Opinion
Civil Action 8:21-1171-SAL-MHC
07-07-2022
Christopher Edward Lewallen, Plaintiff, v. Timothy McCarley, James Ruff, Chad McBride, David Stipe, Deputy Brewer, Elisha Barrs, Monica Grier, Rachel Stoner, Stephen Patlewicz, Anmed Hospital, and The County of Anderson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United State Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff brings this action pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violation of his constitutional rights. At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff was a detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. ECF No. 1. He claims that his constitutional rights were violated during his arrest. ECF No. 83. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for assault and battery, based upon the circumstances of his arrest and allegations that he was involuntarily catheterized at the hospital following his arrest. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff is no longer housed at the Detention Center. See ECF Nos. 141 (Notice of Change of Address to Kirkland Correctional Institution); 150 (notifying Court of release from prison).
Before the Court are several motions. Defendants Timothy McCarley, James Ruff, Chad McBride, David Stipe, Deputy Brewer and the County of Anderson (“Detention Center Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 132. Defendants Anmed Hospital, Elisha Barrs and Stephen Patlewicz (“Medical Defendants”) also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 115. Defendant Monica Grier filed two Motions for Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 112 and 121. Defendant Rachel Stoner filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 134. Plaintiff did not file a Response in Opposition to any of the Motions.
Use of the phrase “Individual Detention Center Defendants” refers to these individual defendants, excluding Defendant Anderson County.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 124, with a supporting Affidavit, Id. at 124-1; and the Medical Defendants and Detention Center Defendants filed Responses in Opposition, ECF Nos. 131 and 135.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C. This Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted to Defendants on Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied; that this Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims; and that this action be dismissed.
The facts are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the non-moving party on Defendants' Motions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The facts pertaining to Plaintiff's arrest are primarily drawn from a flash drive containing videos of the arrest, which were recorded by two dash cameras (“DCs”), one on the vehicle of Deputy McCarley (“McCarley DC”) and one on the vehicle of Officer Ruff (“Ruff DC”). See ECF Nos. 135-1 and 135-3. To the extent that the DCs clearly depict the events at issue, they will prevail over contrary versions of the events submitted by either side. “[W]hen a video ‘quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by [the plaintiff] . . . so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt [the plaintiff's] version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.'” Witt v. West Virginia State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alterations in original)). However, this principle does not permit a court to “reject a plaintiff's account on summary judgment” if the “documentary evidence, such as a video,” merely “offers some support for a governmental officer's version of events.” Witt, 633 F.3d at 276 (emphasis in original).
On August 13, 2021, Defendant McCarley, who is an Anderson County Deputy Sheriff, was on patrol on I-85. ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶¶ 1, 3-4. Defendant McCarley is a certified canine handler, and his assigned dog is “Face.” Id. at ¶ 2. Defendant McCarley attempted to stop a silver Hyundai Santa Fe being driven by Plaintiff, after learning the tag on the vehicle was stolen. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff initially stopped the Hyundai, but after Defendant McCarley stopped his patrol car behind the Hyundai, Plaintiff sped away. ECF No. 135-1. Plaintiff proceeded to drive through bushes and over a curb in a parking lot, passed several vehicles on double yellow lines with inches to spare, and almost hit at least one vehicle before stopping. Id.; ECF No. 132-12 at ¶ 6. Another deputy deployed stopsticks in the road, which caused the Hyundai's tires to deflate. Id. Defendant James Ruff, also an Anderson County Deputy Sheriff, positioned his patrol vehicle to intercept the Hyundai. ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3; 132-15, Ruff Aff. ¶¶ 4-5.
After the Hyundai was stopped, Defendant McCarley exited his patrol vehicle, drew his pistol, and approached Plaintiff, who was sitting in the driver's seat, ordering Plaintiff to raise his hands. ECF Nos. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 11; ECF No. 135-1. Plaintiff complied, and Defendant McCarley opened the driver's door of the Hyundai and holstered his pistol. Id. Defendant McCarley then pulled Plaintiff out of the Hyundai and to the ground, attempting to pin Plaintiff down with his knee while reaching to the right rear of his duty belt for a pair of handcuffs. ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 12; see also ECF No. 124-1 at 1, Plaintiff Aff.
Defendant McCarley testified that he punched Plaintiff several times, as a result of Plaintiff's resistance. ECF No. 123-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 13; see also ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. He twice ordered Plaintiff to give Defendant McCarley his hands. Id. Plaintiff rolled on the ground and was not giving Defendant McCarley his right hand. ECF No. 135-3. In addition to ordering Plaintiff to give his hands, Defendant McCarley ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting. ECF Nos. 1351 and 135-3. Defendant McCarley also told Plaintiff that he would release his dog, if Plaintiff kept resisting him. Id.
