Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2095-D
March 10, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintffs' Motion to Enforce and Motion for Sanctions Against Defendant M.S. Carriers, Inc., filed February 19, 2003, and Defendant M.S. Carriers, Inc.'s Response to Motion to Enforce and Motion for Sanctions, filed February 27, 2003. This matter has been referred to Magistrate Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez for hearing, if necessary, and for determination pursuant to the District Court's Order, filed February 20, 2003. The Court held a hearing on this motion on Friday, March 7, 2003, at 9:00 A.M. In light of the motion, the response, the oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce and Motion for Sanctions Against Defendant M.S. Carriers, Inc. should be GRANTED.
I. Background Procedural History
A. Plaintiffs' Motion to CompelPlaintiffs served interrogatories on Defendant on June 25, 2002. (Pls. Mot. at 2.) On August 8, 2002, Defendant served Plaintiffs with its response. Id. On December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Opposed Motion to Compel Written Discovery from Defendant MS. Carriers, Inc. The Court ordered counsel to confer face-to-face regarding all disputed issues, and to submit a Joint Submission regarding all remaining disputed issues. On January 16, 2003, the parties filed their Joint Submission, wherein they indicated that they had resolved all issues except one pertaining to the following interrogatory:
INTERROGATORY NO. 21 : Identify all lawsuits filed against M.S. Carriers, Inc. In [sic] the preceding five(5) years involving claims of personal injury resulting from motor vehicle accidents.
ANSWER: Defendant objects to this Interrogatory in that it is overly broad, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence.
In the Joint Submission, Plaintiffs argued that the Interrogatory seeks information on prior similar accidents, which is within the scope of federal discovery. (Joint Sub. at 3.) Defendant argued that the Interrogatory was overly broad because it was not specifically tailored to identify only information pertaining to "substantially similar lawsuits," and that five years was an unreasonable time period. Id.
Based upon the arguments in the Joint Submission and the applicable law, on January 31, 2003, the Court ordered Defendant to respond to the Interrogatory. The Court reasoned that FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) does not impose a "requirement that the information sought be `substantially similar' to the facts of the instant case." (Ord. at 1.) Further, the Court explained that substantial similarity "is the more stringent standard for admissibility at trial, not discoverability before trial." (Ord. at 1-2.) Thus, the Court held that the Interrogatory, which requested the identity of lawsuits filed against Defendant involving allegations of personal injury arising out of motor vehicle accidents, was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that "five years is a reasonable time period for discovering information." Id. Thus, the Court ordered Defendant to answer the Interrogatory.
B. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce the Court's Order
On February 19, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion, complaining that Defendant has failed to answer the Interrogatory and thereby failed to comply with the Court's Order. (Pls. Br. at 2.) On February 27, 2003, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs' motion, arguing that the Court was in error. (Def. Br. at 2.) Specifically, Defendant argued that complying with the Order would be "burdensome" because the "voluminous request" lacked a "geographical limitation" or "causal connection," and that answering it would require a "nationwide search." (Def. Br. at 2-3.) The Court notes that Defendant did not raise these specific objections to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory, nor did Defendant raise any of these arguments in its Joint Submission, so the Court's Order did not address these arguments. Finally, Defendant argued that because the Court never set a compliance deadline, it has not failed to comply. Id. at 2-3. Indeed, Defendant asserted that it has "done nothing but attempt to comply" with the Order. Id. at 3, 4. Defendant also requested that the Court set a reasonable deadline for compliance. Id.
C. Hearing
A hearing was held on Friday, March 7, 2003. Defendant's counsel conceded that despite the Court's Order, Defendant had not yet responded to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory. Based on counsel's response to the Court's inquiry, it appears that Defendant made no effort to begin compiling a response to the June 25, 2002 discovery request until the Court's January 31, 2003 Order. Counsel for Defendant stated that when he received the Court's January 31, 2003 Order, he forwarded it to his client. Sometime later, the client contacted him and indicated that compliance with the Order would be "burdensome." However, counsel could not articulate how or why compliance would be burdensome, and he admitted that he had not made any inquiry of his client regarding this issue. He merely followed his client's direction to file admitted untimely objections to the Order.
