Summary
applying Puerto Rico damages law to Virgin Island residents injured in Puerto Rico
Summary of this case from In re Air Crash Near Rio GrandeOpinion
Civ. Nos. 93-1473 (DRD), 93-1832 (DRD)
August 24, 1995.
Wanda I. Medina-De-Soler, Medina Roman Del Valle, Rio Piedras, PR, Maritilde Roman-del-Valle, Rio Piedras, PR, Manuel Porro-Vizcarra, Santurce, PR, Jeffrey M. Williams-English, Indiano, Williams Weinstein-Bacal, Hato Rey, PR, for plaintiffs.
Diego A. Ramos-Cayon, Fiddler, Gonzalez Rodriguez, San Juan, PR, Maria E. Pico, Bufete Pico, Miramar, PR, Stephen R. Stegich, Peter F. Tamigi, Condon Forsyth, New York, NY, Jose R. Garcia-Perez, A.J. Bennazar-Zequeira, Gonzalez, Bennazar, Garcia-Arregui Fullana, Hato Rey, PR, Lawrence E. Duffy, Martinez-Alvarez, Fernandez Paoli, Menendez, Monroig, Menendez Cortada LeFranc Rome, Santurce, PR, Antonio J. Bennazar, Guaynabo, PR, for defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Codefendants CASA and CASA U.S.A. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing the Wrongful Death Claims of the Siblings of Alton E. Leslie, the Claims of Decedent's Parents for Non Pecuniary Wrongful Death Damages and the Claim for Decedent's Personal Injuries, Docket #185, American Airlines motion joining CASA defendants request, Docket #200, plaintiff's opposition thereto and cross motion for summary judgment, Docket #206, and codefendants' reply thereto, Docket #209 which the Court will now address. Codefendants allege that choice of law rules governing the case mandate the application of Virgin Islands Law and consequently various claims should be dismissed or limited accordingly.
Related to these documents is also Docket #223, entitled "Leslie Plaintiffs Documentary Supplement . . ."
The standard upon solving a motion for summary judgment is first reexamined.
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.Civ.P. Rule No. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must then designate specific facts that show that there is a genuine triable issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
A fact is material if, under applicable substantive law, it may affect the result of the case. Ortega-Rosario v. Alvarado-Ortiz, 917 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1990). A dispute is genuine only if there is conflicting evidence that requires a trial to resolve the discrepancy. Ortega-Rosario 917 F.2d at 71. A court should deny a motion for summary judgment if the dispute about a material fact is genuine when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, the Court views the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must indulge all inferences in favor of that party. See Le Blanc v. Great American Insurance, 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); Richard A. Mottolo and Service Pumping and Drain Co., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., et al., 43 F.3d 723 (1st Cir. 1995); Lydia Libertad, et al. v. Patrick Welch, et al., 53 F.3d 428 (1st Cir. 1995); Rossy v. Roche Products, Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir. 1989); John Kostas Service Station, Inc. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 948 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1991).
The party opposing the motion for summary judgment can not rely on "mere allegations or denials" of the pleadings. F.R.Civ.P. Rule No. 56(e). Rather, the opposing party must be able to show by affidavits, depositions, answers, and admissions in the record that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
As to issues upon which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, the movant need do no more than aver "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case". Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. The burden of production then shifts to the nonmovant, who, to avoid summary judgment, must establish the existence of at least one question of fact that is both "genuine" and "material". See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The nonmovant, however, may not rest upon mere denial of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. no. 56. See Mottolo, supra at 3.
RELEVANT FACTS
We are familiar with the facts of the case which are the following:
A CASA aircraft C-212 operated in Puerto Rico by Executive Airlines, Inc. took off the Luis Muñoz Marín Airport in Carolina on June 7, 1992 at 1:33 in the afternoon as American Eagle's Flight No. 5456 destined to Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. The aircraft crashed short of the runway in Eugenio Maria de Hostos Airport, Mayaguez.
The Aircraft CASA C-212, operated by Executive Airlines, Inc. under the trade name of American Eagle, was maintained, serviced, fueled and operated in Puerto Rico.
Codefendant Construcciones Aeronáuticas, S.A., (hereinafter referred to as "CASA") is a corporation organized under the laws of a state or country other than the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with its principal place of business in Madrid, Spain. CASA was responsible for the design and manufacture of the aircraft and a beta blocking device designed to prevent accidental reverse thrust by the engines.
Codefendant CASA U.S.A., Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Virginia, with its principal place of business in Washington, D.C.
Codefendant American Airlines, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Delaware with its principal place of business in Dallas, Texas doing business in Puerto Rico.