During this time, Defendant Ruff was handcuffing the Hyundai's female passenger, Monica Craigo. ECF Nos. 132-15, Ruff Aff. ¶¶ 5-7; 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶¶ 18, 19. Defendant Ruff then went around the front of the Hyundai to assist Defendant McCarley. Id.; ECF No. 13212, McCarley Aff. ¶ 18. Defendant McCarley told Defendant Ruff to open the back door of his patrol car so Face could get out. Id.; see also ECF No. 132-15, Ruff Aff. ¶ 7. As Defendant Ruff opened the door of the patrol vehicle, Ms. Craigo moved beside the open driver's side door of the Hyundai, close to Defendant McCarley, and either kicked or kneed Defendant McCarley in the head. ECF Nos. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 19; 132-15, Ruff Aff. ¶ 7; 135-1; 135-3. Defendant McCarley then stated that Ms. Craigo would be facing an assault charge. ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3; see also ECF No. 132-4 at 5.
Although Defendants McCarley and Ruff did not know it at the time of Plaintiff's arrest, a handgun, from which shots had been fired at deputies during the car chase, was later located in the Hyundai. See ECF Nos. 132-4 at 1-4; 132-5; and 132-6.
Once the patrol car's door was opened, Defendant McCarley gave “a bite command, and Face bit [Plaintiff] on the upper part of his right arm.” ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 20. Defendant McCarley told Deputy Ruff to get Ms. Craigo. Id.; see also ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. Plaintiff began screaming and trying to pull away from Face after the dog made contact. ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 21; see also ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. According to Defendant McCarley, resistance “causes the dog to become more engaged and focused on the suspect, which is what happened” to Plaintiff. Id. After moving Ms. Craigo away from the car, Defendant Ruff then returned to assist Defendant McCarley and handcuffed Plaintiff, while Face was attached to Plaintiff and Defendant McCarley controlled Plaintiff's arms. Id. Defendant McCarley then stood and commanded Face to release Plaintiff. ECF No. 123-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 23; see also ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. According to the time stamps on the DCs, the entire exchange with Face occurred in under a minute. See ECF Nos. 135-1 and 135-3.
Defendant Ruff called for EMS to respond to the scene because of the dog bite. Id.; Ruff Aff. ¶ 10. The Pelzer Rescue Squad transported Plaintiff to Defendant Anmed Hospital. See generally, ECF No. 132-8. At the hospital, Plaintiff was seen by the Medical Defendants, as well as Defendant Stoner. The treating paramedic's primary impression of Plaintiff's condition was “Poisoning/Drug Ingestion,” and Plaintiff was noted to be exhibiting “[c]ombative or violent behavior,” as well as experiencing hallucinations. ECF No. 132-8 at 1. In the “Mental Status” comments, the reporting paramedic noted that, per Ms. Craigo, Plaintiff had a history of schizophrenia and had not been taking his medication. Id. Ms. Craigo also informed the paramedic Plaintiff took methamphetamine the day before, and Plaintiff advised the paramedic he had taken methamphetamine several days previously. Id. Plaintiff informed hospital personnel that he smoked crack. ECF No. 115-2 at 11.
Defendants Barrs and Patlewicz are registered nurses and were employed by Defendant AnMed Health (“Anmed” or “Hospital”) on the date Plaintiff was admitted to the emergency room. ECF Nos. 115-4; 115-5. Defendant Barrs took Plaintiff's vital signs upon his arrival at the Hospital, then transferred his care to Defendant Patlewicz and Defendant Rachel Stoner, who is a licensed and board-certified physician assistant employed by In Compass Health, Inc., and was working in the emergency room at Anmed on the date at issue. Id.; ECF No. 134-1.
Plaintiff avers that, while at the Hospital, he was held down against his will by two Anderson County deputies, Defendants Brewer and Stipe, and involuntarily cathaterized (and urine extracted) by AnMed medical staff. ECF No. 124-1 at 2. Plaintiff does not know which Hospital medical staff exactly but indicates he “believes” it was “Elisha Barrs, who did the catheter. If not her it was Rachel Stoner.” Id.
Defendant Monica Grier, M.D., is a board-certified radiologist who read and interpreted an X-ray that had been taken at AnMed on August 13, 2019. ECF No. 112-2. Dr. Grier read the X-ray offsite at Cannon Memorial in Pickens. Id. She never met Plaintiff. Id. She is not an employee of AnMed, nor does she practice in the emergency room there. Id.
