Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG06266873
Pollak, J.
Plaintiffs Lien Ly and Robert Harvey purchased a vacant parcel of real property at a tax sale conducted by the County of Alameda (the county) and the county tax collector (collectively the county defendants). After learning that the parcel was not the property they thought they were purchasing and could not be developed, plaintiffs filed the present action seeking to rescind the sale. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges two seemingly conflicting legal theories. Plaintiffs’ first cause of action seeks to rescind the sale based on several grounds, including an alleged mistake of fact as to the particular parcel being sold. The court sustained without leave to amend the county defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action on the ground that a claim for rescission on equitable grounds is not within the exclusive remedies provided in the Revenue and Taxation Code. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action seeks to quiet title. While the prayer includes a request to quiet title in plaintiffs, it was clear throughout the proceedings in the trial court that plaintiffs did not wish to prevail on this claim and sought to use the denial of such relief as the basis to set aside the sale under other provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code.
All statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise noted.
Prior to the entry of judgment, cross-appellant Gia Austin-Carroll filed an answer purporting to appear as a doe defendant in the cause of action to quiet title. She claims an interest in the property by virtue of a quitclaim deed signed by the heir of the person who owned the property in 1864; she contends that for several reasons the tax deed is void. While plaintiffs later amended the complaint to name Austin-Carroll as a defendant, the court questioned her standing in the proceedings before entering judgment quieting title in favor of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs and Austin-Carroll filed notices of appeal and the appeals were later consolidated. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in sustaining the county defendants’ demurrer to their cause of action for rescission. Austin-Carroll contends that the court erred in quieting title in plaintiffs’ favor. The county defendants argue that the appeal should be dismissed on numerous grounds, including that Austin-Carroll is not a party to the action. We find that there is no basis to dismiss the appeal but shall affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
In March 2005, at a tax sale conducted by the county defendants pursuant to section 3701, plaintiffs purchased a vacant parcel of real property in the City of Hayward for $140,804. In April 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint to rescind the tax sale and recover the funds paid for the property. An amended complaint filed in May 2006 reasserted plaintiffs’ claim for rescission and added a cause of action to quiet title.
The amended complaint alleges that the 40- by 1, 000-foot parcel had once been used as a public street, but that the parcel had long since been abandoned for that purpose. Plaintiffs’ claim for rescission alleges that the county failed to comply with the standard convention of the United States Postal Service when it assigned the parcel an even number, rather than an odd number, address, which made ascertaining the actual location of the property “difficult, if not impossible” and that, at the time of the tax sale, they were “misled by the... address of the property” and “believ[ed] they were bidding on the vacant lot on the other side of [the] street.” The quiet title cause of action alleges that the adjoining landowners and the heirs of the original landowner “claim to have some interest in the subject real property” but that their “claims are without right and that none of the defendants have any right.”
The county defendants filed a demurrer to the amended complaint on the ground, among others, that “the remedies provided in... sections 3725-3731 are exclusive and plaintiffs’ first cause of action is not described in those sections.” Plaintiffs argued that their remedies were not limited to those expressly set forth in the Revenue and Taxation Code. The county defendants’ demurrer to the amended complaint and a subsequent demurrer to the second amended complaint, which contained nearly identical allegations, were sustained with leave to amend, and the court ultimately sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to the cause of action for rescission in the third amended complaint. At the time of its ruling on the demurrer to the second amended complaint, the court substantially narrowed the scope of plaintiffs’ claim for rescission by agreeing with the county defendants that they were “statutorily immune from a claim for damages and that plaintiffs must proceed in accordance with... sections 3725-3731 if they desire to have the tax deed rescinded and their purchase price refunded.” The court recognized a split in authority with respect to the remedies available to a purchaser at a tax sale, but considered the cases that restricted a purchaser’s remedies to those found in the Revenue and Taxation Code to be “better authority and reflect the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the courts that have considered the questions presented.” (Compare Schultz v. County of Contra Costa (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 242 (Schultz) [recognizing claim for rescission of tax sale based on mistake of fact] with Van Petten v. County of San Diego (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 43, 46-47 (Van Petten) [purchaser of tax-defaulted property limited to statutory remedies] and Craland, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1400, 1404 (Craland) [same].)