Defendant's counsel further conceded that according to the case law, the subject matter of the Interrogatory was proper, and that Defendant did not object to all of the information sought by the Interrogatory. However, Defendant had not thus far produced the information it deemed responsive and non-objectionable. Specifically, Defendant does not object to the identification of lawsuits in Texas involving "commercial motor vehicles" and allegations of failure to "control speed" or "disregard of a traffic control device." Defendant's counsel also conceded that despite its objection to the five-year time limitation, counsel's research revealed that five years was a reasonable time limitation.
II. Analysis
A. Enforcement of the Court's Order
Rule 37(b)(2) provides the standard for enforcing the Court's Order, which was issued under Rule 37(a). It provides that if a party fails to comply with a Rule 37(a) order, a court may enforce its order in any manner that is just. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) ("If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under [Rule 37(a),] the court may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just[.]") The Court has broad discretion in fashioning an enforcement. F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Rule 37 . . . grants a district court considerable, but not unlimited, discretion in fashioning appropriate penalties for those who disobey such an order.")
In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant has not responded to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory despite the Court's January 31, 2003 Order. Defendant argues that the Court's Order should not be enforced based on arguments and objections not previously asserted. Assuming arguendo that Defendant has not waived these arguments and objections, Court will address each of Defendant's new arguments.
1. Burdensome
Defendant alleges that responding to the Interrogatory would be burdensome. However, Defendant provides no factual support for its position, either by affidavit, testimony or proffer, and its Response provides no legal support. Indeed, counsel had to be repeatedly reminded that the discovery request at issue is an interrogatory which essentially seeks a list of cases, rather than a request to produce the underlying case files. In Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Ind. 1991), the court found that a similar request was not burdensome on its face. Domino's Pizza was sued for a death arising out of an automobile accident involving one of its delivery drivers. Wauchop, 138 F.R.D. at 543. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's policy of a 30-minute delivery caused the hasty driving, which contributed to the accident causing death. To implicate the policy, the plaintiff requested by interrogatory information "as to other litigation arising from accidents involving delivery drivers." Id. at 549. The defendant objected that the interrogatory was "burdensome and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. The Court found that the defendant's objection lacked adequate support, and thus ordered the defendant to answer the Interrogatory. Id. at 549, 552.
As in Wauchop, Defendant's objection lacks adequate factual or legal support. Without more than a conclusory allegation, the Court cannot sustain this objection.
2. Voluminous Request
Additionally, Defendant argues that it should not be required to answer such a "voluminous request." As with the prior objection, Defendant does not demonstrate how the information is "voluminous." Such an interrogatory is not improper simply because it is alleged to be voluminous. See Cooper v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 325364, at * 1 (E.D.La. June 12, 1997).
3. Nationwide Search
Defendant also argues that the Interrogatory is without "geographical limitation" and compliance would therefore require a "nationwide search," and that it should be limited to lawsuits filed only in Texas, where the accident at issue occurred. In Wauchop, however, the court permitted discovery on a national basis where a national policy was at issue. 138 F.R.D. at 549.
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that the gross negligence of Defendant, through its "system-wide safety problem," contributed to the accident. Defendant admits that it is a national company engaged in "interstate" trucking and "operating in all forty-eight . . . continental states." The driver involved in the accident is from Virginia, and Defendant is a Tennessee corporation with its principal office in Tennessee and principal place of business in Texas. (Compl. at 2.) There has been no showing to support a geographical limitation herein. See Chavez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 206 F.R.D. 615, 622 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (limiting discovery to previous lawsuits by similarly situated employees against defendant at plant where plaintiff and allegedly discriminating supervisor worked); Dixon v. Ashcroft, 2001 WL 1910055 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 21, 2001) (limiting discovery regarding other claims to facility where plaintiff employee and allegedly discriminating supervisor worked); Lovoi v. Apple One Employment Serv., 2000 WL 1863522 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 2000) (limiting discovery request regarding age of individuals hired by employer to offices owned or operated in the state where plaintiff employee worked). Without a showing that Defendant's driver only worked in Texas, and because of Defendant's national presence, the Court declines to limit Plaintiffs' Interrogatory to Texas.
