th Cir. 1995); Sigurdson, 532 N.W.2d at 229 (finding that plaintiff's diabetes alone was insufficient for him to qualify as disabled); Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319 (finding that even though plaintiff had coronary artery disease and other impairments, plaintiff had not shown that the impairments restricted his ability to perform any major life functions). To the extent that Liljedahl contends her disability is cancer, she offers no evidence other than the fact of her cancer and surgery.
The Court finds that Liljedahl has not presented evidence that her cancer materially limits her in the major life activity of working. The only evidence that is possibly relevant to this claim are the restrictions supposedly imposed by Liljedahl's physician, Dr. Nelson. Liljedahl argues that she was only permitted to work part-time following her surgery in March 1997. As evidence, she points to the February 17 note from Dr. Nelson in which Nelson "recommended" that Liljedahl work part-time.
Dr. Nelson's deposition testimony, however, undermines Liljedahl's claims. Dr. Nelson testified that Liljedahl requested the restriction, telling Dr. Nelson "in the course of . . . conversation that she was hoping to go back to work in two weeks and planned to go half-time." (Nelson Dep. at 25.) Dr. Nelson stated that she felt this was a "reasonable request," but that she "did not make any type of judgment about [Liljedahl's] work ability." (Nelson Dep. at 26.) This is supported by the "Family and Medical Leave Certification" that Dr. Nelson filled out for Ryder on Liljedahl's behalf in April 1997. In that document, Dr. Nelson certified that she had treated Liljedahl for "lung resection surgery and recuperation," but she did not answer the question: "Is employee able to perform work of any kind?" (Guy Aff. Ex. 8.) Dr. Nelson's declining to answer this question supports her testimony that she had no opinion on whether Liljedahl needed restrictions.
The record also shows that Liljedahl's cancer surgeon, Dr. John Shearen, did not feel that she needed any work restrictions. Dr. Shearen testified that when he last examined Liljedahl, on February 10, 1997, she was doing "very well" and "from a functional standpoint it appeared at that point that she would be able to return to work" without any limitations. (Guy Aff. Ex. 4 ("Shearen Dep.") at 14.) Dr. Shearen also testified that "the limitations I put on people are pretty much dependant on what they tell me they're capable of," but that in Liljedahl's case, he had no "indication that she asked me or told me that she desired or requested or required limitations." (Id.) Moreover, Dr. Shearen said that nothing he observed indicated that Liljedahl needed any limitations at work.
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Liljedahl plainly cannot demonstrate that she was "disabled" due to cancer. Liljedahl argues, however, that her disability is not limited to cancer. She now claims for the first time that her disability consists of emphysema and respiratory trouble caused by the cancer surgery. She contends that this disability materially limits her in the major life activity of "breathing."
Ryder notes that plaintiff made no reference to emphysema or respiratory difficulties in her complaints to the MHRD or before this Court. Ryder argues that such claims are therefore barred. Liljedahl contends that her alleged respiratory disability was pled with sufficient specificity because her complaint specifically mentions her lung surgery. In order for this Court to consider Liljedahl's allegations of a respiratory disability, the allegations must be "like or reasonably related to" the substance of the charges she brought before the MHRD. Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 6 88 (8th Cir. 1998); Tart v. Hill Behan Lumber Co., 31 F.3d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court finds that Liljedahl's present allegations of breathing difficulties did "gr[o]w out of the discrimination charge" she filed with the MHRD, and therefore are not barred. The Court notes, however, that simply because these allegations are sufficiently pleaded does not mean they are sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
Liljedahl presents scant evidence to support this allegation. As with her cancer allegations, she relies heavily upon the testimony of Drs. Nelson and Shearen. Although the physicians testified as to Liljedahl's breathing, the Court finds that neither have provided evidence that her breathing is materially impaired so as to make her disabled under the statute. For example, Dr. Nelson testified that Liljedahl has breathing difficulties, but she also testified that Liljedahl's breathing improves when she uses an inhaler. Moreover, Dr. Nelson testified that she performed no tests to authoritatively establish whether Liljedahl's breathing, once treated with medication, was significantly worse than that of the average person in the general population. (Nelson Dep. at 51.)
Contrary to Liljedahl's assertion, Dr. Nelson never opined that Liljedahl's breathing would be impaired even with "maximal medication." (See Pl. Reply at 4.) Dr. Shearen also testified that although Liljedahl has emphysema, he cannot determine whether her breathing difficulties are significantly worse due to her cancer surgery. (See Shearen Dep. at 32-35.) The record also shows that Liljedahl worked several full-time jobs after leaving Ryder, in which she did not request any accommodations. The evidence thus suggests that to the extent Liljedahl has a breathing impairment, it is controlled through medication. "A person whose . . . impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a major life activity." Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999); Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999). Aside from her doctors' equivocal testimony and her own allegations, Liljedahl presents no evidence that she has a respiratory impairment that, when treated, substantially or materially limits one of her major life activities. The Court therefore finds this insufficient to raise a genuine question of material fact on the question of her disability. On this ground alone, Ryder's motion for summary judgment should be granted, and Liljedahl's denied, on Count Five.
