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Leiton v. ARCO Marine, Inc.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, C.D. California
Aug 22, 1995
896 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1995)

Opinion


896 F.Supp. 1001 (C.D.Cal. 1995) Eliecer Araya LEITON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ARCO MARINE, INC., et al., Defendants. And Related Counterclaim. No. CV 93-1311 JMI (Tx). United States District Court, C.D. California. Aug. 22, 1995

        Conrad Lopes, Wilmington, CA, for plaintiffs.

        William H. Collier, Jr. of Long Beach, CA, Karen L. Robinson, Long Beach, CA, for defendants.         IDEMAN, District Judge.

        IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

        The parties to the above-entitled action came before this Court seeking the just resolution of events which occurred on the high seas off the Western coast of Costa Rica. Defendants ARCO Marine, Inc. and ARCO Transportation [hereinafter "ARCO"], removed this action from State Court, invoking proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and 46 U.S.C. § 2303(c), the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971.

        The remaining plaintiffs and counterdefendants, Eliecer Araya Leiton, Henry Salas, William Salas, and Santos Matarrita; and ARCO, the remaining defendant and counterclaimant, stipulated to a bench trial. The matter came on for trial on Tuesday, August 23, 1994.

        After careful consideration of the evidence, review of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel, this Court hereby grants judgment in favor of ARCO on plaintiffs' claims, and on its counterclaim against plaintiffs.

        Defendant ARCO is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Delaware, having its principal place of business in Long Beach, California. ARCO owns and operates the vessel ARCO Independence [hereinafter Independence], an 1100 foot, 265,000 ton American flag oil tanker. ARCO uses the tanker to transport crude oil and petroleum products on the high seas. Plaintiffs are the owner, Captain, and crew of the Erika I, a 41 foot wooden hull fishing vessel registered and home ported in Costa Rica.

        On December 28, 1991, at approximately 1200 hours, Henry Salas, Captain of the Erika I, and his crew of William Salas, Olman Molina, Fidel Sanchez and Santos Matarrita, put out to sea from Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Within approximately 24 hours of leaving port, the Erika I's engine stopped working. The Erika I did not have a mechanic on board. As of midday, January 2, 1992, the Captain and crew of the fishing vessel found themselves without power, adrift on the high seas approximately 180 miles outside of the Papagaya Gulf. They flashed a distress signal with the sun and a mirror.

        At approximately 1530 local time, in the midst of a fire and boat drill roughly 100 miles off the coast of Nicaragua, an Independence crew member spotted the flashing light in the distance. Under the command of Captain James Morgan, the tanker changed course towards the flashing light. Lieutenant Ross Bryant, the U.S. Coast Guard's liaison, later confirmed that on that day the Costa Rican Coast Guard did not have a vessel capable of rendering assistance to the Erika I.

        Captain Morgan discovered the Erika I with a crew of five, circling the smaller vessel to assess her condition. Then the 1100 foot tanker maneuvered alongside the fishing boat. Though plaintiffs have argued that the Independence struck the Erika I at this time, the evidence at trial did not conclusively establish that such contact occurred. However, the Erika I did tie up along the starboard side of the Independence and take shelter in the lee of the tanker.

        Once the Erika I was safely alongside, either her crew boarded the Independence and carried their engine's starter with them, or the fishermen just passed the suspect engine part up to the Independence in hopes it could be repaired. While neither version of events was clearly established, for purposes of this case, it does not matter where the examination of the starter took place.

        After checking the starter, two of the Tanker's engineers and an able-bodied seaman, Brian Albert, inspected the rest of the Erika I's engine for any other problems. From approximately 1845 to 2130, local time, the engineers attempted to repair the Erika I, but after almost three hours, they determined that the engine was "frozen."

        According to the evidence, weather conditions began to build. As midnight approached on January 2, 1992, the wind was blowing from the north at approximately 30-35 knots. The sea was moderate with 15 foot waves and moderate westerly swells. Testimony also revealed that in spite of the weather conditions, and in spite of the fishing vessel's lack of power, Captain Salas advised Captain Morgan that he and his crew would remain aboard the Erika I and would wait for assistance from another vessel. Captain Salas communicated his wishes to Lieutenant Bryant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Captain Morgan confirmed that decision with Lt. Bryant, who then released the Independence from any further rescue obligations.

        Captain Morgan explained to Captain Salas the maneuver he intended to use to separate the two vessels. As demonstrated by Captain Morgan at trial, the maneuver, sometimes referred to as a "Nantucket Sleighride," would permit the Erika I to swing out and away from the side of the Independence on a bow line in a pendulum-like fashion. The tanker would move slowly forward until the fishing vessel began to move out and away from the tanker. As the two vessels separated and the fishing vessel reached a 45 degree angle to the tanker, the tanker's engine would kick ahead with a hard right rudder to increase the its distance from the fishing boat. At that point, the Erika I should then cut the line, safely completing the separation. Captain Morgan testified that he diagrammed the maneuver on the tanker's deck with a piece of chalk. Captain H. Salas, who did not speak English, nevertheless acknowledged that he understood his role in the maneuver and the point at which he was to cut the line.

