Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 09-10031-RGS.
July 1, 2009
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Scott Leonard, a former employee of defendant American Medical Response (AMR), brought this civil rights action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Leonard seeks reinstatement to a position that he alleges that he had been promoted prior to his involuntary separation from AMR. In addition to AMR, the Complaint names as individual defendants Bill Sanger, Brendan McNiff, Mary Ellen Fletcher, Shauna Anderson, and Bill Harvey, Leonard's former supervisors at AMR. Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
As alleged in the Complaint, McNiff, Fletcher, Anderson, and Harvey are managers in AMR's Natick, Massachusetts office where Leonard was employed. Sanger is the Chief Executive Officer of AMR and is based in Colorado. Leonard alleges that on December 12, 2006, Anderson and Harvey offered him a promotion to a supervisory position at AMR. The day before the promotion was to take effect, McNiff began investigating Leonard for his involvement in an unspecified prior incident. On December 22, 2006, McNiff presented Leonard with an "ultimatum of resigning or being fired." Complaint ¶ 9. Sometime after December 22, 2006, Leonard was hospitalized with post-traumatic stress disorder and "completely forgot about the supervisor position [he] was awarded." Id. ¶ 12. Leonard received an acknowledgment of his resignation from AMR on January 4, 2007. He denies, however, that his separation was voluntary. Leonard alleges that AMR was "guilty of psychological abuse, workplace bullying, and creation of a hostile work environment." Id. ¶ 19. He further asserts that AMR is "guilty of discriminating [against him] based on [his] emotional disorder." Id. at ¶ 20. Leonard filed this pro se Complaint on January 8, 2009, alleging as a cause of action a "[d]enial of promotion due to disability." See Civil Cover Sheet (Docket #1-3).
DISCUSSION
The ADA prohibits discrimination by an employer "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of employment with or without reasonable accommodation; (2) has a disability; and (3) that he suffered discrimination in "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. The ADA defines a "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (The ADA is "not operative, and the definition not satisfied, unless the impairment affects a major life activity.").
The court must dismiss a Complaint if, after accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of a plaintiff, it determines that the Complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In order to defeat a motion to dismiss, a Complaint must contain "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting the claims asserted.Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009), quoting from Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A plaintiff must plead "more than labels and conclusions," and his factual allegations must be sufficient to "raise a right [to] relief above the speculative level." Morales-Talon v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2008).
Individual defendants
As set out on the civil cover sheet and as described in the Complaint, Leonard's sole cause of action against any defendant is an alleged violation of the ADA. See Civil Cover Sheet (Docket #1-3); Complaint ¶ 8 (alleging "bullying, harassment, and creating hostile work environments" by McNiff); id. ¶ 19 (alleging "psychological abuse, workplace bullying, and creation of a hostile work environment"); id. ¶ 20 (alleging discrimination by AMR based on Leonard's "emotional disorder"). As even this cursory description makes clear, Leonard has failed to plead facts essential to a viable ADA claim. Other than the general accusation made against McNiff, the Complaint is devoid of any description of alleged wrongdoing by the individual defendants. Leonard's sole mention of Fletcher is that she is a "member of management" in AMR's Natick office. Complaint, ¶ 2. The only conduct Leonard alleges with respect to Anderson and Harvey is that they awarded him a supervisory position. Id. at ¶ 5. The only conduct Leonard alleges on the part of Sanger is that he failed (apparently after Sanger left AMR) to respond to "[l]etters, faxes, emails and phone calls" made by Leonard "to see what exactly was going on." Id. at ¶ 17. Given the dearth of allegations of actionable conduct, Leonard's ADA claims against Sanger, Fletcher, Anderson, and Harvey must be dismissed.
This court will also dismiss the claims against the individual defendants, including McNiff, on the alternative ground that the ADA does not impose liability on individual defendants (as most judges of this court have held). See Fink v. Printed Circuit Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 119, 129 (D. Mass. 2002) (dismissing ADA claims against individual defendant because the ADA's "definition of employer extends to agents so as `to ensure employer liability, and reject individual liability'"); Orell v. UMass Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64 (D. Mass. 2002) (dismissing ADA claims against individual defendant); Lemire v. Silva, 104 F. Supp. 2d 80, 92 (D. Mass. 2000) (dismissing ADA claims against individual defendants). See also Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[I]ndividual liability is precluded for violations of the ADA's employment discrimination provision."); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investig., Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that "individuals who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition of `employer' cannot be liable under the ADA."). Cf. Fantini, 557 F.3d at 30 (holding that "there is no individual employee liability under Title VII" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). By its specific terms, the ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against a "qualified individual on the basis of disability," including "known physical or mental limitations." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a)-(b). An "employer" is defined by the ADA as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A) (emphasis added). The motion by the individual defendants to dismiss Leonard's claims against them will therefore be ALLOWED. AMR
AMR asks for dismissal of Leonard's claims against it because Leonard has failed to allege that he has a disability under the ADA or that AMR discriminated against him in "application procedures"; "hiring"; "advancement"; "discharge"; "job training"' or any other "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." In his Complaint, Leonard states only that he has an unspecified "emotional disorder." Complaint ¶¶ 12, 20.2. This glancing reference to an unknown "disorder" is insufficient to raise a claim of "disability" under the ADA. See Morales-Talon, 524 F.3d at 18. Moreover, Leonard makes no factual allegations that his disorder constitutes "an impairment" affecting "a major life activity" as required by the ADA.
Leonard also fails to allege that AMR took any adverse employment action against him based on his alleged disability.See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Leonard asserts that AMR promoted him to a supervisory position, and then later told him that he was required to resign. Complaint ¶¶ 12, 13. Leonard does not claim that AMR's alleged demand for his resignation was connected in any way to his purported "emotional disorder." Even though a court must resolve any doubts in favor of a plaintiff on a motion to dismiss, there are no doubts to resolve when a plaintiff fails to provide "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). AMR's motion to dismiss will therefore also be ALLOWED.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss areALLOWED. The Clerk will enter judgment for AMR and each of the individual defendants and terminate the case.SO ORDERED.