Even if Liljedahl does have a respiratory disability under the MHRA, she still could not prevail because she has not demonstrated that Ryder knew about this disability. Under the MHRA "'[r]easonable accommodation' means steps which must be taken to accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified disabled person." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(6) (emphasis added). See Cravens v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff can only establish claim of failure to engage in the interactive accommodation process by showing that employer knew about plaintiff's disability); Greer v. Emerson Electric Co., 185 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination where she produced no evidence that employer knew of her alleged disability). Therefore, if Ryder did not know about Liljedahl's disability, it was under no obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation.
Liljedahl claims that she made several requests for accommodations at work, and that these requests should have alerted Ryder to her disability, and triggered the company's duty to engage in an interactive process to determine what accommodations were needed. An employer's failure to engage in this interactive process generally raises a sufficient factual question to prevent summary judgment. Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1021. To establish that Ryder failed to participate in an interactive process, Liljedahl must show that Ryder knew about her disability. Id. It was her responsibility to inform Ryder that she needed an accommodation. Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prod., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1999); Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1998). A request for accommodation need not "invoke the magic words 'reasonable accommodation,' [but] the notice nonetheless must make clear that the employee wants assistance for . . . her disability. In other words, the employer must know of both the disability and the employee's desire for accommodations for that disability." Ballard v. Rubin, 284 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added); Lowery v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 244 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir. 2001).
It is undisputed that Ryder knew of Liljedahl's cancer diagnosis and surgery. Liljedahl presents no evidence, however, that Ryder knew of her respiratory difficulties. Liljedahl claims that Ryder's knowledge of her lung cancer and surgery, combined with her purported requests for accommodation, should have put Ryder on notice that she suffered from a respiratory disability that required accommodations. Her support consists of three documents: (1) the February 17, 1997 letter to Dischinger, which discussed her returning to work part-time on March 3 (the "February letter"); (2) a memo to Dischinger dated May 16, 1997, in which Liljedahl responds to critiques from Dischinger about her attitude and job performance (the "May memo"); and (3) her August 27, 1997 response to the annual appraisal by Dischinger (the "August memo"). The Court finds that these documents neither provided notice of any disability, nor constituted requests for reasonable accommodations.
Liljedahl relies primarily on her February letter, which was accompanied by a note from Dr. Nelson. The letter states in relevant part: "I'm due back [March 3] 'half time' — which in my mind means 'as tolerated.'" (Vogl Aff. Ex. A60) (emphasis added). Liljedahl claims that this letter constitutes a request for accommodation, and refers to Dr. Nelson's note as "medical certification." This is even though Dr. Nelson testified that she did not evaluate plaintiff's ability to work, that the part-time recommendation was Liljedahl's idea, and that Dr. Nelson anticipated that the limitation would be for a short period of time. (See Nelson Dep. at 27.) Dr. Nelson also specifically testified that she made no evaluation of Liljedahl's work ability; this is reflected in the Medical Leave Certification that the doctor completed. The evidence shows that Liljedahl apparently returned to work full time, and never indicated to Ryder that she was unable to perform her job because of any disability. Moreover, neither the February letter nor Dr. Nelson's note indicate that Liljedahl suffered any sort of respiratory impairment. Neither does the evidence support Liljedahl's claim that Ryder's knowledge of her cancer surgery is enough to provide notice that she had a respiratory disability. The Court therefore finds that the February letter and Dr. Nelson's note do not demonstrate that Liljedahl was disabled, and do not constitute a request for reasonable accommodations.
Dr. Nelson's note states in full: "Ms. Liljedahl has been recuperating from surgery. I have recommended that she return to work half-time on March 3." (Guy Aff. Ex. 8.)
Liljedahl implies that the fact that she had a portion of her lung removed should make it obvious that she had a respiratory disability. Her surgery alone, however, is not enough to demonstrate such a disability. Dr. Shearen testified that in some cases, removal of half a lung would improve a patient's breathing. (Shearen Dep. at 28.) Dr. Shearen noted that this was not true for Liljedahl. Nevertheless, this shows t hat, contrary to Liljedahl's suggestions, the mere fact of her surgery does not mean her breathing was impaired.
Liljedahl also claims that the May memo to Dischinger should be construed as a request for accommodation. Liljedahl wrote this memo in response to criticism of her job performance and attitude. In the memo, Liljedahl defends herself, stating, "I work between 9 and 12 hours a day now without coming in any earlier. . . . And, if I remember correctly, I still have not gotten full time plus overtime clearance from my doctor." (Guy Aff. Ex. 2.) This statement still makes no allusion to any respiratory difficulties, and demonstrates that Liljedahl was able to work complete days without accommodations. The Court also finds that the evidence contradicts Liljedahl's implication that she was operating under some sort of restrictions from Dr. Nelson. As the Court has noted, Dr. Nelson imposed no such restrictions. Moreover, no evidence in the record shows that Dr. Nelson implied — either to Liljedahl or to Ryder — that Liljedahl needed any further "clearance" to work normal or overtime hours.