4. Causal Connection
Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should require a "causal connection" between the requested lawsuits and the instant suit. Defendant argues that this connection would be satisfied by seeking only lawsuits with similar causal allegations such as speeding and disregarding traffic control devices. As set forth above, however, Plaintiffs allege a "system-wide safety problem." It is well settled that for "discovery purposes, the court need only find that the circumstances surrounding the other accidents are similar enough that discovery concerning those incidents is reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of substantially similar occurrences." Lohr v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 135 F.R.D. 162, 164 (W.D. Mich. 1991). Moreover, "it is not too strong to say that a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action." Briney v. Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 159, 163 (S.D. Ia. 1993), citing 8 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2008 (1970). Plaintiffs' Interrogatory seeks only lawsuits filed against Defendant (1) involving claims of personal injury arising from (2) motor vehicle accidents (3) involving Defendant. The presence of these circumstances in another lawsuit makes that lawsuit similar enough that its discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of a substantially similar accident. See id. (allowing discovery of all bypass-start accidents for machine at issue, as well as similar machines); see also Lohr, 135 F.R.D. at 164 (allowing discovery of accidents involving not only the stapler used by plaintiff but also other products that exhibit the features that plaintiff claimed caused or contributed to his injury); Scaturro v. Warren and Sweat Mfg., 160 F.R.D. 44, 46 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing discovery of same type or similar make tree ladder stands).
B. Sanctions — Time for Compliance
Defendant argues that it should not be sanctioned for failing to comply with the Court's Order, because the Order set no specific date for compliance. Defendant further argues that "Plaintiffs should accept the fact that if they make a voluminous request, once the Judge has entered an Order requiring the production of such a voluminous request, Defendant must be given time to conduct the necessary nationwide search." (Resp. at 3.) A similar argument was made in Cooper, 1997 WL 325364, at * 1. In that case, the plaintiff requested "all pertinent documents generated in the last five years with respect to claims and lawsuits in Louisiana which arose out of policies similar to the policy at issue." Id. For approximately eight months, the defendant "ignored these discovery requests and plaintiff's first motion to compel until ordered to respond." Id. The defendant argued that its delay was justified, because "[w]hen a party asks for the sun, the moon and the stars, it should not be heard to object that its going to take some time to round up the entire solar system." Id. Given that the defendant had these requests for eight months, the court found this reasoning to be "disingenuous at best and evidence of bad faith at worst." Id.
In this case, Defendant has had the Interrogatory for seven months. Despite the existence of responsive, non-objectionable information that could have been provided, Defendant made no effort to begin compiling information until after the Court's January 31, 2003 Order. It has now been more than thirty days since the Court issued its Order, but no information has been provided. This Court likewise rejects Defendant's argument.
Because the parties did not indicate that timing of providing the information was at issue, the Court's Order did not address the issue. Given that the Order did not set a date for compliance, and given that Defendant's counsel represented that Defendant did not willfully disregard the Court's Order, no sanctions will be entered at this time pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)-(E). However, the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs should be awarded attorney's fees for bringing this motion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's Order is ENFORCED, in full, and STAYED, in part, and it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant shall fully respond to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 21 no later than 5:00 P.M., Friday, March 14, 2003. It is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with all responsive non-objectionable information to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 21 no later than 5:00 P.M., Friday, March 14, 2003. This includes information regarding all lawsuits filed against Defendant in Texas within the last five years involving commercial motor vehicles where there was an allegation of failure to control speed or disregard of a traffic control device. It is further
ORDERED that this Order be, and it is hereby, STAYED, in part, with respect to the information which is the subject of Defendant M.S. Carriers, Inc.'s Objection to Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order until the District Court rules on the objections. It is further
ORDERED that, to the extent that the District Court overrules Defendant's objections, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with a full and complete answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory no later than 5:00 P.M. on the fifth business day after the date on which the District Court's decision is filed. It is also hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall file an application for reasonable expenses and attorney's fees, supported by case law, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) no later than March 14, 2003. Defendant may file a response, supported by case law, no later than March 21, 2003.