Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Jacqueline A. Connor, Judge., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC105559
Law Offices of Jina A. Nam & Associates, Jina A. Nam, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Appearance by Gilsleider, Enerle & Trembath, Kristine L. Harn, for Real Party in Interest, Cheol Ho Kim.
KITCHING, J.
Plaintiff Karissa Lee (plaintiff) seeks a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate an order finding the damages in this case would not exceed $25,000 and reclassifying the case as a limited jurisdiction action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 85 et seq.)
Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a)(1) of section 86 defines a limited civil action as “Cases at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less.”
Transfer from a court of unlimited jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction is permitted only when “(i) the absence of jurisdiction is apparent before trial from the complaint, petition or related documents, or (ii) during the course of pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will ‘necessarily’ result in a verdict below the superior court jurisdictional amount.” (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262 (Walker).) Applying the principles established in Walker, we conclude the respondent court abused its discretion in ordering transfer of this case to a court of limited jurisdiction because it cannot “be said that a damage award would ‘necessarily’ be $25,000 or less.” (Id. at p. 273.)
We therefore stayed the order reclassifying this case as one of limited jurisdiction and notified the court and the parties we were considering issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171). We invited the court to follow the procedure set forth in Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233 (Brown), and reconsider the order reclassifying this case as a limited civil case.
Following issuance of the “suggestive” Palma notice, described as the appellate court’s tentative ruling in Brown, “a trial court often will quickly vacate, modify, or otherwise reconsider the challenged ruling” by informing the parties of its intent to revisit the interim ruling in response to the suggestive Palma notice and provide them with an opportunity to be heard prior to any change in the existing order. (Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1238-1239.)
We received notice from counsel for real party in interest defendant Cheol Ho Kim (defendant) indicating no opposition would be filed to the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance.
Based on our review of the complaint, the petition, other related documents, and the record made available to this court, this is not a case in which we can agree that a verdict in this case will necessarily be $25,000 or less. Accordingly, we conclude the respondent court abused its discretion in ordering transfer to a court of limited jurisdiction. The petition is granted.
DISCUSSION
1. Factual background.
This is a two vehicle traffic accident. The following are plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff alleges that defendant drove through a stop sign at a speed in excess of the posted limit. Plaintiff was assisted from her car, examined by emergency medical personnel, immobilized in a neck brace and back board, and transported by ambulance to the emergency room of the Sherman Oaks Medical Center. She was X-rayed and given a CT scan. She was diagnosed with “severe whiplash” injuries to her neck, shoulder and back.
Plaintiff alleges she was examined by her regular physicians at UCLA Medical Center within days of the accident and the diagnosis was confirmed. She argues she underwent “several months” of physical therapy at the UCLA physical therapy department. Lee alleges severe pain and suffering from the injuries for at least 107 consecutive days following the accident and continues to have residual pain and limitation to her daily activities. Plaintiff further indicates additional physical therapy and other medical treatment will be necessary.
Lee also alleges property losses. She alleges she missed eight days of work, incurring at least $1,875 in lost wages. She argues her car was a total loss and the insurance paid $6,617.81, much less than the cost of replacing her means of transportation to work.
Plaintiff claims she has thus far incurred actual damages of $16,511. This amount does not include damages resulting from her pain and suffering and emotional distress. Damages for pain and suffering claims are not subject to precise pre-trial measurement, and the possibility clearly exists that plaintiff’s total damages could exceed the $25,000 limit available in a court of limited jurisdiction.
2. Standard for reclassification.
In 1998 the California Constitution was amended to permit unification of the municipal and superior courts in each county into a single superior court system having original jurisdiction over all matters formerly designated as superior court and municipal court actions. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 5.) After unification, the municipal courts ceased to exist. Civil cases formerly within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts are classified as “limited” civil cases, while matters formerly within the jurisdiction of the superior courts are classified as an “unlimited” civil action. (§ 88.)
Notwithstanding the new categories the “amount in controversy” distinctions remain. Whether an action qualifies as a limited or unlimited civil action is determined initially from the demand for relief in the plaintiff’s complaint and that classification usually continues throughout the litigation. But if the facts show the controversy was not filed with the correct designation, the statutory scheme authorizes “reclassification” of the case into the proper court. (§ 403.040.)
The standard of review of an order transferring a case to a court of limited jurisdiction is abuse of discretion. (Williams v. Superior Court (Gemco/Lucky Stores) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 171, 179.)
The standard for reclassification based on the amount in controversy is whether “ ‘lack of jurisdiction is clear’ [citation], whether a $25,000 verdict ‘was virtually unattainable’ [citation], and whether such a verdict ‘simply could not be obtained’ [citations].” (Walkerv.Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 269.) Transfer may not occur before a court has determined “that ‘the action... will necessarily involve the determination of questions’ ” that rest within the jurisdiction of the court of limited jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 269.)
Numerous cases have addressed the proper standard for determining whether a case should be transferred to a court of limited jurisdiction. Such a transfer must not be made unless it is clear that the amount in controversy is less than the $25,000 statutory limit established in section 85. “A transfer deprives the plaintiff of the forum of original choice, and, unless set aside on review, precludes the plaintiff from proving damages greater than those available in an inferior court. [Citations.] A decision to transfer made without proper evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case, ... would violate a plaintiff’s interests.” (Campbell v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 152-153.)
In Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 257, our Supreme Court established the standard for transfer from a court of unlimited jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction based on the failure to meet the $25,000 amount in controversy standard in section 85. Walker repudiated cases which had ordered transfer to the municipal court based upon finding that an award in excess of $25,000 was “ ‘not reasonably probable.’ ” (Id. at pp. 261-262.) Walker held the standard is “whether ‘lack of jurisdiction is clear’ [citation], ” and required a determination that “such a verdict ‘simply could not be obtained’ [citations].” (Id. at p. 269.) The Walker court held these “articulations of the standard comport with [the]... requirement that before transfer may occur... a court must determine that ‘the action... will necessarily involve the determination of questions not within the jurisdiction of the [superior] court[.]’ ” (Ibid., italics in original.)
