Summary
granting in part multiple defendants' motion to dismiss
Summary of this case from Ledbetter v. City of TopekaOpinion
Case No. 00-1153-DES.
January 23, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on (1) defendants Lisa Pinkley, Mark Grayson, and Police Chief Dean Forester's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14), (2) defendants City of Topeka ("City"), City Attorney Linda P. Jeffrey, Mayor Joan Wagnon, and Municipal Judge Neil Roach's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), and (3) plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue (Doc. 4). Having reviewed the record in this case and the parties' filings, the court is now prepared to rule on all three motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed his Complaint (Doc. 1) in this matter on April 20, 2000. At the outset, the court notes that the hand-written complaint is difficult to read and comprehend. Acknowledging plaintiff's pro se status, the court has attempted to liberally construe plaintiff's filing. Plaintiff appears to be asserting deprivations of his constitutional rights. At the heart of these allegations resides a dispute regarding the proper licensing of plaintiff's canine. Apparently, plaintiff was served a complaint for failing to have proof of registration and vaccination for his dog, in violation of the relevant Topeka City Ordinances. Plaintiff failed to answer the complaint or pay the fine within the proscribed time period, so a warrant for his arrest was issued by Municipal Court Judge, Neil Roach. However, Judge Roach did not personally review or sign the warrant. Instead, the warrant was generated by computer and a clerk, using Judge Roach's signature stamp, signed the warrant.
On April 24, 1998, plaintiff was arrested, booked, and released on bond. Judge Roach later found plaintiff guilty of the charge contained in the complaint, and plaintiff was ordered to pay a fine of $132.00. Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Shawnee County District Court, but the appeal was dismissed when the City agreed to dismiss the charges if plaintiff would purchase a dog license for his animal. Plaintiff apparently brings this action in response to his treatment at the hands of the named defendants.
II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The court has interpreted plaintiff's filings as asserting several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment violation for the unlawful search of his backyard by defendant Lisa Pinkley. Second, plaintiff asserts that the arrest warrant issued by Judge Roach was "bogus," so making his arrest and detention illegal. Third, plaintiff alleges he has undergone ten years of retaliatory conduct and deprivation of his First Amendment right to free speech. Fourth, he asserts that his time in jail pursuant to the arrest warrant constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, plaintiff claims the defendants have violated his habeas corpus rights.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendants Lisa Pinkley, Mark Grayson, and Police Chief Dean Forester's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14).
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this matter on April 4, 2000. Plaintiff failed to serve a summons or copy of the complaint on any of the defendants within the proscribed 120 days. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Forthwith, on August 31, 2000, plaintiff was ordered by the Honorable James P. O'Hara, United States Magistrate Judge, to show cause why service had not been performed. After plaintiff's response was received, this court issued an Order (Doc. 7) giving plaintiff until October 18, 2000, to properly serve the defendants. To date, defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forester have not been served. Therefore, in accordance with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's previous order, this action is dismissed as to defendants Pinkley, Grayson, and Forester.
B. Defendants City of Topeka, City Attorney Linda P. Jeffrey, Mayor Joan Wagnon, and Municipal Judge Roach's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16).
Defendants bring their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, defendants request an order under Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement.
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and must draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 493 (1986). Dismissal is proper only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In order to avoid dismissal, plaintiff must do more than plead mere conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions. See generally Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). "Despite the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, the court will not construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues." Drake v. City of Forth Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991). See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) ("It is not the court's function to become an advocate for the pro se litigant.").
2. Analysis
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must present facts demonstrating two critical elements: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States; and (2) the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
a. Retaliatory Conduct and Free Speech
Plaintiff's allegations of retaliatory conduct and free speech deprivation are vague and completely lacking in specificity. Additionally, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how or when any of the named defendants participated in the alleged conduct. The court finds dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) appropriate.
b. Habeas Corpus
Plaintiff makes no factual presentation whatsoever regarding this claim. The claim is merely written into the complaint as superfluous language. The court finds dismissal appropriate.
c. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The complaint proffers no explanation of this claim. Once again, plaintiff merely includes the claim without presenting any allegations of specific wrong-doing. Dismissal is appropriate as to this claim.
d. False Arrest
Kansas law requires that all warrants issued by a municipal court "shall be signed by the judge of the municipal court." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-4208. By allowing the clerk to sign for the court, Judge Roach issued plaintiff's warrant in violation of Kansas law. Therefore, the warrant by which plaintiff was arrested could not be interpreted as being valid.