Plaintiff received “1-2 sutures” and was given antibiotic ointment for the dog bite. ECF No 115-2 at 6. After Plaintiff was treated, he was released back into police custody and left the emergency room.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
DISCUSSION
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff asserts that his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants. He contends that all Defendants were acting under color of state law. See generally ECF No. 83.
Constitutional claims by pre-trial detainees, such as those raised by Plaintiff here, are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the “due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988).
I. Detention Center Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 132)
The Detention Center Defendants have moved for summary judgment on, and dismissal of, all claims alleged against them. In support of their Motion, they provided affidavits of Defendants McCarley (ECF No. 132-12), Brewer (ECF No. 132-13), Stipe (ECF No. 132-14), and Ruff (ECF No. 132-15), as well as several other documents and dash cam videos (ECF Nos. 1322 through -11; 135-1; 135-3). Although Plaintiff did not file a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, he filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment, which includes arguments in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and an Affidavit. ECF Nos. 124; 124-1.
A. Section 1983 Claims Against Detention Center Defendants
1. Defendant Anderson County
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Anderson County should be dismissed. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff makes no specific allegations in his Second Amended Complaint regarding any wrongdoing by Defendant Anderson County. See ECF No. 83. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Elliott v. Am. States Ins. Co., 883 F.3d 384, 395 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (additional internal citation omitted)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2009) (requiring specific facts must be pled to establish plausibility). While Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . this rule ‘requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action's elements will not do.'” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Thus, “a court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him.” Mickle v. Ahmed, 444 F.Supp.2d 601, 613 (D.S.C. 2006) (citing Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993)). Nor may it “‘conjure up questions never squarely presented' to the court.” Id. (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff has not alleged in his Second Amended Complaint facts sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Anderson County. See generally ECF No. 83.
Instead, Plaintiff's allegations pertain to the actions of several deputies of Anderson County. However, “a deputy sheriff has been considered, both under South Carolina common and statutory law, as the agent of the sheriff, not as [an] ‘employee' of the county.” Allen v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 515 F.Supp. 1185, 1190 (D.S.C. 1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1982). In South Carolina, “the deputy sheriffs are answerable only to the sheriff and not to the county government.” Id.; see also Ramos v. Berkeley Co., No. 2:11-3379-SB, 2012 WL 5292895, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2012) (holding the sheriff's department is “an arm of the state separate and apart from the county”); Millmine v. County of Lexington (S.C.), No. 3:09-1644-CMC, 2011 WL 182875, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 20, 2011) (“In South Carolina, a sheriff's department is an agency of the state, not a department under the control of the county.”). “[I]t is well established in South Carolina case law that law enforcement at the county level is the exclusive province of the sheriff.” Patel by Patel v. McIntrye, 667 F.Supp. 1131, 1146 (D.S.C. 1987) (citing Allen, 515 F.Supp. at 1189-90), aff'dsub nom., Patel by Patel v. Dyar, 848 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1988). Because Defendant Anderson County has no control over the deputy sheriffs serving within the county, “it bears no concomitant responsibility.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Cobb v. State of South Carolina, No. 2:13-CV-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014) (“[S]ince the county has no control over the operations or policy of the jail, it cannot be held liable for events that take place there.”).
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Anderson County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
2. Official Capacity Claims Against Individual Detention Center Defendants: Brewer, McBride, McCarley, Ruff and Stipe
Any § 1983 claim against the Individual Detention Center Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed. Because the Individual Detention Center Defendants are agents or employees of an arm of the State of South Carolina when acting in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (explaining that “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is . . . no different from a suit against the State itself”); see also Pennington v. Kershaw Cnty., S.C., C/A No. 3:12-1509-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 2423120, at *4 n.2 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-1-10 and applying the Eleventh Amendment to a county as “a political subdivision of the State”); Chisolm v. Cannon, C/A No. 4:02-3473-RBH, 2006 WL 361375, at *5-6 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2006) (finding Sheriff and Charleston County Detention Center entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the state); Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. 1992) (holding that employees of a county Sheriff are state officials and thus not liable in their official capacities for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons' for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, in this instance, Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief from the Individual Detention Center Defendants because he is no longer housed at the Detention Center and has not presented any evidence showing a reasonable expectation that he will be detained at the Detention Center in the future, such that any claim for injunctive relief is moot. See ECF No. 82 (change-of-address notice); Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 24849 (4th Cir. 2005) (presuming that former detainee plaintiff will abide by the criminal laws in the future, finding no reasonable probability that he will return to the jail as a pretrial detainee, and holding that former detainee's request for injunctive relief was moot).