Plaintiffs Vivian and Esther Leslie are the parents of Captain Alton E. Leslie, the Pilotin-Command of Flight 5456, who was killed in the crash. They are domiciled in the United States Virgin Islands. Plaintiffs Segrid D. Leslie and Linda Leslie McGhee are two of the decedent's siblings; domiciled in Tortola, British Virgin Islands, and North Carolina, respectively. The decedent was not survived by a spouse or lineal descendants.
Warren P. Leslie is the other sibling who is no longer a party to this action. See Leslie plaintiffs opposition at p. 6 n. 11.
DISCUSSION
THE PARTIES CONTENTIONS
Codefendant CASA accepts having designed and manufactured the aircraft and the beta blocking device of the aircraft involved in the accident. CASA USA alleges not being involved in any manner in the aircraft's design, manufacture, distribution or sale of the aircraft. CASA USA admits that from time to time it would provide product support to CASA aircraft.
Codefendants allege in support of their motion that under Puerto Rican choice of law rules the substantive rights of decedents in the instant case are governed by the laws of the Virgin Islands. Codefendants allege that the Virgin Islands have the most significant contacts to issues involving the rights of actions and damage recovery. Codefendants further contend that under the Restatement 2d the law of a decedent's domicile should control the issue of recoverable damages regardless of where the injury was accidentally sustained. Since decedent Leslie resided in the U.S. Virgin Islands, said location is the interested jurisdiction. Codefendants also sustain that in cases wherein plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different jurisdictions the courts of Puerto Rico apply the law of the decedent's domicile. Codefendants cite Fornaris v. American Surety Co., 93 P.R.R. 28 (1966) and Jimenez v. American Airlines, 579 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1983).
Codefendants move the Court to distinguish this case from the holding in Bonn v. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1975), a case that applied the law of the place of the accident to citizens of the Virgin Islands killed in an airplane crash that occurred in Puerto Rico. Defendfants allege that in Bonn the defendant was a local business, tax payer, and employer, different from CASA and CASA USA which lack the described contacts with this jurisdiction.
However codefendant American Airlines, Inc. and American Eagle are also local employers, taxpayers and operate local businesses in Puerto Rico directly related to this accident, the downed aircraft was an American Eagle.
Codefendants then argue disposition of the case based on Virgin Islands' law.
American Airlines, Inc., has joined the CASA defendants request.
The Leslie plaintiffs opposed the CASA defendants and American Airlines, Inc., motions stating, among other factors, that the accidented aircraft was operated in Puerto Rico by Executive Airlines, Inc.; that the aircraft took off from the airport in Carolina and flew entirely on a scheduled flight within Puerto Rico; that as to CASA, the use, sale and installation of the defective blocking device occurred in Puerto Rico. That the operation and maintenance of the defective aircraft also occurred in Puerto Rico, and that the tortious conduct of codefendant American Airlines as to improper supervision and review of safety audits and inspections, occurred in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs also emphasize that Leslie had interests in Puerto Rico where he allegedly lived fifty percent (50%) of the time.
In sum, plaintiffs allege that since Puerto Rico follows the dominant or predominant contacts rule of choice of law under which place of conduct and injury are considered to be determinant, Puerto Rican substantive law is predominant. Plaintiffs also make reference to this Court's order in the case of Rodriguez, et. al. v. American Airlines, et al., Civil No. 92-1789 wherein a motion filed by American Airlines, similar to that filed by the CASA defendants herein, was denied.
The matter in this case is closer than in case No. 92-1789 since in the instant case Executive Airlines, Inc., the owner and operator of the aircraft, a Puerto Rican corporation is not a defendant.
In their reply the CASA defendants continue to sustain that the law of the United States Virgin Islands is to determine the elements of compensatory damages in the case of caption and the identity of who may recover; CASA defendants further oppose the Leslie plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment as unsupported by the facts of the case and judicial authority. CASA defendants further distinguish the pertinent facts as to liability and remedial issues at bar stating that Puerto Rico, as the loci delicti has an interest in setting standards of liability as a means of regulating local conduct, but that the Commonwealth has no interest in the issue of compensating non-citizens. Fearful that Executive Airlines, Inc.'s contacts with Puerto Rico may be attributed to them, the CASA defendants state that CASA designed and manufactured the aircraft and blocking device in Spain and that CASA U.S.A. had no involvement with the design, manufacture or sale of the aircraft.
APPLICABLE LAW
The case of caption is before this court based on diversity of citizenship. We therefore must apply the choice of law rules of Puerto Rico, which is the forum state. Day Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975); Jiménez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1978); González Camejo v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 313 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (D.P.R. 1970).
