Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2297-CM
February 21, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs in this case assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Plaintiffs also assert various state law claims. This matter is before the court on defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 29).
I. Background
On July 4, 1998, the decedent in this case, Dana Christianson, died in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit, claiming that defendants violated the decedent's constitutional rights. The caption of plaintiffs' initial complaint in this case included as plaintiffs "The heirs of Dana Christianson (Ryan James Graves) by and through his grandmother guardian Elizabeth Lemmons . . . and for Dana Christanson [sic] estate." On August 3, 2000, more than two years after the accident, Ryan Hodge was appointed as administrator of Dana Christianson's estate.
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add the administrator of the estate of Dana Christianson, Mr. Hodge. On August 8, 2001, Magistrate Judge Waxse granted plaintiffs' motion to amend. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Waxse permitted plaintiffs to amend the capacity in which Dana Christianson brought her cause of action (i.e., add Mr. Hodge as plaintiff) and further ordered that the amended complaint relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. Defendants now argue that this case should be dismissed because no named party had the capacity to sue when the complaint originally was filed.
II. Standards
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
III. Discussion
A. Appropriate Law
Defendants first direct the court to Kansas state law, contending that state law determines whether a civil rights action has survived. It is true that under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-280 (1985), federal courts apply the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injury in § 1983 actions. In this case, the applicable statute of limitations is two years.
Moreover, the court agrees with defendants that the capacity to sue for claims of the deceased Dana Christianson is governed by state law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). Under Kansas law, a survival action must be brought by a decedent's personal representative, not her heirs. Cory v. Troth, 170 Kan. 50, 53, 223 P.2d 1008, 1010 (1950). In this case, when the original complaint was filed, the Estate of Dana Christianson was not an existing entity. The case was instead brought by the heirs of Dana Christianson — not the personal representative of the estate of Dana Christianson. Thus, at the time of the original complaint, no party had the capacity to sue.
However, Magistrate Judge Waxse permitted plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add the personal representative of Dana Christianson's estate. Thus, the sole issue before the court is whether the amended complaint relates back to the date the original complaint was filed. If there is no relation back, then plaintiffs' claims are time-barred, and the case must be dismissed. On the other hand, if the court concludes that the addition of Mr. Hodge relates back, then the amended complaint is deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint.
The court disagrees with defendants' argument that this court must follow Rogers v. Williams, Larson, Voss, Strobel Estes, 245 Kan. 290, 777 P.2d 836 (1989) in determining whether plaintiffs' amended complaint should relate back. In Rogers, the relevant plaintiff initially filed her legal malpractice claim in the capacity as sole heir of the decedent. The case was dismissed, and plaintiff refiled the action pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-518 as co-administrator of the estate of the deceased. The Kansas Supreme Court stated that, to come within the savings statute, the same plaintiffs would have to bring both actions. Id. at 293, 777 P.2d at 838. The court went on to hold that, because plaintiffs' second petition (brought by the administrators of the estate) did not have the same plaintiffs as the first petition (brought by the heir of the decedent), the action could not be refiled under the purview of § 60-518. Id. at 294, 777 P.2d at 839.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-518 is a saving statute that allows a plaintiff six months to file a second action if the statute of limitations has run during the pending of the first action and the first action is dismissed otherwise than on the merits. Waltrip v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 1059, Syl. ¶ 4, 678 P.2d 128 (1984).
The court questions whether the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-518 is sufficiently analogous to the present case, wherein this court must determine whether plaintiffs' amended complaint relates back. However, the court need not address this issue because, even if Rogers were analogous, Rogers simply is not controlling in this case.
When a complaint is filed in federal court, the matter of relation back of amendments to pleadings is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 57 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that, although capacity to sue is governed by state law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern relation back); Simmons v. S. Cent. Skyworker's, Inc., 936 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the question of whether an amendment relates back to the date of the original complaint is a question of federal procedure not controlled by state law); Am. Banker's Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Colo. Flying Acad., Inc., 93 F.R.D. 135, 137 (D.Colo. 1982) (holding that question of whether amended complaint should relate back is a question of federal procedure under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The court will therefore turn to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether plaintiffs' amended complaint relates back to the date of the filing of the original complaint.
B. Relation Back Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The court considers both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 17. Rule 15 provides, in part, as follows:
c) Relation Back of Amendments. An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when. . . .
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and . . . the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). The goal of relation-back principles is "to prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 Advisory Committee Note (1991). The court notes that Rule 15(c) is framed in terms of an amendment that would change the party "against" whom a claim is asserted. It is unclear in this circuit whether Rule 15 is applicable when the proposed amendment seeks to add a plaintiff. See Scheufler v. Gen. Host Corp., 126 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting uncertainty and citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 Advisory Committee Notes (1966) ("The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised Rule 15(c).")).
The court therefore turns to Rule 17(a), which specifically provides:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for . . . joinder or substitution of the real party in interest; and such . . . joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a) (emphasis added). This mandatory relation-back provision means that, once it is concluded that the administrator of the estate is the real party in interest and the administrator is allowed to join as a plaintiff, the administrator's claim automatically relates back to the filing of the action. Scheufler, 126 F.3d at 1270-71. The court concludes that Ryan Hodge, as administrator of Dana Christianson's estate, is the real party in interest. The court must therefore determine whether Mr. Hodge should have been permitted to join the action.
The court concludes that the addition of Mr. Hodge as a plaintiff in this action was proper. There is no indication that plaintiffs' failure to include Mr. Hodge as a party plaintiff was a result of some tactic designed to prejudice defendants. Rather, an administrator simply had not yet been appointed by the time the lawsuit commenced. Moreover, there has been no showing that defendants were prejudiced by the addition of Mr. Hodge. The survival claims brought by the estate of Dana Christianson in the amended complaint arise out of the same occurrence complained of in the original complaint. Thus, the defendants had timely constructive notice of the claims before the limitation period expired — the addition of Mr. Hodge did not alter the factual allegations, nor did it substantially change the issues in the case. In these circumstances, the court finds that the addition of Mr. Hodge as a party plaintiff was proper.
This decision is in accord with Shinkle v. Union City Body Co., 94 F.R.D. 631, 638 (D.Kan. 1982). In Shinkle, the plaintiffs had filed their survival action as heirs at law of the decedent. After the statute of limitations had run, one of the plaintiffs was appointed administrator of the decedent's estate. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint, naming the administrator as a party plaintiff. Justice O'Connor wrote, "We agree with those courts that permit a plaintiff to change the capacity in which an action is brought when there is no change in the parties before the court and all parties are on notice of the facts out of which the claim arose." Id. at 638. The court recognizes that, in the case at hand, the newly added administrator was a stranger to the original complaint. However, such a fact does not alter the underlying reasoning in allowing the amendment of Mr. Hodge as a plaintiff: "The fact that an applicable statute of limitations may have run before the real parties were substituted is not significant where the change is merely formal and in no way alters the facts and issues on which the action is based." Metro. Paving Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 439 F.2d 300, 306 (10th Cir. 1971). The court finds that, in these circumstances, the addition of Mr. Hodge was merely formal and does not alter the underlying facts and issues.
IV. Conclusion
The court determines that the amendment permitting Mr. Hodge to be added as a party plaintiff was proper and that, as a result, Rule 17(a) mandates the amended complaint relate back to the time the original complaint was filed. The amended complaint is therefore deemed filed within the statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court denies defendants' motion to dismiss.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) is denied.