Summary
finding that plaintiff's complaint against multiple insurers satisfied notice pleading as to a single insurer " when viewed in the broader context of the entire complaint."
Summary of this case from In Re: Litigation, 05C-09-020-JRSOpinion
Civil Action No. 00C-01-207 HDR.
Submitted: June 27, 2000.
Decided: August 9, 2000.
Upon Motion of Defendant Commercial Union Insurance Company for a More Definite Statement of the Third Claim for Relief in Plaintiffs' First and Second Amended Complaints Denied.
Michael D. Goldman, Esq., John E. James, Esq., and Richard L. Horwitz, Esq. of Potter Anderson Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware and Robert L. Carter, Jr., Esq., Andrew M. Reidy, Esq., Daniel G. Jarcho, Esq., and John M. Clerici, Esq. of McKenna Cuneo, LLP, Washington, D.C. for plaintiffs Liggett Group Inc. and Brooke Group Holding Inc.
Donald E. Reid, Esq. of Morris, Nichols, Arsht Tunnell, Wilmington, Delaware as defense coordinator.
Donald L. Gouge, Jr., Esq. and Susan E. Kaufman, Esq. of Heiman, Aber, Goldlust Baker, Wilmington, Delaware and Theodore A. Howard, Esq. and Richard A. If ft. Esg. of Rosenman Cohn LLP, Washington, D.C. for defendant Commercial Union Insurance Company.
ORDER.
This 9th day of August, 2000, upon consideration of the briefs filed by counsel and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) Defendant Commercial Union Insurance Company ("Commercial Union'6) has moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(e). Specifically, it seeks an order requiring the repleading of the Third Claim for Relief in the First Amended Complaint of plaintiffs, Liggett Group, Inc. and Brooke Group Holding, Inc. (collectively "Liggett"), because the Third Claim is so vague that Commercial Union cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading to it.
(2) On February 4, 2000, Liggett filed its First Amended Complaint, and on May 8, 2000, it filed its Second Amended Complaint seeking insurance coverage under policies sold to Liggett by thirty-three insurers from 1970 to the present. At issue is coverage for more than 700 underlying tobacco-related bodily injury claims dating back to 1980. Liggett seeks coverage from Commercial Union under policy Number CY 9501-142, which was in effect for the period of September 30, 1981 to September 30, 1982. The policy provided Liggett with excess liability coverage, involving $5 million participations in the excess layers incepting at the $10 million in excess of primary and $25 million in excess of primary levels, respectively.
In its First and Second Claims for Relief, Liggett seeks declaratory relief as to the obligations of the insurers to defend and indemnify Liggett for the claims. In the Third Claim for Relief, Liggett seeks damages because "one or more Defendants have breached their contracts of insurance by denying their duty to indemnify [Liggett] with respect to such claims and actions." Additionally, the Second Amended Complaint states "[a]s a direct result of such Defendants' breaches of their contracts of insurance, Plaintiffs have been deprived of the benefit of the insurance coverage" which has resulted in actual damage to Liggett. Out of the 33 defendants, 32 have responded to Liggett's complaint.
Defendant's motion at 3.
Second Amended Complaint at 14.
(3) Commercial Union argues that the allegation that "one or more defendants have breached their contracts of insurance . . . by denying their duty to indemnify [Liggett] with respect to such claims and actions" is framed in such vague and indefinite terms that Commercial Union is unable to determine whether Liggett contends that Commercial Union has breached its policy or not. Commercial Union argues that the First Amended Complaint is otherwise devoid of factual allegations that, if presumed true, would establish the existence of any current contractual duty to indemnify on the part of an excess insurer, such as Commercial Union, whose coverage is not implicated until at least $10 million in underlying insurance has been consumed with respect to losses attributable to the relevant policy period.
(4) Liggett responds that Commercial Union has denied its obligations under the same contract that Commercial Union asserts that it is unable to respond thereto and that it has filed a Rule 12(e) motion in order to obtain premature discovery rather than to frame a responsive pleading. Liggett points Out that there are many similarly situated insurers who have answered the complaint.
(5) Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(e) states "[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading." This type of motion is usually "restricted to situations where a pleading suffers from "unintelligibility rather than the want of detail.'" "If the requirements of Rule 8 are satisfied and the opposing party is fairly notified of the nature of the claim, a Rule 12 (e) motion is inappropriate." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 "provides that a claim for relief need only contain, "a shortened statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief and demand for judgment.'"
United States v. Board of Harbor Commissioners, D. Del., 73 F.R.D. 460, 462 (1977) (quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice p 12.18(1) at 2389 (2nd ed. 1975)).
Id. See Also Balm v. Amerimar Realty ComDany, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12896, Jacobs, V.C. (Dec. 23, 1993) (Mem. Op.).
In re Asbestos Litigation, Del. Super., C.A. 92C-10-100, Gebelein, J. (Feb. 4, 1994).
(6) On the pleadings before me, I find that Liggett has satisfied the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). I do not find that Liggett's amended complaint is so vague or ambiguous that Commercial Union cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. The Third Claim, when viewed in the broader context of the entire complaint, adequately informs Commercial Union of the nature of the claim against it. Further information may be obtained by Commercial Union through the discovery authorized by the Case Management Order. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ______________________________________ President Judge, Henry DuPont Ridgely.