Opinion
NO. 01-18-00999-CR
11-14-2019
LINDA LIZETTE LERMA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 23rd District Court Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 82180-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Linda Lizette Lerma was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years' confinement. In a single issue, Lerma contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm.
Background
Lerma was indicted for the murder of her fiancée, Joseph Malloy. The evidence presented at trial established the following facts, none of which are disputed on appeal.
In the summer of 2017, Lerma and her two minor sons were living with Malloy in Liverpool, Texas. One afternoon in late June, Lerma drank some moonshine, got into a verbal dispute with Malloy, declared that she was going to kill herself, and then left the house with a loaded firearm. Malloy followed her.
A short while later, Malloy returned, yelling at Lerma, who followed closely behind. The two entered the house, and Lerma shot Malloy, killing him instantly.
Lerma then left the house with her two boys, discarded the firearm in a nearby field, and began walking toward her mother's house in Angleton, Texas. While en route, Lerma was arrested by the police, who had been dispatched to the area in response to a 911 call made by Lerma and Malloy's neighbor.
While in custody, Lerma was interviewed twice by the officers investigating the case. In the first interview, Lerma stated that she and Malloy had been arguing about Malloy's ex-girlfriend, who was the mother of Malloy's biological children. Lerma had discovered that Malloy had been texting her, and Lerma believed Malloy's ex-girlfriend wanted to get back together with him. Lerma stated that, on the day of the shooting, she had been drinking moonshine when Malloy returned home, called her names, and blamed her for him not seeing his children. Lerma stated that she then left the house with a loaded firearm, intending to shoot herself in the woods. Lerma stated that Malloy followed her into the woods and assured her that he loved her. Lerma stated that, on the way back to the house, the two continued to argue, and Lerma finally "snapped" and shot Malloy. In the second interview, Lerma admitted that she had been "mad" and had "exploded," but she also claimed that she "never meant to hurt" Malloy but only meant to "shoot him in the arm or something."
Lerma was indicted for murder. She pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.
After the State presented its case, Lerma presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed Lerma's intelligence. The psychologist testified that Lerma's intelligence was in the "borderline range," which, the psychologist explained, was "above what used to be called mental retardation" but "below the average range." The psychologist opined that Lerma would have difficulty planning an intentional murder and that her killing of Malloy was reactive, arising from her intense emotional state.
The jury found Lerma guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced her to 40 years' confinement.
Lerma appeals.
Legal Sufficiency
In her sole issue, Lerma contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction for murder.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
As charged in this case, a person commits the offense of murder if she (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1), (2). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of her conduct when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b).
We review legal sufficiency challenges under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Fernandez v. State, 479 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Under this standard, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask whether any rational factfinder could have found the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 837-38. If a rational fact-finder could have so found, we will not disturb the verdict on appeal. Id. at 838.
B. Analysis
Here, it is undisputed that Lerma caused the death of Malloy by shooting him with a firearm. And, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is evidence from which a rational factfinder could have found that Lerma either (1) intentionally or knowingly caused Malloy's death or (2) intended to cause Malloy serious bodily injury.
This evidence includes Lerma's use of a firearm, which is a "deadly weapon" from the use of which intent to kill or seriously injure may be inferred. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17)(A) ("'Deadly weapon' means . . . a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury[.]"); Arnold v. State, 234 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ("[W]hen 'a deadly weapon is used in [a] deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that [the appellant] intended to kill . . . ." (quoting Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
The evidence also includes Lerma's flight from the scene and disposal of the firearm, both of which are circumstances from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (concealment of evidence); Robinson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd) (flight).
Finally, the evidence includes Lerma's statements to the investigating officers, which support the State's theory that Lerma shot Malloy in a jealous rage arising from Lerma's discovery that Malloy had been texting his ex-girlfriend and Malloy's complaints that his relationship with Lerma was preventing him from spending time with his children.
Nevertheless, Lerma argues that the evidence is legally insufficient because she repeatedly told the investigating officer that she "never meant to hurt" Malloy but only "meant to shoot him in the arm or something." Lerma contends that these statements prove she did not have the requisite intent to commit murder. We disagree.
Lerma's argument is self-defeating: If Lerma intended to shoot Malloy in the arm, then she intended to cause him serious bodily harm, which is sufficient to support her conviction for murder. See Harrell v. State, 659 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that defendant's testimony "that he intended to hit the deceased in the arm when he fired the .22 rifle from 150 yards away" proved that defendant "intended to cause serious bodily injury to the deceased and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of the deceased"). In any event, the jury, as sole judge of Lerma's credibility, was not required to believe Lerma when she claimed she did not intend to kill Malloy. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("The jury, being the judges of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, could choose to believe or not believe the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony.").
Lerma further argues that the evidence is legally insufficient because she proved she is mentally retarded and thus incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit murder. Again, we disagree.
The psychologist never testified that Lerma is mentally retarded. On the contrary, the psychologist testified that Lerma's intelligence is in the "borderline range," which is above what was previously known as mental retardation but below the average range. We are unaware of any authority providing that a defendant is incapable of forming the intent to murder simply because she has below average intelligence.
Lerma emphasizes the psychologist's testimony that Lerma's conduct was reactive, the result of her emotional state and not long-term planning. But it is well-established that premeditation is not an element of murder. See, e.g., Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Lerma's conviction for murder. Accordingly, we overrule Lerma's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Gordon Goodman
Justice Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Goodman, and Landau. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).