As discussed in greater detail below, these sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code authorize a purchaser to bring an action to quiet title and provide for reimbursement if the purchaser is unable to quiet title.
After additional amendments, the quiet title cause of action as set forth in the fifth amended complaint went to trial, naming as defendants the county, the county tax collector, the adjoining landowners (the Hayward Unified School District, Eugene A. Rapp, and SRE California 2 LLC), an heir of the original landowner in 1864 (Peter Phleger), and Does 1-50. The fifth amended complaint prayed for a decree quieting plaintiffs’ title in the property against all defendants except for the county defendants. In the event that the court did not quiet title in their favor by reason of invalidity of the tax sale or of the assessments giving rise to the tax sale, the complaint prayed for an order requiring the county defendants to refund to plaintiffs the amounts they paid at the tax sale plus interest.
Peter Phleger and the Hayward Unified School District did not answer and eventually their defaults were entered. Defendants SRE California 2 LLC and Eugene A. Rapp each filed a notice of disclaimer with respect to the property. Accordingly, the action proceeded to trial with only the county defendants participating as defendants.
The following evidence was presented at trial:
Plaintiffs presented evidence that in February 1868, Faxon Atherton purchased the parcel at issue, along with a substantial portion of surrounding property, for $400,804. Soon after purchasing the property, Atherton subdivided the parcel and deeded the resulting smaller parcels to various people. The deeds admitted at trial describe the various parcels in relationship to a “Walpert Street, ” which apparently is the property at issue in this action.
Plaintiffs introduced a copy of a 1946 Alameda County Assessor’s Map that shows the property as a public street. County records show, however, that the county stopped treating the property as a public street in 1964 when it assigned the property an assessor’s parcel number and began assessing the property to Title Insurance and Trust Company. No evidence was presented explaining why the county assessed the property to the title company in 1964. The parties stipulated that the City of Hayward considered the property a city street prior to 1995 when the city adopted and recorded a resolution abandoning an easement on the property. However, no evidence was introduced showing that an enforceable easement had in fact ever been created. The resolution abandoning an easement explains that the property, “which has appeared as a street on all city maps and on the county assessor’s records since 1974 has never been used... for street purposes.” The report prepared for the city council in advance of the adoption of the resolution describes the property as a “meandering dirt path” and explains, “This 40-foot wide strip of land has thus never actually been a street, and has been totally impassable for 30+ years. There is no present or future public use for this property, and vacation of the city’s interest will eliminate any city liability.”
The title company is not named as a defendant in the action.
Although we refer to the property in the singular, it was historically made up of two separate parcels with separate parcel numbers. The substantially larger parcel was assessed to the title company in 1964. The smaller of the parcels apparently was not assessed to any owner at that time. In 1995, when the City of Hayward abandoned its interest in the property, the county assessed the smaller parcel to the title company and combined the two parcels into a single parcel with a new parcel number. The entire parcel was sold at the sale and the plaintiffs’ tax deed transfers ownership of the whole parcel to plaintiffs.
At some point after 1965, the county assigned an even numbered address, 1000 E Street, to the vacant lot. The assessor’s maps reflect that every other property on the same side of E Street has an odd numbered address and every property on the other side of the street has an even numbered address.
Beginning in 1964, the county tax collector began mailing tax bills and notices to the title company, first at its office in San Francisco and later to 1000 E Street. The taxes were never paid and went into default for nonpayment.