A plaintiff is entitled to have the action classified as unlimited if she can demonstrate a possibility the damages might exceed $25,000. Reclassification from “unlimited” to “limited” is warranted only if the matter will necessarily result in a verdict below $25,000; it may be not be reclassified as a “limited” case unless it appears to a “legal certainty” that the plaintiff cannot recover more than $25,000. (Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 276-277.) Thus, if it appears that a verdict in excess of $25,000 could possibly result, the court must not order the case to be transferred to a court of limited jurisdiction. The court may order such a transfer only where it appeared to a legal certainty the plaintiff’s damages would necessarily be $25,000 or less. (Ibid.)
The designation of a case as a limited action has significant implications. If a case is tried as a limited civil case, the court has no authority to award a judgment in excess of $25,000. (See Ash v. Hertz Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1110; Williams v. Superior Court (RD Instruments) (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 378, 383; § 396a, subd. (d).)
In contrast, a court in an unlimited civil action may enter a judgment that could have been entered in a limited civil court. (§ 403.040, subd. (e).)
Subdivision (e) of section 403.040 provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the superior court to reclassify an action or proceeding because the judgment to be rendered, as determined at trial or hearing, is one that might have been rendered in a limited civil case.”
The high threshold required to reclassify a case from an unlimited action to a limited action is warranted in view of the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts. A transfer must be made only when the lack of jurisdiction is clear because reclassification as a limited case deprives the plaintiff from attempting to prove damages greater than those available in the limited civil court. (Williams v. Superior Court (Gemco/Lucky Stores), supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at pp. 175-176.)
The trial court, without adjudicating the merits of the underlying case, should review the record to determine whether a judgment in excess of $25,000 is obtainable. If such a verdict is not virtually unobtainable, that is, unless it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff’s damages will necessarily be $25,000 or less, the court may not reclassify the case as “limited.” The trial judge is not permitted to trespass into the province of the trier of fact or to determine the merits of the claim. To do so gives rise to the risk of depriving a plaintiff of the right to a jury trial in the forum of choice. (Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 401.)
The Walker court cautioned that when a court inquires into the facts of a case to determine the amount in controversy, the court is not permitted to determine the merits of a claim or to intrude on the right to jury trial. (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270.) “ ‘Pain and suffering are not subject to precise measurement by any scale, and their translation into money damages is peculiarly the function of the trier of the facts.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 269.)
“The unlikeliness of a judgment in excess of $25,000 is not the test. The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.” (Maldonado v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 402.)
Transfer to a court of limited jurisdiction where there is a possibility, even a remote possibility, that the judgment could exceed $25,000 is a violation of the plaintiff’s interests. (Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 152-153.) The court may reclassify the case only if a verdict of $25,001 is “virtually unobtainable.” (Ytuarte v. Superior Court, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 279.)
3. Scope of inquiry into facts.
A court cannot fail to consider the possibility of damages based on claims pain and suffering, the calculation of which is exclusively within the province of the jury. Even though a plaintiff may not prevail on the factual disputes regarding the extent of her economic loss, pain and suffering, or emotional damage, a hearing to reclassify to a court of limited jurisdiction “ ‘is not to be perceived as a minitrial or an opportunity for a trial judge to put forth a well-educated guess of a verdict.... The trial court reviews the record to determine whether the result is obtainable. Simply stated, the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.’ [Citation.]” (Singer v. Superior Court (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)
Even if the court believes it “highly unlikely” that the plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, that is not enough to defeat jurisdiction. It must appear to a legal certainty that plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the subject accident or that she cannot, under the circumstances, recover an amount exceeding $25,000. (Walkerv.Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270.) “[I]nappropriate transfer poses the potential of fostering inefficiency and delay if, after transfer, the plaintiff can establish a right to retransfer to the superior court. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 271.)
4. Analysis.
As of the time the motion to reclassify the case as one of limited jurisdiction was heard plaintiff had incurred $8,019 in medical bills, $1,875 in lost earnings, and claimed $6,617 in property damage, for a total of $16,511. In addition, she alleges pain and suffering and emotional distress, a matter which must be determined by the trier of fact. Physical therapy is continuing and additional medical costs will be incurred, a claim supported by plaintiff’s physician. These costs together with the possibility of additional medical treatment, and the value of the pain and suffering claim could exceed $25,000.
The hearing on a motion to reclassify a case as a limited civil action is not a minitrial. While the court, in an appropriate case, has authority to conclude the damages sought are not within the jurisdictional amount of the superior court, the court is limited in the extent to which it may weigh the merits of the claim. (Andre v. Superior Court (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 11, 20.)
In Maldonado v. Superior Court, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 397, the plaintiff suffered neck and back injuries and had incurred medical expenses of approximately $7,000. One doctor opined there was a chance that surgery would eventually be required. The Maldonado court granted a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance, holding the record did not support a conclusion that the damages necessarily would be less than $25,000.
CONCLUSION
The record here shows a substantial possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict in excess of $25,000. The order transferring the case is error.
Because the order transferring the case is clear error, we conclude plaintiff’s “entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue” (Ngv.Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35), and conclude the matter is one in which issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance is appropriate. (Palmav.U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 178-180.)
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate be issued directing the trial court to vacate the order of November 24, 2010 transferring this action to a court of limited jurisdiction and to place the action on calendar as one of unlimited jurisdiction for all further trial court proceedings.
No costs are awarded in this proceeding.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.