Summary
In Levy v. Fire Association of Philadelphia, 321 Pa. 45, 183 A. 776, plaintiff's hand was caught between elevator doors.
Summary of this case from Hucaluk v. Clyde Realty Co., Inc.Opinion
January 14, 1936.
March 23, 1936.
Negligence — Elevator — Operation — Closing doors — Contributory negligence — Evidence.
1. In action for injuries sustained by plaintiff, who was making a delivery in defendant's building, when his hand was caught between two elevator doors which he was closing because told to do so by an employee of defendant, evidence held insufficient as a matter of law to establish negligence of defendant, where no defect was shown to exist in the elevator, and no evidence was submitted to show fault on the part of defendant arising from lack of adequate instructions to plaintiff. [46-7]
2. Where plaintiff's first attempt to shut elevator doors from outside by pulling a strap on the inside proved unsuccessful, and plaintiff made a second try which caused sudden closing of doors resulting in injury, he was guilty of contributory negligence since he knew or should have known of the danger involved. [46-7]
3. Rule that when the instrumentality which caused the injury is under the control of the owner and an accident occurs which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened if those in control had used care, it affords evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident happened as a result of want of care, held not applicable. [46-7]
Before KEPHART, C. J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN and BARNES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 440, Jan. T., 1935, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1934, No. 187, in case of Max Levy v. Fire Association of Philadelphia. Judgment affirmed.
Trespass. Before KUN, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict directed for defendant and judgment entered thereon. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was direction of verdict for defendant.
George F. Lowenthal, for appellant.
Michael A. Foley, for appellee, was not heard.
Argued January 14, 1936.
Appellant, a trucker, hauled cabinets to appellee's building. An employee of the building took him and the cabinets to the basement on a freight elevator. The employee then departed telling appellant to close the elevator. The doors came together from top to bottom meeting in the center, and, to close them, appellant stood outside the elevator and pulled a strap inside of it. The doors did not move. He pulled again and they shut catching his hand and causing the injuries for which this action is brought. On the facts the trial judge nonsuited appellant for want of evidence of negligence on the part of appellee. This ruling was correct.
No defect was shown to exist in this elevator. The question of fault arising from lack of adequate instructions to a party known to be unfamiliar with elevators does not arise for no evidence was submitted to establish liability in this manner. Appellant sought to invoke the rule that when the instrumentality which caused the injury is under the control of the owner and an accident occurs which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened if those in control had used care, it affords evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident happened as a result of want of care. See Knox v. Simmerman, 301 Pa. 1; McKnight v. Kresge Co., 285 Pa. 489; Phelan v. Armstrong Cork Co., 282 Pa. 285; Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216; Shafer v. Lacock, Hawthorn Co., 168 Pa. 497; Hamill v. P. R. T. Co., 98 Pa. Super. 242. For obvious reasons the rule does not apply in this case; if it did, it would apply in almost every case.
Appellant had the opportunity to observe, while riding in the elevator, how the doors closed and that they were operated from the inside. In attempting to shut the doors from the outside and in jerking the strap a second time he assumed the risk and was guilty of contributory negligence. As the court below stated, after the first attempt to release the doors by pulling the strap inside the door proved unsuccessful, it was negligence on appellant's part to repeat an effort which obviously would subject him to the danger which actually resulted.
Judgment affirmed.