In 2004, the county initiated proceedings to sell the property for nonpayment of taxes in 1964 and/or 1965. The notice of the March 2005 sale indicates that the amount necessary to redeem the property was $1,981.91 and sets the opening bid at $2,347. The property is described by street address (1000 E Street) and by parcel number. The parties stipulated that the assessor’s parcel map, which correctly identified the property by parcel number, was available for inspection in the assessor’s office prior to the sale. The notice, which was mailed to the title company at the 1000 E Street address, was returned by the post office to the county tax collector. Notice of the March 2005 sale was also made by publication.
Bidders were advised that properties were sold “as is.” A document entitled, “Frequently Asked Questions about Public Internet Auction of Tax Defaulted Land” is made available to every bidder and advises, “Be an informed bidder. Prospective purchasers are urged to examine the title, location and desirability of the properties available to their own satisfaction prior to the sale.... Bidders are responsible for knowing what they are purchasing. The city planning department can provide zoning, General Plan designation, water source and other information. Examine the county recorder’s records for any easements of the property. ALL SALES ARE FINAL.”
On March 19, 2009, following the presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence but prior to entry of judgment, Austin-Carroll filed an answer to the fifth amended complaint, claiming an interest in the property. She claimed “to have acquired a fractional interest in the property as a transferee of Peter Phelger, a lineal descendent of Faxon D. Atherton, who purchased the subject property at a Sheriff’s sale in 1864.” On March 20, the court continued the action to give Austin-Carroll an opportunity to defend her standing in the action. On the same day, plaintiffs took the default of defendant Peter Phelger, whose interest Austin-Carroll claimed to have obtained by quitclaim deed. Ten days later, plaintiffs filed an amendment naming Austin-Carroll in place of a doe defendant.
At a hearing in April 2009, the court questioned Austin-Carroll’s standing in the action. The court explained, “[W]e have an answer filed before anybody is named as a Doe, we have an apparent quitclaim deed that the court was not aware of, and then we have Mr. Phelger’s default. So this is totally and absolutely irregular as far as the way that a case is supposed to process through the system.” Plaintiffs’ attorney disputed the suggestion that the complaint had to be amended before Austin-Carroll could file an answer and appear as a doe defendant. The court, noting the irregularities “being said, ” proceeded to rule on the merits that plaintiffs were entitled to quiet title and that to the extent that they were attacking the validity of the sale, the court would not grant them relief. The court added, “Now with respect to Mr. Phelger’s declaration, I said that I would consider it and I am accepting your representation that his declaration only contains his lineage. That would mean he owned the property until he [quitclaimed] it to Ms. Austin-Carroll. So I don’t know that [the county defendants] ever disputed that entitlement or that deed so I don’t know the evidence is there, but I don’t know that it would make any difference one way or the other.”
Judgment was entered finding that “[p]laintiffs were the valid owners of the property... [as of the recording of the tax deed] and none of defendants had any interest in that property on that date.” Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal and Austin-Carroll filed a timely notice of cross-appeal.
Discussion
1. Motion to Dismiss
Initially, the county contends that the appeal should be dismissed because plaintiffs and Austin-Carroll failed to designate a necessary party, the county tax collector, as a respondent on appeal. The county relies on the “Civil Case Information Sheet” and “Case Screening” forms filed by plaintiffs that identify only the county as a defendant/respondent in the appeal. The notices of appeal filed by plaintiffs and by Austin-Carroll, however, identify the “County of Alameda, et al.” as the defendant/respondent on appeal. Under the liberal construction rule, ambiguities in the notice of appeal will be resolved in favor of validity of the notice. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 561, p. 640.) Mistakes in designating parties will not be fatal, especially where respondents are not prejudiced or misled. (See id., § 562, p. 641; Lopez v. City of Oxnard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [failure to designate employee as an “appellee, ” in addition to his employer, in notice of appeal from judgment not fatal]; Beltram v. Appellate Department (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 711, 715 [notice naming only defendant city as appellant construed as appeal also by its employee where city’s liability was derivative and plaintiffs were not prejudiced or misled]; Boynton v. McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 787-788 [notice of appeal referring only to order granting new trial for one defendant held applicable to second defendant where order of stated date granted new trial to both defendants].) Here, the county defendants were represented by the same attorney in the trial court and presented a single defense. Under the circumstances, the failure to expressly designate the county tax collector as a separate defendant/respondent in either the notice of appeal or the subsequently filed forms did not mislead or prejudice the county defendants.