Accordingly, the Individual Detention Center Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any § 1983 claim against them in their official capacities or that seeks injunctive relief.
3. Claims for Damages Against the Individual Detention Center Defendants in their Individual Capacities
Although they cannot be sued in their official capacities, the Individual Detention Center Defendants are subject to suit for money damages in their individual capacities in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27; Goodmon v. Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186, 1187 (4th Cir. 1991). However, for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's claims against the Individual Detention Center Defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed.
a. Defendant McCarley
Plaintiff's claim against Defendant McCarley is for excessive use of force in effecting his arrest. ECF No. 83 at 2. Detention Center Defendants contend that Defendant McCarley is entitled to summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force because he used an objectively reasonable amount of force to arrest Plaintiff.
The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures bars police officers from using excessive force to seize a free citizen. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989); Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003). This Court must analyze whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable in determining if the force brought to bear was excessive. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-96; Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1996)); E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 179 (4th Cir. 2018). “Determining the reasonableness of an officer's actions ‘requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.'” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 179 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
Courts evaluate the following three factors when determining if the force used by an officer was reasonable: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts may additionally consider “other ‘objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.'” Id. (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). For example, the “extent of the plaintiff's injuries is also a relevant consideration.” Buchanan, 325 F.3d at 527; see Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. However, “[s]ubjective factors involving the officer's motives, intent, or propensities are not relevant.” Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 120 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994)). “The ultimate question is whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of seizure.” Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 179 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
With regard to the first Graham factor, while the crime giving rise to the arrest of Plaintiff was operating a vehicle with a stolen license tag, the circumstances surrounding his arrest were severe. Notably, Plaintiff initially fled, leading Defendant McCarley on a dangerous chase over a substantial distance in Anderson County. ECF No. 135-1. Plaintiff came to a stop only after another deputy deployed stopsticks and boxed the Hyundai in. Id. Moreover, Defendant McCarley's “training and experience dictate that individuals often use stolen tags on vehicles to hide other, more significant crimes.” ECF No. 132-1, McFarley Aff. ¶ 28. Indeed, that was the case here, as Plaintiff was driving a stolen vehicle. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in Defendant McCarley's favor. See McDaniel v. Jackson, Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-1939-RMG, 2019 WL 6463788, *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2019) (finding first Graham factor to weigh in favor of defendant where plaintiff's vehicle attempted to flee from officer on traffic stop and crashed into another vehicle while doing so); cf. Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2019) (“When the offense is a ‘minor one,' we have found that the first Graham factor weighed in [the] plaintiff's favor.”).
Defendants also emphasize that Plaintiff had a gun in the vehicle and that shots were fired during the car chase, ECF No. 132-1 at 18; however, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendants were aware of this fact at the time of arrest.
The second and third Graham factors consider whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See McDaniel, 2019 WL 6463788, at *4; see also Bryan v. McPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The most important factor under Graham is whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this instance, these two factors are intertwined and also weigh in Defendant McCarley's favor.
Plaintiff contends that he did not pose any threat and was not resisting arrest (ECF No. 83 at 2), and he avers that he “was held down and at no risk of fleeing,” ECF No. 124-1 at 1. However, the DCs reveal otherwise. ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. Plaintiff was initially cooperative in raising his hands upon command, though only after the aggressive vehicle chase came to an end. ECF No. 123-12, McCarley Aff. ¶¶ 9, 11. Once Plaintiff was on the ground, he was less than cooperative, rolling around and refusing to give Defendant McCarley his right hand, despite orders to do so. See ECF No. 135-3.
