Opinion
(14470)
The defendant appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment rendered on the report of an attorney trial referee. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the attorney trial referee should not have allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint to add an allegation that the defendant had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.). Held that the trial court improperly allowed the attorney trial referee to rule on the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint; under the rules of practice (§ 433), once the pleadings have been closed and the case referred to an attorney trial referee, no further pleadings may be filed except by agreement of the parties or by order of the court.
Argued February 21, 1995
Officially released June 4, 1996
Action to recover damages for breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and referred to Cecelia F. Rosenberg, attorney trial referee, who filed a report recommending judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Tobin, J., overruled the defendant's objection to the referee's report and rendered judgment in accordance with the report, and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Kevin A. Coles, for the appellant (defendant).
Edward F. Kunin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant appeals from the trial court's judgment rendered on the report of an attorney trial referee. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly determined that the attorney trial referee was authorized to rule on the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint.
The plaintiff initially filed a three count complaint. A fourth count was added on the day of trial before the attorney trial referee. The first count alleged a breach of contract; the second sought the reasonable value of the materials sold to the defendant; the third sought recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment; the fourth alleged that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Judgment was rendered on counts one and four, but no mention was made regarding counts two and three. Counts one, two and three, however, present mutually exclusive theories of relief. Because the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on count one, the trial court implicitly found in favor of the defendant as to counts two and three. Therefore, we treat the matter as an appealable final judgment.
The following facts were found by the attorney trial referee and accepted by the court. The defendant has been a Connecticut corporation since 1927 and its principal office is located in Bridgeport. The defendant's president, Gerald Yoney, is also president of Consolidated Equities, Inc., a Delaware corporation. From time to time, the plaintiff sold materials and supplies to the defendant for which the defendant gave to the plaintiff purchase orders inscribed with the name "Paul S. Yoney, Inc." On August 25, 1993, the plaintiff instituted suit against the defendant to recover $109,086, the value of those supplies for which the plaintiff had not received payment.
The trial court referred the case to an attorney trial referee appointed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-434 (a)(4). Several weeks before the case was heard by the attorney trial referee, counsel for the defendant notified the plaintiff that the plaintiff was suing the wrong corporation. The defendant asserted that Consolidated Equities, Inc., was the true debtor. Gerald Yoney claimed that he had merged the original Paul S. Yoney, Inc., into Consolidated Equities Inc., in 1983 and then formed a new Paul S. Yoney, Inc., which never conducted any business.
General Statutes § 52-434 (a)(4) provides: "In addition to the state referees who are appointed pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this section, the chief justice may appoint, from qualified members of the bar of the state, who are electors and residents of this state, as many state referees as he may from time to time deem advisable or necessary. No appointment of a member of the bar may be for a term of more than one year. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, state referees appointed by the chief justice from members of the bar shall receive such reasonable compensation and expenses as may be determined by the chief justice."
The attorney trial referee heard the case on April 8, 1994. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, and over the objection of the defendant, the attorney trial referee granted the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint to include a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On July 11, 1994, the attorney trial referee issued a report of her findings of fact and a memorandum of decision that recommended judgment for the plaintiff. She found that the defendant owed the plaintiff $109,086 for the materials as well as $16,362.90 in punitive damages allowable under CUTPA. In the attorney trial referee's response to the defendant's motion to correct, the attorney trial referee specified that the compensatory damages were awarded under the breach of contract claim and affirmed the CUTPA punitive damage award. The defendant objected to the acceptance of the trial referee's report. Among its objections, the defendant claimed that the attorney trial referee's granting of the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint violated Practice Book § 433. The trial court overruled the defendant's objections to the report and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the attorney trial referee's report. This appeal followed.
See footnote 1.
Practice Book § 433 provides: "No case shall be referred to a committee until the issues are closed and a trial list claim filed. Thereafter no pleadings may be filed except by agreement of all parties or order of the court. Such pleadings shall be filed with the clerk and by him transmitted to the committee."
The defendant claims that the attorney trial referee did not have the authority to rule on the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint. We agree and reverse the decision of the trial court.
The limited role and function of an attorney trial referee was discussed in Seal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc. 199 Conn. 496, 508 A.2d 415 (1986). An attorney trial referee does not exercise the powers of a court and is simply a fact finder. Id., 502. This court has previously observed that under Practice Book § 433, once the pleadings have been closed and the case referred to an attorney trial referee, no further pleadings may be filed except by agreement of all parties or order of the court. State Bank of Westchester v. New Dimension Homes of Connecticut, Inc., 38 Conn. App. 491, 496-98, 661 A.2d 119 (1995). An attorney trial referee cannot make a legal determination regarding the merits of a contested motion to amend pleadings, and the trial court improperly ruled otherwise. Id., 498.
Because we determine that the attorney trial referee had no authority to rule on the motion to amend the complaint, we do not address the defendant's other claims, which also address the fourth count.