The county defendants also contend that Austin-Carroll lacks standing to appeal because the court found that she was not a party to the action. They rely on County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736, in which the court noted that “[i]t is generally held... that only parties of record may appeal.” This general rule, however, is not absolute. (In re FairWageLaw (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 279, 285 [nonparty shareholder has standing to appeal judgment in voluntary dissolution proceeding]; Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G. A. MacDonald Construction Co. (1998) 71 Cal.App.4th 38, 58 [nonparty subcontractor was aggrieved party entitled to appeal trial court’s judgment]; People v. Hernandez (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 715, 720 [nonparty pawnbrokers may appeal order directing them to release pledged goods].) Insofar as Austin-Carroll claims an interest in the property she is aggrieved by the judgment. In any event, the record is unclear with respect to Austin-Carroll’s status in the action. As set forth above, Austin-Carroll filed an answer claiming an interest in the property and plaintiffs filed an amendment naming her as a doe defendant. While the trial court found the irregular sequence of these actions “problematic” and made some comments suggesting that Austin-Carroll was not a proper party to the action, the record does not include an express finding to that effect. Neither Austin-Carroll’s answer nor plaintiffs’ amendment were stricken and minute orders from the subsequent hearings list her appearance as “Defendant Gia Austin-Carroll appearing in pro per.” Accordingly, we decline to dismiss the appeal.
2. Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action for Rescission
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action sought to rescind the sale on the ground that they had been misled by the address given to the parcel and believed at the time of the sale that they were buying a vacant parcel located on the other side of the street. The trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to this cause of action on the ground that the Revenue and Taxation Code provides the exclusive remedies for purchasers at a tax sale and a claim for rescission based on traditional contract theories, including a unilateral mistake of fact, is not cognizable under the code. We agree.
“ ‘A tax sale proceeding is wholly a creature of statute.’ [Citation.] After a declaration of default with respect to real property which has become subject to a tax lien, ‘the property becomes “tax-defaulted property.” [Citation.] The five-year redemption period commences to run upon the declaration of default. [Citation.]... [¶] The tax-defaulted property becomes subject to sale following the expiration of the redemption period.... [Citation.]... [¶] Property sold by public auction pursuant to section 3691 et seq. goes to the highest bidder. [Citation.]... [¶] ‘The tax deed passes title free of all encumbrances except tax liens or assessments, easements, water rights, ... recorded restrictions[, and any Internal Revenue Service liens which, pursuant to federal law, are not discharged by the sale]. [Citation.] In the absence of actual fraud, the duly acknowledged or proved tax deed is conclusive evidence of the regularity of the tax sale proceedings. [Citation.] The tax sale furthers the public interest by collecting the taxes owed upon the property, and also returning the property to the tax rolls by placing it into the hands of those who do pay their taxes.’ ” (Van Petten, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46-47, citing Craland, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1403-1404.)
“Under the Revenue and Taxation Code, a purchaser at a tax sale is entitled to a refund of purchase money paid only where the court determines the tax deed is void (§ 3729) or the property ‘should not have been sold’ (§ 3731). There is no statutory remedy of rescission or refund based on... misrepresentation and breach of contract theories.” (Van Petten, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) To determine whether a tax deed is void, a purchaser may, as in this case, bring an action to quiet title under section 3727. If as a result of that action it is determined that the tax deed obtained through the sale is void, section 3729 provides a remedy.