On October 27, 1998, the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications issued an opinion ordering Judge Roach to cease and desist from issuing warrants without first personally reviewing and signing the warrants.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. Within these protections lies persons' right to be free from arrest without probable cause. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The invalid warrant issued by Judge Roach cannot serve to establish probable cause in this case. Therefore, it appears that plaintiff may have been arrested without probable cause, so depriving him of his rights as secured by the Constitution. Given this situation and the minimal standard to be applied under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is unwilling to find it impossible that plaintiff could prove a set of facts sufficient to establish his false arrest claim. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (reiterating the standard for dismissal). Hence, the court does not find dismissal appropriate as to this claim.
Whether or not plaintiff's arrest was supported by probable cause independent of the invalid warrant is a question reserved for later proceedings.
Although plaintiff's claim may continue, the court finds that the claim may only continue as to defendant City. It is well established that the theory of respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1988). Considering plaintiff has offered no allegations remotely connecting either Mayor Joan Wagnon or City Attorney Linda Jeffrey to his alleged deprivation, the court finds dismissal appropriate as to these defendants.
As for Judge Roach, judges performing official capacities are immune from suit under § 1983. See Hunt v. Bennet, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 832 (1994). This immunity is broad in scope and continues even if the action taken was in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of the judge's authority. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). The only caveat to this absolute immunity is if the judge acted in "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 357. The court finds that Judge Roach's action did not breach this exceedingly high standard. Hence, dismissal is appropriate as to Judge Roach.
The court recognizes the substantial burden plaintiff carries in presenting his claim against the City, for a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985) (plurality opinion). Instead, municipal liability under § 1983 may be found only when a municipal "policy" or "custom" caused the plaintiff's injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Of this standard, the Supreme Court noted:
Locating a "policy" ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a "custom" that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 (1997) (citations omitted).
On the other hand, the court is cognizant that because this is a claim against a municipality, as compared to a governmental official claiming a qualified immunity, plaintiff's pleadings are not subject to a higher level of scrutiny. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Instead, all plaintiff must satisfy is the basic notice pleading requirements found in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has alleged that he was arrested and detained pursuant to an invalid warrant. Lacking from plaintiff's allegations are an indication of how this alleged deprivation was the product of the City's policies or customs. There is, however, within plaintiff's pleadings some indication that it was routine for Judge Roach not to personally sign his arrest warrants. Whether these facts are sufficient to satisfy the appropriate legal standard, is a question best reserved for summary judgment.
The court offers no opinion as to whether this allegation, taken as true for this limited purpose, would reflect either a decision made by a policy-maker within the City or as an inherent and pervasive "policy" or "custom" of the City. Plaintiff has merely made an allegation sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The veracity of such an allegation and its implication on the legal standards set before plaintiff are reserved for later proceedings.
As an alternative theory, defendants contend that plaintiff's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations for claims of false imprisonment imposed by Kansas Statutes Annotated § 60-514. However, claims brought under § 1983 are governed by the two-year statute of limitation imposed by Kansas Statutes Annotated § 60-513(a)(4). See Cowdrey v. City of Eastborough, 730 F.2d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir. 1984); Oyler v. Finney, 870 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (D.Kan. 1994); Mason v. Stock, No. 93-1437, 1994 WL 682783, at *5 (D.Kan. Nov. 30, 1994). Plaintiff was arrested and detained on April 24, 1998. The complaint in this matter was filed on April 20, 2000 — four days within the two-year period of limitation. Defendants' argument is without merit.
As a second alternative theory, defendants argue that this court lacks jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court finds this assertion lacking in merit.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue
The court has considered plaintiff's motion and does not find that the interests of justice compel transfer, so the court denies the motion for change of venue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court has dismissed defendants Lisa Pinkley, Mark Grayson, Police Chief Dean Forester, Mayor Joan Wagnon, City Attorney Linda P. Jeffrey, and Municipal Judge Neil Roach from all claims relating to this action. All claims brought against defendant City are dismissed except plaintiff's claim of false arrest, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendants Lisa Pinkley, Mark Grayson, and Police Chief Dean Forester's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is granted. Additionally, defendant City of Topeka, City Attorney Linda P. Jeffrey, Mayor Joan Wagnon, and Municipal Judge Neil Roach's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) is granted in part and denied in part. The court has dismissed defendants Lisa Pinkley, Mark Grayson, Police Chief Dean Forester, Mayor Joan Wagnon, City Attorney Linda P. Jeffrey, and Municipal Judge Neil Roach from all claims relating to this action. All claims brought against defendant City are dismissed except plaintiff's claim of false arrest, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IT IS FURTHER BY THIS COURT ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue (Doc. 4) is denied.