Moreover, while Plaintiff remained uncuffed, there was another individual on the scene, Ms. Craigo. When Plaintiff continued to attempt to roll and would not give Defendant McCarley his hand, Defendant McCarley yelled for Defendant Ruff to open the back door of Defendant McCarley's patrol vehicle so Face could come to his assistance. ECF No. 123-12, McCarley Aff. at ¶¶ 14, 18; ECF Nos. 135-1 and 135-3. At this point, Defendant Ruff left Ms. Craigo to do so. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Ruff could have assisted Defendant McCarley with putting handcuffs on him. See ECF No. 83 at 2. This ignores, however, that Ms. Craigo then moved close to the open driver's side door of the Hyundai, began yelling, and kicked or kneed Defendant McCarley, all of which raise concerns for the officers' safety. Although Ms. Craigo was handcuffed, she was standing next to the open door of the Hyundai, where a weapon was later located. Indeed, Defendant Ruff ran back over to secure Ms. Craigo and moved her away from the car. ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. Under the totality of these circumstances, Defendant McCarley's actions were objectively reasonable.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant McCarley did not “handcuff Plaintiff in the upright position” and that “at no time did McCarley use or attempt to use his taser or mace. He went straight to physical force.” ECF No. 83 at 2. However, Plaintiff has not cited to any authority requiring these steps be taken, and the undersigned is not persuaded otherwise. Indeed, officers are trained “to remove suspects from vehicles due to the potential for them to access weapons within [a] car, and to put suspects into disadvantageous physical positions prior to handcuffing.” ECF No. 123-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 12. Moreover, the only evidence before the Court is that Defendant McCarley does not carry a taser or mace and that his intermediate weapon option is his assigned canine. ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 16.; see also ECF No. 123-10 at 3. When Defendant McCarley was not able to overcome Plaintiff's resistance and gain compliance with hard, empty hand control, Defendant McCarley warned Plaintiff he was going to release Face and then did so, after Plaintiff failed to comply. See id.; see also ECF Nos. 132-10 at 3; 132-11 at 1 (noting “the canine may be utilized under the same conditions a deputy would use an intermediate weapon”). Notably, the measures Defendant McCarley employed worked, as following the bite, he and Defendant Ruff were able to handcuff Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.
Additionally, the extent of Plaintiff's injuries were minor, further weighing in Defendant McCarley's favor. See Buchanan, 325 F.3d at 527. Plaintiff avers that Face caused “severe lacerations to [his] right arm, causing gaping wounds that needed surgery and stitches with permanent scarring.” ECF No. 124-1. However, there is no medical evidence before the Court regarding a gaping wound, the need for surgery or any long-term or lasting injury. See Lassiter v. Reece, Civ. Action No. 3:07-885-HFF-JRM, 2008 WL 2852164, at *5 (D.S.C. July 22, 2008) (characterizing plaintiff's injury as de minimis where dog bite wounds were cleaned, treated with antibiotic ointment and bandaged, and the plaintiff provided with a tetanus shot and antibiotics) (citing Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (claims of nerve damage and pain, without medical records establishing long-term injury, insufficient to demonstrate excessive use of force); Cooper v. City of Virginia Beach, 817 F.Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“lasting or serious injury” must be proven to escape summary judgment in excessive force case), aff'd, 21 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1994) (table). While at the hospital, Plaintiff received a few stitches for the three bite wounds on his arm. ECF No. 115-2 at 6. Plaintiff refused a tetanus shot and was prescribed an antibiotic. Id. at 6-7. As in Lassiter, “[t]here is no record of any further treatment being needed.” 2008 WL 2852164, at *5.
Of further note, there are no allegations by Plaintiff or evidence before the Court that any force was used against him after he was handcuffed, which “supports the finding that the force used by the officers was that force which was necessary to affect the arrest of an aggressive individual in a rapidly changing environment.” Wilson v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 2005).
Under the totality of circumstances here, including specifically Defendant McCarley's orders to cease resisting arrest, warning to Plaintiff prior to use of the canine, and Plaintiff's minor injuries, Defendant McCarley's use of force in taking Plaintiff into custody was objectively reasonable. Lassiter, 2008 WL 2852164 at *5 (“Where a plaintiff's claims of serious injury are entitled to little weight, so are his claims of excessive force.”); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (noting the “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a given situation.”); Mickle, 444 F.Supp.2d at 611 (“Because [the plaintiff] was forcibly resisting arrest, it was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to allow the K-9 to hold [the plaintiff] until he was securely handcuffed.”). Accordingly, Defendant McCarley is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under § 1983 for excessive use of force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
b. Defendant Ruff
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Ruff personally participated in any of the actions giving rise to the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. The law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government employee in his personal capacity. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)); Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 439 n.7 (4th Cir. 2015). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff cannot make out an excessive force claim against Defendant Ruff. See McDaniel, 2019 WL 6463788, at *3 (finding no allegations to support excessive force claim against defendant who was not the K-9 handler).
Instead, Plaintiff contends Defendant Ruff is liable because he “did not intervene to protect Plaintiff from being beaten by” Defendant McCarley and he allowed Plaintiff to be bitten by opening the door to release Face. ECF No. 83 at 2. Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendant Ruff should be held liable under a theory of bystander liability. As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, “an officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act.” Randall v. Prince George 's Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). In other words, officers cannot stand on the sidelines; rather, in certain situations, they are “obliged to act.” Id.; see also Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence.”).