Section 3731, subdivision (a) which authorizes the Board of Supervisors, with the written consent of the county’s legal advisor and the purchaser, to rescind a tax sale and refund the purchase price if it determines the property “should not have been sold, ” is inapplicable in this instance. (See 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2009) § 11:162 [“This provision allows for a consensual rescission of the sale, which may avoid the costs and risks of litigation both for the tax sale purchaser and the taxing authority. If the purchaser or taxing authority is unwilling to rescind, however, ... then an action to set aside the sale is required”].)
Section 3727 provides: “Whenever property has been purchased at tax sale, the purchaser or any other person claiming through the purchaser may bring suit to quiet title to all or any portion of the property and prosecute it to final judgment.” (See also 9 Witkin, Summary (10th ed. 2005) Taxation, § 267, p. 400 [“Because of the many possible defects in a tax title, it is customary for the purchaser... to seek to confirm it by an action to quiet title”].)
Section 3729, subdivision (a) provides: “When a court holds a tax deed... void, the purchaser at tax sale is entitled to a refund from the county of the amount paid as the purchase price in excess of the amount for which he or she has been reimbursed for taxes, penalties, and costs....”
Plaintiffs point out that there is a division of authority as to whether a purchaser of tax-defaulted property from a public entity at a tax sale is limited to those remedies provided by the Revenue and Taxation Code. They argue that the trial court erred in relying on Van Petten and Craland, both of which applied a restrictive view of the available remedies, rather than on Schultz, which recognized a cause of action for rescission outside of the statutory provisions.
The origins of this conflict in the cases date back to 1913. Originally, when an error resulted in a tax sale being declared void, the tax sale purchaser, though innocent of wrongdoing and unlikely to have had any knowledge of the entity’s mistakes, lost both the property and the sums paid, with no right to reimbursement. (Loomis v. County of Los Angeles (1881) 59 Cal. 456, 456-457; Brooks v. County of Tulare (1897) 117 Cal. 465, 468.) In 1913, the Legislature provided a measure of relief to thwarted purchasers by enacting statutes (the precursors to sections 3728 and 3729) which applied when a tax sale was declared void, and permitted the purchaser to recover from the owner “the full amount of taxes, penalties and costs paid out and expended by him” and to recover from the selling entity “refund of the amount paid into the county treasury as the purchase price of such property in excess of the amount for which he may have been reimbursed [by the owner] for taxes, penalties, and costs.” (Stats. 1913, ch. 299, § 7, p. 562.)
In Routh v. Quinn (1942) 20 Cal.2d 488, the California Supreme Court considered whether additional common-law remedies should be available to tax-sale purchasers. In Routh, a purchaser of personal property at a delinquent tax sale sought to hold a tax assessor liable for damages he suffered as a result of the assessor’s negligence in the computation of the tax payable. (Id. at p. 489.) The purchaser’s claim “relie[d] on the general proposition that a public officer is liable to respond in damages to one specially injured by his neglect to perform or negligent performance of an official ministerial duty to the extent of such special injury.” (Id. at p. 490.) The court concluded that the tax assessor could not be liable, based on the “fundamental principle” that “in tax sales the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in all its vigor” and “[a] purchaser of property at a tax sale takes the risk of any defect in the proceedings in the taxation process. No warranty of the validity or regularity of the proceedings exists.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Chambers (1951) 37 Cal.2d 552, 561, the court confirmed that “[w]here a tax statute provides for recovery, that remedy is exclusive.” In that case, a purchaser acquired at a county tax sale property that previously had been conveyed to the state park commission as part of the state park system. In an action by the State (as owner) to quiet title as against the purchaser’s interest, the California Supreme Court determined that the State was entitled to quiet title and that the purchaser had no statutory remedy for a refund for either the purchase price paid at the tax sale or any taxes assessed and paid since the purchase. The court noted, however, that the purchaser had a remedy against the county as the seller: “There are statutory provisions with reference to reimbursement in this state. The basic rule applicable is: ‘The purchaser of tax sold or tax deeded property is entitled to a refund of the amount paid as purchase price whenever it is determined by the board of supervisors that the property belongs to the United States, this State, a city, or other political subdivision of this State and should not have been sold for taxes. The refund shall be made in the same manner as a refund of an overpayment of tax.’ [Citation.] Thus it is seen that the county must make a refund of the purchase price.” (Id. at pp. 561-562.)
