Opinion
A22-1344
04-04-2023
Garey Francis Ledin, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-94-017931
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Renee L. Worke Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 1995, appellant Garey Francis Ledin was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The offenses arose from two incidents, each involving a separate victim. The district court sentenced Ledin to 182 months in prison. Ledin appealed, raising one claim not at issue here. This court affirmed Ledin's convictions. State v. Ledin, No. C3-95-1079 (Minn.App. Feb. 27, 1996).
2. In 1996, Ledin petitioned for postconviction relief, raising another claim not at issue here. This court affirmed the district court's denial of Ledin's petition, and the supreme court denied further review. Ledin v. State, No. C7-97-876 (Minn.App. Dec. 9, 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1998).
3. In 2001, Ledin filed his second postconviction petition. He argued that he did not receive a fair trial because the two offenses should have been tried separately, his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move for severance, and his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective by failing to brief all issues listed in the statement of the case. This court affirmed the district court's denial of Ledin's second postconviction petition. Ledin v. State, No. C2-01-2007, 2002 WL 1326180 (Minn.App. June 18, 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
The statement of the case from Ledin's direct appeal does not appear in the record. But Ledin alleged in his fourth postconviction petition that the statement of the case raised the issues of "sufficiency of evidence, preclusion of one victim's prior sexual behavior, preclusion of impeachment of one victim, denial of Sixth Amendment right to present a theory of defense, erroneous jury instructions, and prosecutorial misconduct."
4. In 2002, Ledin petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, again raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The federal district court denied the petition as untimely. In 2008, Ledin filed his third postconviction petition, raising another claim not at issue here. The district court denied that petition, and this court dismissed Ledin's appeal of that denial as untimely.
5. In 2022, Ledin filed his fourth postconviction petition. He asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move for severance and failing to sufficiently argue against the preclusion of a victim's testimony about the effects of using alcohol with her prescribed medication. Ledin also asserted that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective by failing to raise the severance issue, his trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness regarding severance, the preclusion of the intoxication testimony, and the exclusion of evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct. The district court summarily denied Ledin's petition, concluding that each claim was Knaffla-barred. Ledin filed the current appeal.
6. A summary denial of postconviction relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). The district court abuses its discretion "when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Id. (quotation omitted).
7. "[A] postconviction court may summarily deny a claim that is procedurally barred by the Knaffla rule." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Minn. 2017); see State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976). Under the Knaffla rule, "all claims raised in the direct appeal" or a prior postconviction petition, "and all claims that were known or should have been known but were not raised . . . are procedurally barred." Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 626 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
8. Here, Ledin raised almost all his claims regarding severance in his second postconviction petition. And all the claims raised in his fourth postconviction petition are ineffective-assistance claims premised on the acts or omissions of his trial lawyer or his lawyer on direct appeal. Ledin did not previously raise these claims when he knew or should have known about them. See Townsend v. State, 723 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2006) (stating that ineffective-trial-counsel claims must be raised no later than first postconviction petition and that ineffective-appellate-counsel claims must be raised in postconviction petition following relevant appeal). The Knaffla rule applies to all Ledin's claims.
9. Ledin asserts that the interests-of-justice exception to Knaffla applies because he discovered in 2021 that his attorney on direct appeal was convicted of fraud in 2014 and was disbarred in 2013 for misconduct involving other clients. The interests-of-justice exception applies only "if fairness requires it." Perry v. State, 731 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. 2007). And the misconduct and sanctions of Ledin's counsel on direct appeal, which did not involve Ledin or his case, are irrelevant to whether fairness requires us to review Ledin's claims.
10. Ledin should have raised his claims on direct appeal or in his first postconviction petition. Yet, in affirming the denial of his second postconviction petition, this court rejected Ledin's ineffective-assistance claims and the underlying severance claim on the merits. Ledin, 2002 WL 1326180, at *1-4. Further, Ledin has not been incarcerated since 2007 and his sentence has expired. As a result, fairness does not require us to review any of Ledin's claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling them Knaffla-barred.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order denying postconviction relief is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.