Plaintiff's bystander liability claim against Defendant Ruff fails, first and foremost, because Defendant McCarley did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, Plaintiff makes a conclusory allegation that Defendant Ruff was aware Defendant McCarley was hitting him. However, Defendant Ruff was handcuffing Ms. Craigo while Defendant McCarley was dealing with Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 135-1; 135-3. There is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Ruff saw what was occurring between Defendant McCarley and Plaintiff during the initial attempt to handcuff Plaintiff or that Defendant Ruff had any reasonable opportunity to do anything other than secure Ms. Craigo while Defendant McCarley was securing Plaintiff. See N. C. ex rel. Hailey v. Westmoreland, 267 F.Supp.2d 497, 502 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (finding that the defendant officer did not have a reasonable opportunity to prevent harm to the plaintiff where another officer's act in striking the plaintiff occurred, if it all, “without warning” and in a “very brief' time period); Dukes v. Richards, No. 5:06-CT-3094-D, 2009 WL 9056101, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 27, 2009) (granting summary judgment on a bystander liability claim where the testimony in the record indicated that “even if [the defendant officer] was standing next to [the] plaintiff during the alleged incident, [the defendant] would not have had a reasonable opportunity to prevent some other officer's sudden decision to kick [the] plaintiff”), aff'd, 366 Fed.Appx. 467 (4th Cir. 2010).
As to Plaintiff's assertion that Defendant Ruff allowed Plaintiff to be bitten by releasing Face, the undersigned acknowledges Defendants' point that Defendant Ruff's release of the canine did not cause Plaintiff to be bitten. See Hinds v. Mohr, 56 Fed.Appx. 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2003) (where a police canine was under the control of its handler, granting summary judgment to remaining police officers given the plaintiff did “not contend that [they] possessed by virtue of their positions or their training any ability to restrain the dog while it was under [the handler's] command”); Edwards v. High Point Police Dept., 559 F.Supp.2d 653, 661 (M.D. N.C. 2008) (noting noncanine handler officer was entitled to summary judgment since he had no means to control the dog, because he “was not a canine handler”). Instead, it was Defendant McCarley's command to the dog which caused the bite to occur. See ECF No. 132-12, McCarley Aff. ¶ 20. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's argument appears to be that Defendant Ruff should not have opened the patrol car door in the first instance. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument incorrectly presupposes a constitutional violation by Defendant McCarley, Defendant Ruff did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid the scenario as it played out. Indeed, Plaintiff has offered no logical or reasonable alternative to opening the patrol door for Face to get out to help gain control over Plaintiff, in light of Plaintiff's continued resistance, particularly after a warning to him that the dog would be released if he did not comply.
There is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Ruff used any excessive force against Plaintiff, knew any constitutional right had been violated or had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the alleged harm to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant Ruff is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under § 1983 for excessive use of force and bystander liability. See Kelly v. Solomon, No. 3:17-CV-311-FDW, 2020 WL 247539, at *14 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 15, 2020) (holding an excessive force claim against one Defendant officer who allegedly struck Plaintiff in the temple survived summary judgment, but that a bystander liability claim against another Defendant officer did not survive summary judgment because there was no evidence the bystander officer had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the single strike to Plaintiff's head).
c. Defendant McBride
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant McBride personally participated in any of the actions giving rise to the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. As noted above, personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government employee in his personal capacity. Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171. Because Plaintiff has presented no evidence of personal wrongdoing by Defendant McBride, instead making only generalized, conclusory allegations which are insufficient to impose constitutional liability, Defendant McBride is entitled to summary judgment. See Elliott, 883 F.3d at 395; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676, 678; Francis, 588 F.3d at 196-97.
Although the Second Amended Complaint contains no allegations regarding personal actions by Defendant McBride, Plaintiff alleges that he is responsible for the constitutional deprivations by the other Detention Center Defendants by virtue of his authority as sheriff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant “McBride also is responsible because he's been notified of all the deputies [sic] misconduct in this case but has done nothing to correct their actions. [F]urthermore he implements a policy that violates the rights of arrestees and citizens.” ECF No. 83 at 4. He claims Defendant McBride was aware of past complaints against the deputies involved in this action, “but has not done anything to prevent them from continuing their misconduct resulting in these violations . . . against [Plaintiff].” Id.