In Schultz, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at page 247, a divided court reached a different conclusion as to the exclusivity of the statutory remedies. The court held that an action for rescission on the ground of mistake, as provided for in Civil Code section 1689, subdivision (b)(1), is an available remedy because “the language of [the provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code] does not indicate that the remedies therein are the exclusive means for a purchaser to recover.” In Shultz, the purchaser planned to build a residence on a lot purchased at a tax sale. After the sale, he learned that the lot was unbuildable and worth less than half what he had paid. He sought rescission based on a failure of consideration and mistake of fact. The court stated that the Supreme Court cases cited above considered “distinguishable fact situations” and applied “stringent responsibilities of an antiquated era.” (Id. at p. 246.) The court explained that the decision in Routh “was based on provisions of the former Political Code which contained no warranties of the validity or regularity of tax sale proceedings. The buyer was ‘bound to inform himself of the regularity of the tax proceedings, ’ and assumed the risk of error. [Citation.] The Routh holding is no longer viable because current... sections 3725-3731 provide a remedy for a purchaser at an invalid or irregular tax sale.” (Schultz, at p. 246.)
A few years later, the Craland court disagreed with Schultz and held that “the State and County are not subject to contractual liability and that purchasers at a tax sale are limited to statutory remedies.” (Craland, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1407-1408.) The property at issue was “ ‘underlain by a large landslide.’ ” (Id. at p. 1402.) Information concerning the property’s geological status was contained in a review prepared before the sale by the engineering geology section of the county engineer design division, but was not known to the purchaser. (Ibid.) The purchaser brought an action to rescind the sale, asserting that the defendants “breached their contractual ‘duty, as knowing sellers, to disclose... the landslides... prior to [the purchase]’ ” (id. at p. 1404) and that “defendants owed the same duty as to ordinary sellers of real property to disclose all known, hidden defects” (id. at p. 1405). Based on “[t]he overwhelming body of decisional law governing tax sales, ” the court held that “neither the State nor the County owes a nonstatutory duty of care with respect to the purchaser” (id. at p. 1405) and that “purchasers at a tax sale are limited to statutory remedies” (id. at pp. 1407-1408). The court noted that the “plaintiff could have learned of the existence of the landslide prior to the tax sale through the same investigation of public records that led to the discovery three years later.” (Id. at p. 1408.) The court emphasized that “ ‘[t]he burden should be on buyers at tax sales at public auction, in advance of the sale, to take all steps necessary to assure themselves that the use and development of the property which they have in mind will be permitted by local government.’ ” (Ibid., citing Schultz, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 252 (dis. opn. of King, J.); Routh v. Quinn, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 492-493 [“Sound public policy dictates that no such intolerable burden shall be placed upon the tax assessor that will make him liable for any error he may make in the computation of the tax. The multitude of transactions with which he must deal and the great probability that mathematical error may well creep into the calculations regardless of his competency and efficiency, refutes the wisdom of imposing such duty upon him”].)
In Van Petten, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at page 51, the court considered the spilt in authority and chose to follow the “well-settled rule of Chambers and Craland that purchasers of property at a tax sale are limited to statutory remedies” and expressly rejected Schultz’s holding to the contrary. In Van Petten, the purchaser had been given a brochure listing the assessed value of the parcels available for bid. At the auction, he was told that the assessed values “reflected ‘a recent appraisal of the current values.’ ” (Id. at p. 44.) He later learned that the value of the property had been substantially overstated. (Id. at p. 45.) He sued the county for restitution and rescission under a number of theories, including mistake, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. (Ibid.) The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the county on the ground that there is no statutory remedy of rescission of a tax sale based on misrepresentation or breach of contract. (Id. at p. 50.)