Finally, Liljedahl claims that her August 1997 response to Dischinger's appraisal constitutes a request for accommodation. As discussed above, Dischinger listed performance deficiencies and unfavorable comments from customers and fellow employees. Liljedahl claims that her two-page memo requested accommodations, citing this passage: "You also say my physical status has nothing to do with how much I was able to do? I am still healing and on pain medication." (Guy Aff. Ex. 5.) Although Liljedahl refers to her "physical status," she gives no indication of any respiratory disability, nor does she in any way request an accommodation. Rather, the Court finds that these comments, as well as those in her May 16 memo, were a response to critical evaluations from her supervisor, and were not requests for accommodation. See Lowery, 244 F.3d at 660 (finding that plaintiff's request to change shifts was not a request for accommodation but rather a response to a disciplinary suspension).
Based on the evidence submitted, the Court finds that Liljedahl has not demonstrated a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the MHRA. She has not shown that any impairment materially affects one of her major life activities. Nor has she shown that Ryder knew about her alleged breathing disability, or that she asked for a reasonable accommodation for this impairment. For these reasons, the Court will grant Ryder's motion for summary judgment as to Count Five. For the same reasons, Liljedahl's motion for partial summary judgment will also be denied
V. Retaliation Claim
Count Seven of the Amended Complaint alleges that Ryder fired Liljedahl in retaliation for her criticism of company policy and of its refusal to grant her reasonable accommodations. As with her other discrimination claims, Liljedahl cannot survive summary judgment unless she demonstrates a prima facie case of retaliation. In order to do so, Liljedahl must show that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) Ryder took adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her conduct and Ryder's action against her. Kunferman v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1997); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1982). The Court finds that Liljedahl cannot make such a showing.
First, Liljedahl has not demonstrated that she engaged in any protected conduct. An employee engages in statutorily protected activity if she opposes an action "based on a reasonable belief that [her] employer has engaged in discriminatory conduct." EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir. 1998). Liljedahl argues that her August memo to Dischinger was protected activity. She claims that her statements were criticisms of Ryder, and that she made them pursuant to Ryder's "open door" policy for employee critiques. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. Although Liljedahl did not refrain from criticizing Ryder in the memo to Dischinger, nothing in it indicates that she felt Ryder was discriminating against her or was implementing a discriminatory policy. Rather, the memo is a point-by-point rebuttal of what Liljedahl clearly felt were unfair criticisms of her job performance. Because Liljedahl provides no evidence that she reasonably believed Ryder or Dischinger were discriminating against her, the Court finds that she was not engaged in statutorily protected activity.
Liljedahl also contends that the August 27 memo is protected because it is a request for accommodation. The Court has already found, however, that this statement does not constitute a request for reasonable accommodation under the MHRA. See Part IV.
Liljedahl's retaliation claim also fails because she cannot establish a causal connection between any allegedly protected activity and her dismissal. In support, Liljedahl offers little more than the fact that she was fired days after writing the August memo. Liljedahl must do more, however, than show a mere "temporal connection between her protected activity and an adverse employment action. . . ." Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 685 (8th Cir. 2001). It is true that some cases have recognized that temporal proximity is significant in showing a causal connection. In those cases, however, temporal proximity is not enough. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the "causal connection requirement may be satisfied by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as a showing that the employer has actual or imputed knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse employment action follows closely in time." Dietrich v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319, 327 (Minn. 1995) (quoting Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 445) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Liljedahl has shown only that the two incidents occurred close in time. Liljedahl claims to find a retaliatory motive in Dischinger's testimony that her August 27 memo was the "sole triggering event" for his decision to fire Liljedahl shows a retaliatory motive. (See Uy 2d Aff. Ex. I at 78-79.) Reading Dischinger's testimony in context, however, shows that she was not fired for the letter in and of itself, but rather for what, to Ryder, was Liljedahl's refusal to address performance problems or to accept job criticism. Therefore, the Court finds that Liljedahl has presented insufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive by Ryder, and cannot demonstrate the required causal connection.
Liljedahl also fails to demonstrate that Ryder's asserted reason for firing her is pretext. Although Liljedahl did receive favorable job reviews in the past, the record clearly contains evaluations and conduct similar to those for which she was fired. Thus, the Court finds that Liljedahl has not shown Ryder's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to be pretext.
Consequently, because Liljedahl cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, the Court will grant Ryder's motion for summary judgment as to Count Seven.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 111] is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 122] is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.