In other words, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant McBride responsible pursuant to a vicarious liability or respondeat superior theory. The doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior, however, are generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Doe, 795 F.3d at 439 n.7 (“Because principles of respondeat superior do not apply in imposing liability under § 1983, it is not enough that Rosa had general supervisory authority over Brandenburg and other Citadel employees. His own individual actions must violate the [plaintiffs'] rights.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; McWilliams v. Fairfax Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1197 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding “that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”).
Even if Plaintiff were pursuing a supervisory theory of liability under § 1983 against Defendant McBride, the claim fails. “[S]upervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). In such a case, liability “is not premised on respondeat superior, but on a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has stated a plaintiff must show the following three elements to establish supervisor liability under section 1983:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices[;] and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2016). As set forth in detail above, Plaintiff has not established any constitutional injury. Moreover, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant McBride had actual or constructive knowledge that any of his subordinates was “engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury” to Plaintiff, nor that Defendant McBride was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the “alleged offensive practices.” See Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support a § 1983 claim against Defendant McBride. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (in a civil rights action, “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.”). Therefore, as to the § 1983 claim against Defendant McBride, the Detention Center Defendants' Motion should be granted.
d. Defendants Stipe and Brewer
Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendants Stipe and Brewer are for an “illegal search and seizure” regarding the taking of his urine without a warrant and against his will. ECF No. 83 at 3. As noted above, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege not only that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, but also that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 48.
Generally, the taking of a urine sample constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.Carroll v. City of Westminster, 233 F.3d 208, 211 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). However, in this instance, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendants Stipe and Brewer, or any person acting under the color of state law, took Plaintiff's urine sample.
The parties dispute whether a urine sample was involuntarily taken from Plaintiff. For purposes of Defendants' Motions only, the undersigned assumes, as set forth in Plaintiff's affidavit, that his urine was involuntarily taken at the hospital. ECF No. 124-1 at 2.
Indeed, the only evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff's urine was collected at the hospital, by hospital personnel, at best with the assistance of Deputies Stipe and Brewer. The deputy sheriffs did not order a urine test or otherwise command that the hospital take his urine. See ECF No. 131-1 at 4, ¶¶ 12. There is no evidence that any law enforcement officer ordered or otherwise took or used Plaintiff's urine sample. Under the circumstances, Plaintiff has not established any civil rights violation by Defendants Stipe and Brewer, such that Plaintiff has not established a § 1983 against those Defendants. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (“Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted).
Complaints raising issues pertaining to civil rights violations and illegal searches and seizures are routinely filed in federal district courts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, a review of the text of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint reveals that, while he does use such terms as “illegal search and seizure” in describing the claim arising from the collection of his urine, the gravamen of his assertion is that Defendants Stipe and Brewer are liable under South Carolina law for “assault and battery.” ECF No. 83. Such claims may be pursued under state law. See Discussion § IV, infra. Section 1983, however, does not impose liability for violations arising under state law. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (noting the federal constitution does not transform common law torts committed by state actors into a constitutional violation).
B. Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “[p]ublic officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” City & Cty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.”).
In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a twopronged inquiry: (1) “whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer's conduct violated a federal right”; and (2) “whether the right in question was ‘clearly established' at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs bear the burden of proof to show that a constitutional violation occurred, while “defendants bear the burden of showing that the violation was not clearly established, and they are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 302 n.5 (4th Cir. 2021).
As set forth above, Plaintiff has not shown that a constitutional violation has occurred. On this basis alone, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Even if Plaintiff had, however, the Detention Center Defendants have shown that no Individual Detention Center Defendant violated a clearly established right, such that the Detention Center Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
When inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established, a court must first “define the precise right into which [it is] inquiring.” Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 907 (4th Cir. 2016). After defining the right, the court then asks whether it was clearly established at the time the officers acted. Id. A right satisfies this standard when it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015); Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2013).
The right at issue must have been defined “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” McKinney v. Richland County Sheriff's Dep't, 431 F.3d 415, 417 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is not enough to say in this case that any Individual Detention Center Defendant violated Plaintiff's clearly established right to be free from the use of excessive force, because that right is defined at too “high [a] level of generality.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cotesluna, ___ U.S.___, 142 S.Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)).
There are no Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court cases delineating a constitutional violation by any Individual Detention Center Defendant under the circumstances alleged in this case. It follows that no reasonable officer in this instance could have known his or her conduct violated any clearly established law. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that the Detention Center Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force.