Like the trial court, we agree that Van Petten and Craland state the correct rule of law. (See also Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 40-41 [noting with approval that the courts in Van Petten and Craland relied on People v. Chambers, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 561 in concluding that a purchaser at a tax sale is limited to the remedies provided by the Revenue and Taxation Code and has no right to common law remedies for defects in the tax sale proceeding].) In Van Petten, the court emphasized that“[t]he principle of caveat emptor as it forcefully applies to tax sales is particularly applicable in the instant case, as the sales brochure Van Petten received in advance of the tax sale explicitly stated, ‘[t]ax defaulted property will be sold on an “as is” basis[, ]’ and warned bidders: ‘Research Before You Invest!’ ” (Van Petten, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 50-51.) The same can be said of the present action. The notice of sale accurately identified the property being sold, not only by its street address, which may have caused some confusion, but by its correct parcel number. The notice also advised potential buyers to speak with the city planning department before bidding. This warning is included to avoid the precise misfortune that plaintiffs have encountered. Plaintiffs were forewarned that in purchasing at a tax sale they do not receive the same warranties and representations that normally accompany the purchase of real property. While a remedy exists should the governmental agency engage in intentional fraud, the taxing authority need not provide the same representations and assurances that a seller must make in a conventional sale of real property. Plaintiffs were put on notice of the need to fully investigate the property they were purchasing and the restrictions to which it was subject before bidding at the tax sale, and had they done so they would have avoided their misunderstanding. Their mistake undoubtedly was costly and unfortunate, but the finality which for reasons of public policy are placed on such sales by the Revenue and Taxation Code precludes equitable relief if the exclusive statutory conditions for relief do not apply. Accordingly, the court properly sustained without leave to amend the county defendants’ demurrer to the cause of action for rescission.
1. Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action to Quiet Title
Austin-Carroll contends that the court erred in quieting title in plaintiffs because the tax deed is void because the property was exempt from taxation prior to 1995 as a public street and alternatively, that the delinquent taxes should have been deemed paid under section 2195. She also argues that there was fraud in the sale and that the notice of the tax sale did not satisfy the requirements of due process.
To prevail on an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs must prove they own the property and that the defendants have no right or title in the property adverse to the plaintiffs’ rights. (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.) “ ‘ “The object of the action is to finally settle and determine, as between the parties, all conflicting claims to the property in controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as [it] may be entitled to.” ’ ” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 278, 305.) As set forth above, the trial court granted the relief sought in plaintiffs’ complaint, that is, the court quieted title in plaintiffs’ favor. As the prevailing parties on this claim, plaintiffs are not aggrieved by this portion of the judgment and cannot challenge this ruling directly. Austin-Carroll, however, is arguably an aggrieved party with standing to challenge this ruling.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs’ tax deed gave them title to the property. Under section 3711, “except as against actual fraud, the [tax] deed duly acknowledged or proved is conclusive evidence of the regularity of all proceedings from the assessment of the assessor to the execution of the deed, both inclusive.” Likewise, while section 3701 provides that the “tax collector shall make a reasonable effort to obtain the name and last known mailing address of parties of interest, ” the section also provides that “[t]he validity of any sale under this chapter shall not be affected if the tax collector’s reasonable effort fails to disclose the name and last known mailing address of parties of interest or if a party of interest does not receive the mailed notice.” Under the plain language of these statutes, any claim with respect to the county defendants’ failure to comply with the statutory assessment and notice requirements are not cognizable. (Chesney v. Gresham (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 120, 128.) These statutes, however, “cannot cure a jurisdictional defect, that is, one which is a constitutionally indispensable step.” (Ibid; L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 950, 958 [“[these] curative statutes simply provide conclusive evidence that all taxing procedures other than those affecting jurisdiction, consonant with due process, have been followed”].) Accordingly, to prevail Austin-Carroll must establish the existence of fraud in the sale, a jurisdictional defect in plaintiffs’ deed or that her right to due process was violated in the sale.
