Opinion
November 9, 1954.
LAYTON, J., sitting.
Stephen E. Hamilton, Jr., for Plaintiff below.
Donald W. Booker for Defendant below.
Plaintiff below, hereafter called Leoncavallo, and defendant below, referred to as Evans, had an automobile collision on January 15, 1954. Each brought an independent action against the other in the Court of Common Pleas. On April 22, 1954, judgment was entered in favor of each defendant in each action. Leoncavallo filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court. Evans did not appeal but filed a counterclaim in the Leoncavallo appeal.
The right to file a counterclaim does not exist in that Court.
Leoncavallo has moved to strike the Evans counterclaim upon the ground that the cause of action was fully litigated in Common Pleas Court and is res adjudicata. Evans defends his right to assert it upon the ground that the Superior Court appeal constitutes a trial de novo in which a defendant by Rule 13, Del. C. Ann., is entitled to file a counterclaim.
Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 449, Civil Action, 1954.
The facts constituting the Evans counterclaim are the same as those forming the subject matter of his suit against Leoncavallo in the Court below. The parties are the same. The matter is res adjudicata. Jones v. Charles Warner Co., 2 Boyce 566, 83 A. 131. Rule 13, of course, permits the filing of a counterclaim but the subject matter of this counterclaim has been litigated and he is barred from asserting it.
Evans complains that to sustain the Leoncavallo motion would encourage the disposition of litigation by technicality rather than on the merits. There are two answers to this point of view. First, the two suits here involved constituted separated actions in the lower Court. Evans could have appealed but failed to do so. He should not now be permitted to relitigate his cause under the guise of a counterclaim. Secondly, the doctrine of res adjudicata is based more upon a public policy that there be an end to litigation than on the rights or benefits of the parties involved. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 6 W.W. Harr. 124, 172 A. 260. Thus, the plea of personal hardship inherent in Evans' argument cannot command the weight to which it might be entitled under other circumstances.
The motion to strike is granted.