Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-11354-PBS.
February 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Following a trial, the jury ruled for defendant on plaintiffs' claims of intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranty regarding plaintiffs' purchase of certain antique furniture from defendant. Plaintiffs now seek findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) on a claim of unjust enrichment and a claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A § 9. After considering the evidence introduced at trial and the supplemental filings, the Court enters judgment for defendant on both claims for the following reasons:
1. Under Massachusetts choice of law principles, New York law, not ch. 93A, applies to plaintiffs' consumer protection claim, as well as to plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. See Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 393 Mass. 622, 631-35, 473 N.E.2d 662, 668-71 (1985) (listing choice of law considerations). The Court stated its reasons for this determination on the record. Most significantly, plaintiffs' interior designer purchased the antiques in New York and personally arranged to have them shipped to Massachusetts.
2. Plaintiffs have no consumer protection claim under New York General Business Law § 349 because, even if defendant's conduct falls with the "consumer-oriented ambit" of the statute, "[p]rivate contract disputes, unique to the parties, . . . would not fall within the ambit of the statute." Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 N.Y.2d 20, 25-26, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (1995) (internal quotation omitted); see also Exxonmobil Inter-America, Inc. v. Advanced Info. Eng'g Servs., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("plaintiff must allege that the disputed acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large" to state a consumer protection claim under New York law); Infostar Inc. v. Worcester Ins. Co., 924 F. Supp. 25, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
3. Even if Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A applied, the jury found that there was no breach of warranty or intentional misrepresentation with respect to any of the disputed antiques. See Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 382 (D. Mass. 1996) (granting summary judgment for defendant because plaintiff "advanced no facts in support of his ch. 93A claim, other than the facts underlying his [failed] warranty and negligence claims");Macoviak v. Chase Home Mortg. Corp., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 755, 760, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's ch. 93A claim because it was "solely based upon his underlying claim for common law fraud," on which the court had also granted summary judgment). Although the jury found negligent misrepresentation with respect to the grandfather clock and the vases that plaintiffs purchased, they found that the negligent misrepresentations caused no damages. See Darviris v. Petros, 442 Mass. 274, 278, 812 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (2004) ("a violation of G.L. c. 93A requires, at the very least, more than a finding of mere negligence"); McCann v. Davis, Malm D'Agostine, 423 Mass. 558, 560, 669 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (1996) ("The jury finding that the defendants' negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages disposes of the G.L. c. 93A claim as well."). I agree with the jury's findings of fact and find no violation of ch. 93A. See, e.g., McCann, 423 Mass. at 561, 669 N.E.2d at 1079 (upholding ch. 93A decision that incorporated jury's finding of facts).
4. Plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment also fails. "Generally, if there is an adequate remedy at law, a court will not permit a claim in equity." Bongat v. Fairview Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 181, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); see id. (dismissing claim of unjust enrichment under New York law because plaintiff had viable claims at law). Here there was an adequate remedy at law. Moreover, unjust enrichment "only applies in the absence of an express agreement," such as the agreement between the parties in this case for the purchase of the antiques at issue. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 388, 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1987); id. at 388-89, 516 N.E.2d at 193 (unjust enrichment available only "where there has been no agreement or expression of assent, by word or act, on the part of either party involved") (internal quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Morales v. Grand Cru Assoc., 759 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891 (N.Y.App.Div. 2003) ("The existence of an express agreement, whether oral or written, governing a particular subject matter precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter."). While plaintiffs may well have paid an excessive price for the antiques, they agreed to that price and cannot invoke the doctrine of unjust enrichment to escape from a bad deal where they failed to establish the causes of action available at law.
II. ORDER
With respect to the requests for findings of fact and rulings of law filed by plaintiffs (Docket No. 343) and defendant (Docket No. 347), the Court enters judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment and plaintiffs' claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A.