Summary
extending general venue statute's "residence" v. "domicile" distinction to venue provisions of the Public Vessels Act
Summary of this case from Bosman v. United StatesOpinion
No. C 04-1834 PJH.
December 2, 2004
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER VENUE
Defendant United States of America's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue came on for hearing on November 24, 2004, before this court. Eric Danoff appeared on behalf of defendant and Ronald Klein and Christopher Goodroe appeared on behalf of plaintiff George Lewis. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue.
BACKGROUND
Lewis was a seaman employed on the United States Navy ship USNS YANO. Lewis alleges that on June 20, 2003, while on board the YANO, he was injured as a result of his work through the negligence of the United States. On December 31, 2003, Lewis filed suit under the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), 46 App. U.S.C. § 781, et seq. Lewis v. United States, C 03-5915 PJH. Because the YANO was then located in Maryland, the case was ordered transferred to the Maryland district court, at which point Lewis dismissed the case.
The docket in C 03-5915 PJH shows that Lewis filed a voluntary dismissal of the complaint in this court on the same day as the hearing at which defendant's motion to transfer was granted.
Lewis moved to California around February 2004, and the parties agree he is physically located in the Northern District now. On May 10, 2004, after the YANO had set sail, Lewis filed suit again in the Northern District of California, on the grounds that the PVA permits suit in the residence of the plaintiff if the vessel is at sea. The United States now moves either to transfer or dismiss the case for improper venue, arguing that Lewis must establish domicile, not mere residence in this district, and that, in any event he does not truly reside in this district.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
1. Venue under the PVA
Admiralty suits are not "civil suits" within the meaning of general venue statutes, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not control. See Denson v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 2d 792, 793 (S.D. Tex. 2000). At the time the complaint was filed, the YANO was at sea, so under the PVA, "if such vessel or cargo [at issue in the suit] be outside the territorial waters of the United States," a lawsuit may be filed "in the district court of the United States for the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have an office for the transaction of business in the United States." 46 App. U.S.C. § 782.
Therefore, the court need only determine whether Lewis is considered to reside in the Northern District for the purposes of the PVA to determine whether the case may properly proceed here. If not, the court must then determine whether the case should be dismissed, or transferred to the District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). There is no case law on the issue of whether the PVA venue provision should be interpreted as requiring mere "residence" (physical presence) or the more restrictive "domicile" (physical presence with an intent to remain indefinitely) in the district at issue.
2. Motion to Transfer
Section 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). There is no established test to determine whether a court should grant a motion to transfer; a court must consider several different "case-specific factors." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). Under the statute, factors to be considered include the convenience of the parties, convenience of the witnesses, and the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Other factors considered are the plaintiff's choice of forum, ease of access to evidence, public or local interest, the familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, and court congestion. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986).
The party bringing the motion to transfer has the burden of showing a "clear balance of inconveniences" against it if the action remains in the original venue, Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979), and a motion to transfer should be denied if the moving party merely prefers another forum, or if the result of transfer would merely be to shift the inconvenience of litigation from one party to another,Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 645-46 (1964).
B. Residence v. Domicile
For the purpose of the PVA venue provision, the court finds that Lewis is required only to prove that he has established "residence" in the district and not "domicile." As an initial matter, not only does the clear language of the statute state that only "residence" is required, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the term "residence" does not connote "domicile" for the purpose of the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), (b)(1). Arley v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 379 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1967); Stacher v. U.S., 258 F.2d 112, 116 (9th Cir. 1958). This holding can be extended to the PVA as well.
Furthermore, the PVA requires only residence and not domicile for business entities, in that venue exists in any district where the business entity has "an office for the transaction of business." 46 U.S.C. § 782. This is expressly different from the language found in the venue provisions for diversity jurisdiction cases, which requires domicile to prove citizenship. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ("a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state . . . where it has its principal place of business;" emphasis added). In expressly using different terminology in the PVA venue provision than in the diversity jurisdiction venue provisions, Congress specifically applies the lesser requirement of residence, or physical presence, rather than the more stringent requirement of domicile, for businesses. It therefore logically follows that the court should infer the same lesser residence requirement for individuals under the PVA.
Public policy supports a looser residency requirement for the PVA as well. The PVA is a mechanism for suit against the federal government which is likely to be used by individuals who spend a large amount of time at sea and have no permanent domicile. For that reason, equating "residence" with "domicile" for the purposes of the PVA's venue provision could exclude a large part of the population likely to bring suit under the PVA.
For example, Lewis' life as a seaman has been transitory. Between 1967 and the present, Lewis held no shoreside job lasting longer than a month. Although Lewis spent most of his shoreside time in Norfolk, Virginia over the past three to four years, the apartment where he was paying rent was not in his name. Lewis has a car registered in Virginia, but the car is no longer in service. Even when Lewis stayed in Norfolk, his mail was sent to his cousin's address in New Orleans, where all of his personal records were kept. Lewis does not know who currently lives at that address. Based on his past history, Lewis could arguably be found not to be domiciled anywhere in the United States. A requirement that he only be permitted to sue under the PVA in a district in which he is domiciled could bar him from filing suit entirely. This is clearly not the intent of the statute.
Given the Ninth Circuit's rule distinguishing "residence" from "domicile" for the purposes of general venue, the Congressional intent evidenced by the language of the PVA and other venue statutes, and the policy reasons favoring a "residence" requirement over a "domicile" requirement, the court finds that Lewis is entitled to file suit under the PVA in the district of his "residence" when the vessel in question is at sea.
C. Lewis' Residence
Lewis testified in his deposition on September 7, 2004 that he currently lives in Oakland, and has lived in Oakland since approximately January or February 2004. Lewis has thus established his residence in the Northern District of California by his physical presence.
To establish that Lewis is domiciled here, by contrast, Lewis must meet a stricter standard of fixed abode in a certain place, plus show an intention to remain at that place permanently or indefinitely. Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940). However, Lewis is currently receiving long-term medical care in the district, and if and when Lewis becomes fit for naval duty again, the San Francisco union hall is the only one from which he can obtain future jobs. While the court does not reach the issue, these facts may be sufficient to establish that Lewis has indeed moved to the Northern District with the intent to remain here indefinitely as well and thus could be considered domiciled here as well.
Relying on two old district court cases from Pennsylvania, the United States next argues that Lewis should not be allowed to "manufacture" venue for the purpose of this suit by filing his claims immediately after moving to the San Francisco Bay Area, and that he in fact resides in Virginia and Louisiana, not California. These cases, which are not binding on this court, are easily distinguished.
In Martin v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a plaintiff domiciled and resident in San Francisco was not permitted to bring a claim in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based solely on her employment of a legal expert there, or on the theory that the Pennsylvanian administrator of the estate in question was the real party in interest. Here, Lewis, the plaintiff, is actually physically present in the Northern District of California and does not reside elsewhere.
In Silk v. United States War Shipping Administration, 79 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Pa. 1948), the plaintiff lived in New Jersey when not at sea, and his only connection to Pennsylvania were occasional visits to the Seamen's Institute in Philadelphia to find work. That was found insufficient for Silk to claim that he had a "place of business" in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Here, Lewis does not claim that his "place of business" is San Francisco solely on the basis that it is where he obtains employment from his union hall, but rather, he claims residence on the basis that he is physically present in the district.
Finally, the United States argues that Lewis has moved to the Northern District for the sole purpose of filing suit in this district. However, even if so, his motive for establishing residence is immaterial for the purposes of analysis. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914).
The United States thus cannot show that Lewis is not actually resident in the Northern District of California.