Opinion
HHDCV156063223S
07-21-2016
Jill K. Levin, Administratrix of the Estate of Margaret Rohner v. State of Connecticut
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
Before this court is a motion filed by the defendant, the State of Connecticut, seeking to strike the complaint of the plaintiff, Jill K. Levin, Administratrix of the Estate of Margaret Rohner. In support of its motion to strike, the defendant argues that based on the authority of Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 586-87, 50 A.3d 802 (2012), the plaintiff has failed to state a claim because there can be no cause of action in medical malpractice for a non-patient third party. In response, the plaintiff claims that this not a medical malpractice case but rather sounds in common-law negligence. The court agrees with the defendant and for the following reasons, grants the motion to strike the complaint.
The plaintiff alleges that the decedent was attacked and stabbed by her son, Robert Rankin, during his release on a visitation pass from River Valley Services (RVS), a mental health residential treatment facility operated by the State of Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. The plaintiff further alleges that RVS, by its agents and/or employees, was negligent in its diagnosis, care, treatment and custody of Rankin and failed to exercise that standard of care, skill and treatment exercised by reasonably prudent, similar health care providers.
The plaintiff does not challenge the holding of Jarmie v. Troncale, supra, 306 Conn. 625, which clearly holds that a cause of action sounding in medical malpractice will not lie against a non-patient plaintiff, which in this case is Margaret Rohner by way of the administratix of her estate. " [A] cause of action alleging medical malpractice must be brought by a patient against a health care provider because the language of the statute specifically provides that the alleged negligence must have occurred 'in the care or treatment of the claimant' . . . As we explained in Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Ass'n, 262 Conn. 248, 811 A.2d 1266 (2002), '[t]he classification of a negligence claim as either medical malpractice or ordinary negligence requires a court to review closely the circumstances under which the alleged negligence occurred. [P]rofessional negligence or malpractice . . . [is] defined as the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services . . . Furthermore, malpractice presupposes some improper conduct in the treatment or operative skill [or] . . . the failure to exercise requisite medical skill . . . From those definitions, we conclude that the relevant considerations in determining whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice are whether (1) the defendants are sued in their capacities as medical professionals, (2) the alleged negligence is of a specialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship, and (3) the alleged negligence is substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment and involved the exercise of medical judgment . . . [T]o prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the requisite standard of care for treatment, (2) a deviation from that standard of care, and (3) a causal connection between the deviation and the claimed injury.'" (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Jarmie v. Troncale, supra, 587-88. In Jarmie, the absence of any allegations of a physician-patient relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was fatal to the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim. Id., 588-89.
Although the plaintiff strives mightily to characterize this matter as a common-law negligence case since a clearly pled complaint pursuant to Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 632, 674 A.2d 811, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 872, 117 S.Ct. 188, 136 L.Ed.2d 126 (1996), may well allow for one, the criteria under Jarmie compels this court to find otherwise. The plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendant was " negligent in its diagnosis, care, treatment and custody of Rankin and failed to exercise that standard of care, skill and treatment exercised by reasonably prudent, similar health care providers." The language of her complaint reflects (1) the capacity in which the defendant is sued, specifically as health care professionals; (2) the medical professional-patient relationship between the defendant and Rankin; and (3) that the negligence arises out of and is substantially related to the defendant's diagnosis and treatment of Rankin. This court rejects the claim that this matter sounds in common-law negligence.
In Fraser, the Court suggested the limited availability of a negligence claim against medical providers by a third party where that third party is an identifiable victim of the medical provider's patient.
Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff sought and received permission to sue from the Office of the Claims Commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160(b) further undermines her claim. In his finding and order, the Claims Commissioner referenced the Good Faith Certificate filed pursuant to § 4-160(b) which mandates that he " shall authorize suit against the state on such claim." As such, and as reflected in his finding and order dated June 1, 2015, the Commissioner specifically limited suit " to that portion of the claim alleging malpractice against the state, a state hospital or a sanitarium or against a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, or all other licensed health care providers employed by the state."
Thus the plaintiff's argument suffers from a dual dilemma. First, by the express language of the provisions of § 4-160(b), the Commissioner has no discretion but to authorize suit in medical malpractice claims upon the filing of a good faith certificate, and the Commissioner duly limited authorization to such. Thus, this court's subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on the claim's character as a medical malpractice action, which then fails in light of this court's foregoing analysis under Jarmie . Second, even if the complaint could be construed as a common-law negligence action, then the court would be forced to consider and ultimately determine that it is without subject matter jurisdiction since there is no basis for finding that the Claims Commissioner specifically authorized it as such. See Estate of Bochicchio v. Quinn, 136 Conn.App. 359, 368-69, 46 A.3d 239 (2012).
Although the plaintiff objects to this court's consideration of the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a motion to dismiss, the court specifically requested and received supplemental briefing of the issue, noting that this court has an obligation at any time to determine, even suo moto, questions involving its jurisdictional authority. See Lenge v. Goldfarb, 169 Conn. 218, 222, 363 A.2d 110 (1975) (questions of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even by court suo motu.)
Having considered the claims of the parties, this court concludes that it need not rule on the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction in light of its determination that the matter sounds in medical malpractice. The court grants the motion to strike the complaint.