Opinion
No. 2-146 / 01-0855.
Filed May 31, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Shirleen Light appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's award of benefits from the Second Injury Fund. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jason D. Neifert of Max Schott Associates, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Hecht, JJ.
Shirleen Light appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review reversing the workers' compensation commissioner's award of benefits from the Second Injury Fund (Fund). We reverse.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings. Throughout her lifetime, Light has suffered three separate scheduled member injuries. In 1974, she injured her right leg at her home. The injury required Light to wear a brace for approximately three months and undergo physical therapy. In 1993, Light injured her left hand while working on a conveyor belt at United Parcel Service (UPS). She sustained a complex hand laceration and crushed her second metacarpal. Following this injury, Light did not work for approximately one year. She was given a seventeen percent impairment rating to the left hand and returned to work. In 1994, Light experienced pain in her right knee while working at UPS. Light underwent knee surgery and thereafter received right lower extremity permanent impairment ratings ranging from seven to ten percent.
Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(a)-(t) specifies the scheduled injuries and sets forth the compensation payable for such injuries.
On September 11, 1995, Light filed a petition against the Fund requesting industrial disability benefits based on the combined effects of the 1974 injury to her right leg and the 1993 injury to her left hand. Although UPS was named as a defendant in the petition, the company was designated a "non-party" because it had paid all medical and indemnity benefits owed in connection with the 1993 injury. On April 12, 1996, Light filed a claim against UPS based on her 1994 right leg injury. The Fund was not a named party in the 1996 petition.
Industrial disability measures an injured worker's lost earning capacity. Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 157 (Iowa 1996).
Liability for an industrial disability caused by two successive scheduled member injuries is apportioned between the employer and the Second Injury Fund when (1) the employee has either lost, or lost the use of, a hand, arm, foot, leg, or eyes; (2) the employee sustained the loss, or the loss of use of another such member or organ, through a work related injury; and (3) there is some permanent disability from the injuries. Iowa Code § 85.64; Second Injury Fund v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994).
The agency consolidated Light's petitions for an arbitration hearing held on November 13, 1997. The arbitration decision established (1) Light sustained a work-related injury in 1993 to her hand, but no additional indemnity benefits were then owed by UPS; (2) the 1974 injury to the right leg did not cause permanent impairment; (3) Light was not eligible for Fund benefits as a result of the combined effect of the 1974 and 1993 injuries; and (4) Light sustained a seven percent permanent partial impairment to the right leg as a result of the 1994 injury and was entitled to 15.4 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits.
On December 15, 1998, Light filed a second petition against the Fund alleging a claim based upon the combined effect of the 1993 hand injury and the 1994 leg injury. After a hearing, a deputy commissioner concluded claim preclusion barred Light's second action against the Fund because it could have been joined and tried with Light's first Fund claim.
On intra-agency appeal, the Commissioner determined Light was not precluded from litigating her second claim against the Fund and reversed the arbitration decision. The Commissioner held:
No claim preclusion has been shown. Claimant is allowed to first pursue a claim against the employer to determine whether a work-related injury has occurred. A favorable showing has created a claim against the Second Injury Fund of Iowa, which claimant pursued as of the date of the filing of the petition, December 15, 1998. It cannot be stated that the evidence used in the hearing against the employer is the same evidence claimant can rely upon to litigate [her] claim against the defendant Fund. The claim against the defendant Fund is for benefits to compensate claimant for any loss of earning capacity she has due to the combination of the two scheduled losses.
After reviewing the relevant evidence, the Commissioner found Light sustained a thirty percent industrial loss as a result of the combined effects of the 1993 hand injury and the 1994 leg injury. On judicial review, the district court reversed, concluding Light's second action against the Fund was barred by claim preclusion. Light appeals.
II. Standard of Review. We review a district court's ruling on judicial review of a workers' compensation case for correction of errors of law. Blanchard v. Belle Plaine/Vinton Motor Supply Co., 596 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). Our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function. IBP v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). In determining whether the law has been correctly applied, we are bound by the workers' compensation commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same conclusion. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000).
III. Merits. Light contends the district court erred in holding the workers' compensation commissioner committed an error of law by allowing her to litigate on the merits her second claim against the Fund. We agree.
"Res judicata as claim preclusion applies when a litigant has brought an action, an adjudication has occurred, and the litigant is thereafter foreclosed from further litigation on the claim." Israel v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Iowa, 339 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983). "Claim preclusion bars further litigation on the same claim or cause of action . . ." Leuchtenmacher v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 860 (Iowa 1990). "A cause of action is the same when the asserted invasion of rights is the same." Westway Trading Corp. v. River Terminal Corp., 314 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1982). To determine "whether the cause of action is the same, we examine the protected right, the alleged wrong, and the relevant evidence." Id. Claim preclusion is based on the principle that a party may not split or try his claim piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put forth his entire defense in the case on trial. An adjudication in a former suit between the same parties on the same claim is final as to all matters which could have been presented to the court for determination. A party must litigate all matters growing out of his claim at one time and not in separate actions.
Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 441 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted).
The Fund argues Light's 1997 hearing "involved substantially the same evidence as the later hearing . . ." See B B Asphalt Co. v. T.S. McShane Co., 242 N.W.2d 279, 287 (Iowa 1976) (holding "identity of cause of action is established when the same evidence will maintain both actions"). "However, the right to join related claims does not bar subsequent litigation of a distinct claim that was not joined." Leuchtenmacher, 460 N.W.2d 858 at 860 (citing Westway, 314 N.W.2d at 401). Because Light's first and second Fund claims are distinct and different, claim preclusion does not bar the second claim which is the subject of this case.
Light's first claim against the Fund sought compensation for the combined effects of a 1974 right leg injury and a 1993 left hand injury. In contrast, her second claim against the Fund seeks compensation for the combined effects of the 1993 left hand injury and the 1994 leg injury. While the agency considered some of the same evidence in the two Fund hearings, distinctly different injury combinations and accordingly different industrial disability claims were alleged and decided. Light's two Fund claims do not allege the same "natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts" nor are they "so woven together as to constitute a single claim." See Leuchtenmacher, 460 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. b). Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in its application of claim preclusion principles to this case.
IV. Conclusion. We reverse the district court's ruling on administrative appeal and remand for an order affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Huitink, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., dissents.
I dissent. I would affirm the trial court for the reasons stated in its opinion.