In L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of County of Los Angeles, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at page 956, the court recognized that “[b]ecause public property is exempt from taxation, tax deeds purporting to convey such property for nonpayment of taxes are void.” Relying on this rule, Austin-Carroll argues that plaintiffs’ deed is void because until 1995 the property was a public street and thus exempt from taxation. The trial court, however, found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the property was burdened by a public street in 1964. The statement of decision states, “Although there was anecdotal evidence that would be consistent with the property at one time being burdened by an easement for a public street, that evidence was subject to other explanations and was not conclusive. Accordingly, the court does not conclude that the property was ever burdened by an easement for a public street.” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. The county defendants stopped treating the property as a street in 1964 when it began assessing the property. While there was evidence that the City of Hayward abandoned any easement it may have had on the property in 1995, there is no evidence establishing that the City of Hayward actually had an enforceable easement. While the property appeared on some maps as a street, other evidence established that it was never used as a street. Accordingly, the evidence does not establish that the property was exempt from taxation as a public street prior to 1995.
Austin-Carroll also contends that section 2195 renders the plaintiffs’ deed void. Section 2195 provides, “Thirty years after any tax becomes a lien, if the lien has not been otherwise removed, the lien ceases to exist and the tax is conclusively presumed to be paid.... Property for which a power to sell has been recorded for nonpayment of taxes is not subject to the provisions of this section.” As the county defendants note, no evidence was presented with respect to whether a power to sell was recorded prior to 1995, when the 30-year time period would have lapsed. Section 3691 provides that once tax-defaulted property becomes eligible for sale, “the tax collector shall have the power to sell and shall attempt to sell” the property. Section 3691.1 provides that “[t]he tax collector shall execute a notice whenever a parcel becomes subject to the power of sale set forth in Section 3691 on a form prescribed by the Controller.” Absent any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the Tax Collector complied with these statutory duties. (Evid. Code, § 664.)
Austin-Carroll also challenges the efforts made by the county defendants to assess the property and give notice to the proper owners. She suggests that “[t]he only reasonable inference to be made from the conduct of the employees at the Assessor’s and Tax Collector’s offices is that they wanted to have a sale, at any cost.” The evidence presented, however, clearly does not support a claim of actual fraud. Therefore, any defect in the assessment or notice procedures is subject to the curative provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code discussed above.
Finally, Austin-Carroll has not established that her due process rights were violated in the sale. “Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” (Jones v. Flowers (2006) 547 U.S. 220, 223.) Actual notice is not required to satisfy due process. The government is required only to provide notice that is reasonably calculated under all of the circumstances to apprise of the pendency of the action and give an opportunity to object. (Id. at p. 226.)
Here, Austin-Carroll did not obtain an interest in the property until long after the sale had been completed. Accordingly, she clearly had no right to notice. Insofar as she contends that she stands in Phelger’s shoes, the conclusion is the same. Phelger allowed his default to be entered, thereby relinquishing any claim that he was denied proper notice. In any event, the notice given by the county defendants adequately satisfies the requirement of due process. Phelger submitted a declaration claiming to be an heir of Faxon Atherton, who purchased the property in 1864. The evidence presented at trial establishes that the property was subdivided and ownership of the various parcels was transferred multiple times since 1864. No evidence establishes a clear chain of title from Atherton to Phelger. The property taxes have remained unpaid since 1964 and at no point has Phelger indicated any interest in the property. Consistent with the statutory requirement, the county defendants gave notice of the impending sale by publication. Under the circumstances, this notice was reasonably calculated to apprise any unknown parties with a potential interest in the property, including the heirs of Atherton, that a tax sale was imminent.
Because no jurisdictional defect renders the deed void, the trial court properly granted plaintiffs’ request to quiet title.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.