See also Federal Ins. Co. v. Dresser Ind., Inc., 111 D.P.R. 96 (1981); Green Giant Co. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 489, 499 (1975); A.H. Thomas Co. v. Superior Court, 98 D.P.R. 864, 869 (1970), and in the federal courts: Ríos Jimenez v. American Airlines, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 631, 632 (D.P.R. 1983); Marcano Díaz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 18 (D.P.R. 1988); In re: San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79 (D.P.R. 1990).
Both parties advise the Court of a well briefed matter: that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as forum state has adopted the dominant contact rules of choice of law incorporating the dominant contacts criteria contained in the Restatement 2d of Conflict of Law (1971), particularly sections 145, 175 and 178. Fornaris v. American Surety Co., supra; Bonn, supra. Naturally, each party seeks a different application of the principles contained therein; plaintiffs sustain that the place of the conduct and injury is paramount and codefendants contend otherwise.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals' not recently amended interpretation of the Puerto Rican choice of law rules made in the case of Bonn v. PRINAIR, supra, guides our decision in this case as in the passenger case of Rodriguez, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., et al., 886 F. Supp. 967 (D.Puerto Rico 1995).
We proceed, once more, to review the dominant contacts that arise from the facts of the case.
American Eagle's flight number 5456 was a flight solely within the boundaries of Puerto Rico, i.e. from Carolina to Mayaguez. The downed aircraft was a CASA C-212 designed and manufactured in Spain by CASA and placed in the stream of commerce until eventual arrival in Puerto Rico where the aircraft received support from CASA U.S.A., which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CASA Spain. The pilot of the aircraft, Mr. Alton E. Leslie rendered services in Puerto Rico. The aircraft was maintained, serviced and fueled in Puerto Rico. The beta blocking device manufactured by CASA and distributed by CASA USA was installed and maintained in Puerto Rico.
We have concluded these facts under the standard that for purposes of summary judgment we must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Le Blanc v. Great American Insurance Corp., supra.
There are two principal theories as to the cause of the accident: failure of the allegedly defective beta blocking device in the CASA C-212 aircraft or force majeure, the extreme bad weather into which allegedly the aircraft was flown by the crew. Under both theories the alleged cause of the accident occurred in Puerto Rico.
The accident may have also been caused by an act of God.
The alleged negligence of American Airlines, Inc., in failing to properly supervise and review safety inspections and audits of the aircraft also occurred in Puerto Rico.
Last, and probably most critical, is the fact that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has a concern of significant magnitude in preventing the occurrence of aircraft crashes in Puerto Rico and a valid concern that due indemnity be granted in such cases. Bonn, supra at p. 92. The dominant contacts with Puerto Rico are therefore not based solely on the place of the accident.
In the present case, as in the case of Bonn, the process of balancing contacts results in a tilt toward the applicability of Puerto Rican law; and even if there was a stand still the factors of the place of conduct and injury are determinative in arriving at the conclusion that Puerto Rican law is applicable to the issues at bar. Bonn, supra p. 92. The Bonn case is precisely a case wherein Puerto Rican law was applied to citizens from the Virgin Islands; the accident occurring in Puerto Rico even though the flight was not totally within Puerto Rico.
The Virgin Islands law applicability argued by codefendants is the product of that jurisdiction's interest in limiting recovery against its domiciliaries who might be defendants. Even though plaintiffs in the instant case are Virgin Islands domiciliaries that fact does not weight more heavily than Puerto Rico's "greater interest in that [sic] the wrongful act be not committed, or, if committed, that due reparation be made." Bonn, supra at p. 92.
Codefendants' argument that Puerto Rico has interest only as to liability and no interest at all in the compensatory damages arising from the liability is a valid argument which after due consideration is dismissed. The court rejects the argument because should Puerto Rico have no interest on the compensatory damages the state would be left practically without power to enforce the interest of preventing and regulating aircraft accidents. Puerto Rico has a deterrence interest which is overriding in the above captioned case.
The CASA codefendants seek that summary judgment be entered in their favor upon application of their understanding of the law to the uncontroverted facts of the case. However, summary judgment may not be granted as requested (application of U.S. Virgin Islands law) since the application of the predominant contacts rule of choice of law, and considering that we must make all inferences against the movant and examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Le Blanc, supra, the result is the application of Puerto Rican compensatory damages law to the case of caption. Bonn, supra.
WHEREFORE, the motion for partial summary judgment as to the Leslie plaintiffs is hereby DENIED without prejudice considering that, if appropriate, the remedy may be requested as a Fed.R.Civ.P. No. 50 motion; plaintiffs' cross motion of plaintiffs for summary judgment is hereby DENIED because there are material and genuine facts in controversy as to the issue of liability. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra.
There is plenty of evidence in record that the accident could have been caused by the pilots flying into bad weather.