        The Erika I crew returned to their vessel. During the separation maneuver, the tanker maintained a slow, steady course forward, but the Erika I's rudder was turned into the Independence, keeping her alongside. The tanker's engine kicked ahead with a hard right rudder and the vessels began to separate. The evidence established that when the Erika I reached the desired 45 degree angle from the tanker, Captain Salas failed to release the line and the Erika I swung back toward the tanker. As the fishing vessel neared the stern of the tanker, the Erika I crew leapt into the dark sea and swam away from the tanker.

        The Independence commenced search and rescue. Her crew illuminated the area with deck lights, threw life rings into the water, and eventually all of the fishermen were able to safely board the Erika I. However, the fishing boat now rolled in the rough seas and took on water over her side rails. The tanker again maneuvered beside the Erika I.

        Captain Salas decided it was not safe to remain aboard the fishing boat, so the Captain and crew of the Erika I returned to the Independence. The tanker crew contacted the U.S. Coast Guard at Alameda and advised that the rescue was complete, and that all five Erika I crew members were aboard the Independence. Both plaintiff's complaint and the testimony at trial verify that none of the Erika I crew members suffered any physical injury during the rescue. The Erika I was cast adrift.

        With the exception of a rescued Captain and crew, the Independence left the Erika I in the same position in which it was found: adrift on the high seas. The tanker certainly did not leave the Erika I in any worse position as a result of the rescue, and the Court finds Captain Morgan's choice of the Nantucket Sleighride to have been an appropriate and reasonable means of setting the Erika I adrift.

         Section 2303(c) of the Federal Boat Safety Act governs a rescuer's liability to a rescued party. The statute reads, in pertinent part:

An individual ... gratuitously and in good faith rendering assistance at the scene of a Marine casualty without objection by an individual assisted, is not liable for damages as a result of rendering assistance ... when the individual acts as an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent individual would have acted under the circumstances. 46 U.S.C. 2303(c).

        In Berg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 759 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit held that a rescuer will be liable for only: (1) negligent conduct that worsens the position of the victim, or (2) reckless and wanton conduct in performing the rescue. Under that standard, it is clear that ARCO is not liable to plaintiffs. The Captain and crew of the Independence were not negligent, nor did their rescue efforts worsen the position of the Erika I or her crew. The tanker found the Erika I adrift and, after saving the fishermen, set the enfeebled craft adrift in the same waters in which she was found. Nor did the actions of the Independence preclude other rescue efforts: on January 2, 1992 the Independence was the only ship capable of making any rescue attempt.

        The Captain and crew of the Independence were far from "reckless and wanton" in performing the rescue. Captain Morgan chose the long-used "Nantucket Sleighride" to release the Erika I, and performed the maneuver in a reasonable manner. Captain Morgan explained the procedure to Captain Salas. Captain Salas expressed his understanding and agreed to the maneuver. However, at the critical moment, Captain Salas failed to cut the bow line.

        It is an overworn truism that the law does not deal in moral duties, but legal ones. However, the Congress enacted Section 2303(c) to protect the Good Samaritan. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1345. Congress, it might be said, simply memorialized a standard of common decency on the high seas. The established facts of this case, in light of the applicable law, compel this Court to hold defendant ARCO free from any liability which might flow from its protracted rescue efforts on the high seas the night of January 2, 1994.

        ARCO's Counterclaim

         Indeed, it is the Erika I, her owner, Captain, and crew, that owe a debt to ARCO. Under the law, performance of another's duty to a third person, if rendered by one qualified to provide such services with intent to charge for them, is ground for recovery in quasi-contract. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859, 98 S.Ct. 183, 54 L.Ed.2d 131 (1977). This Court may consider quasi-contractual claims in admiralty if they arise out of maritime contracts or "inherently maritime transactions." Id. at 835 (citation omitted). A rescue on the high seas is certainly such a transaction.

         The services which ARCO rendered to the Erika I support quasi-contractual recovery. Certainly the owner of the Erika I had a duty to maintain her engine and see that at least one person on board was capable of making emergency repairs.

        Further, the Independence did not act officiously, but in response to the signal of the Erika I. ARCO then returned the crew of the Erika I safely to shore. Upon anchoring in Long Beach, California, immigration officers and representatives from both the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan consulates met the Independence. ARCO incurred considerable expense in repatriating the five Erika I crew members, as reflected in defendants' counterclaim. In returning the Erika I crew to Costa Rica, ARCO performed yet another duty of counterdefendants. The parties have filed a Joint Stipulation Re Damages on defendant ARCO's Counterclaim which this Court approved on August 29, 1994.

        ARCO is entitled to judgment on its counterclaim against plaintiffs in the amount of stipulated damages.

        IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Leiton v. ARCO Marine, Inc.

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, C.D. California
Aug 22, 1995
896 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
Case details for

Leiton v. ARCO Marine, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:Eliecer Araya LEITON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ARCO MARINE, INC., et al.…

Court:United States District Court, Ninth Circuit, California, C.D. California

Date published: Aug 22, 1995

Citations

896 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1995)