II. Federal Claims Against Medical Defendants and Defendants Grier and Stoner
There is no evidence before the Court that any of the Medical Defendants, Defendant Grier or Defendant Stoner are state actors, which is a requirement for Plaintiff's claim against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West, 487 U.S. at 48.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not alleged any individual action by Defendants Grier or Defendant Patlewicz. Instead, he avers that, while at the Hospital, he was held down against his will by two Anderson County deputies, Defendants Brewer and Stipe, and involuntarily cathaterized (and urine extracted) by AnMed medical staff. ECF No. 124-1 at 2. Plaintiff does not know which Hospital medical staff exactly but indicates he “believes” it was “Elisha Barrs, who did the catheter. If not her it was Rachel Stoner.” Id. Notwithstanding neither Defendant Grier nor Patlewicz is a government employee or state actor, the law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government employee in his personal capacity. Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171; Rosa, 795 F.3d at 439 n.7; see Trulock, 275 F.3d at 402. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot make out any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Grier or Patlewicz.
With regard to Plaintiff's claim against Anmed, inanimate objects such as buildings and grounds do not act under color of state law; therefore, they are not “person[s]” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Vanzant v. Carolina Ctr. for Occupational Health, No. 8:14-CV-03725-RBH, 2015 WL 5039302, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2015) (“It remains well-settled law in this circuit that detention centers and medical facilities . . . cannot be sued in a section 1983 lawsuit.”); see also Preval v. Reno, 203 F.3d 821, 2000 WL 20591, at *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (finding that a jail “is not a ‘person' and is therefore not amenable to suit under § 1983”); Jackson v. Palmetto Baptist Hosp., No. 3:05-1901-CMC-BM, 2005 WL 5405815, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2005) (dismissing Palmetto Baptist Hospital as a defendant because it was not a person withing the meaning of § 1983), aff'd, 181 Fed.Appx. 391 (4th Cir. 2006). For this reason alone, Defendant Anmed Hospital, as a facility, is not subject to a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Moreover, as to Plaintiff's federal claim against the Medical Defendants, as well as Defendants Grier and Stoner, the “under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The person charged must either be a state actor or have a sufficiently close relationship with state actors such that a court would conclude that the non-state actor is engaged in the state's actions.” DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 506 (4th Cir. 1999). “[P]rivate activity will generally not be deemed ‘state action' unless the state has so dominated such activity as to convert it into state action: ‘Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party' is insufficient.” Id. at 507 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
To qualify as state action, the conduct in question “must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, 941 F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1991). Purely private conduct, “no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Peirce v. Bryant, No. CIV.A. 4:14-2927-BHH, 2015 WL 5474803, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2015) (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961)); see also Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50; Wiggins v. 11 Kew Garden Ct., 497 Fed.Appx. 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2012). Whether a private individual's or corporation's action rises to the level of state action necessarily depends on the relationship between the activity and the state. The inquiry involves “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action . . . so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). The question of whether a party is acting under color of state law is a question of law to be resolved by the court. Rodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2003).
The only evidence before the Court establishes that the Medical Defendants, Defendant Grier and Defendant Stoner were private, not government, employees. There is no evidence before the Court that they were acting in any other capacity than as private health care providers, nor that any government employee or state actor had any influence over their medical decision to take Plaintiff's urine. As noted above, the deputy sheriffs did not order a urine test or otherwise command that the hospital take Plaintiff's urine. See ECF No. 131-1 at 4, ¶¶ 12. There is no evidence that any law enforcement officer took or otherwise used Plaintiff's urine sample. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite state action for a claim against any of these Defendants, such that his claim against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed. See West, 487 U.S. at 48.
III. Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment asserts reasons why Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims and argues that he has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on the claims. See ECF No. 124. The undersigned has considered all of the arguments set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in analyzing, reviewing, and setting forth reasons why Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment.
IV. State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts state law claims for assault and battery against the Detention Center Defendants, Medical Defendants, Defendant Grier and Defendant Stoner.
If the district judge accepts this Report and Recommendation, the original federal jurisdiction claims will be dismissed and the only remaining claims will be Plaintiff's state law claims for assault and battery. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....” The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “trial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district judge decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims and that the state law claims be dismissed without prejudice. See Williams v. Horry-Georgetown Tech. Coll., 26 F.Supp.3d 519, 543 (D.S.C. 2014); see also Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir. 1989).
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that (1) the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the Detention Center Defendants (ECF No. 132), the Medical Defendants (ECF No. 115), Defendant Grier (ECF Nos. 112 and 121) and Defendant Stoner (ECF No. 134) be GRANTED, in part, on Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such that all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED with prejudice; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 124) be DENIED; (3) the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, such that all state law claims be DISMISSED without prejudice; and (4) the case be DISMISSED in its entirety.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).