Opinion
No. CV05 401 02 27 S
October 3, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action stems from the following facts: On June 4, 2003, Jeremiah Leahy, the decedent, was driving a Jeep Cherokee northbound on I-95 near the city of New Rochelle, New York, when he drove into the back of a double tractor-trailer owned by New England Motor Freight (NEMF) and driven by Patrick Torcicollo, the defendants. At the time of the accident, the truck was stopped in the middle lane of I-95 due to a traffic jam. It is undisputed that the decedent was killed instantly on impact. The plaintiff alleges that the trailer was negligently defective in that it was improperly maintained; that it did not have reflective tape on the rear as required by federal regulations, and that the rear impact guard on the trailer was unsafe.
The defendant was a resident of Stamford, Connecticut. The defendant Torcicollo lives in New York state. The defendant New England Motor Freight is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey; while their principal place of business is in New Jersey, NEMF also has a substantial selling presence in Connecticut.
The defendants have filed this motion for summary judgment. The underlying issue is that while the parties agree that New York law should apply as to the question of liability, the plaintiffs claim that Connecticut law should apply to the question of damages. For the following reasons, however, the court will consider defendant's papers as a motion for determination of applicable law.
"[M]ost reported and unreported cases deciding choice of law issues have done so in the context of deciding a recognized motion seeking substantive relief such as motion to strike or a motion for summary judgment." GGCP, Inc. v. Frank Crystal Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 06 5001622 (Jul. 8, 2008; Jennings, J.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 840]. It is well established in Connecticut that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. This case, however, is distinguishable from "most reported and unreported cases deciding choice of law" because in those cases the pleaded cause of action only existed under the laws of one state and therefore, the claim would not exist if the other state's law was determined to govern. See, e.g., Jaiguay v. Vasquez, 287 Conn. 323, 350, 948 A.2d 955 (2008) ("[u]nlike this state's law, however, the New York statutory scheme contains no provision authorizing an employee to bring a common-law tort action against a coworker for damages stemming from the coworker's work-related, negligent operation of a motor vehicle"). In this case, however, the defendant does not suggest that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the motion is granted. Wrongful death claims exist under both New York and Connecticut law. See N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.1; General Statutes § 52-555. Thus, whether New York or Connecticut law is applied, there remain unresolved genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by a fact finder. For this reason, the court finds that a motion for summary judgment is not the proper procedural vehicle to seek a conflict of laws determination in this case.
In addition,
[a] plaintiff may obtain summary judgment on part of a claim only when it appears that a defense applies to part of the claim or where part of the claim is admitted.
Cannata v. Ricciardi, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 98 0144102 (May 15, 2001, West, J.)
Essentially, the defendant has moved that this court hold that the substantive law of New York applies to the question of damages in this action. "Pre-trial motions to determine the applicable law are not uncommon in other jurisdictions and facilitate the orderly adjudication of the case. The parties have filed comprehensive memoranda and voluminous documents supporting their claims of fact and law. No party has objected to deciding the choice of law issue on the present record." QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 326873 (December 7, 1998, Levin, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 627), aff'd, 256 Conn. 343, 773 A.2d 906 (2001). Although no such motion exists in Connecticut practice under the Practice Book, this procedure has previously been used by the Superior Court. See Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 43 Conn.Sup. 182, 648 A.2d 665 (1994); QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 326873. In light of this precedent, the court will consider the defendant's motion for determination of applicable law.
The threshold choice of law issue in Connecticut, as it is elsewhere, is whether there is an outcome determinative conflict between applicable laws of the states with a potential interest in the case. If not, there is no need to perform a choice of law analysis, and the law common to the jurisdiction should be applied.
Haymond v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 45 Conn.Sup. 481, 488-89, 723 A.2d 808 (1997), aff'd, 247 Conn. 436, 723 A.2d 821 (1998) [ 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 123].
In many instances, issues of liability and damages may be affected by a conflict of law. Butova v. Bielonko, Superior Court, district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 07 5010057 (Nov. 9, 2007, Bentivegna, J.).
In New York, the recovery for a wrongful death action is guided by its wrongful death statute. N. Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-4.3(a) provides in relevant part:
"The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the persons for whose benefits the action is brought. In every such action, in addition to any other lawful element of recoverable damages, the reasonable expenses of medical aid, nursing and attention incident to the injury causing death and the reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent paid by the distributees, or for the payment of which any distributee is responsible, shall also be proper elements of damage." In addition, N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 11-3.3(a) provides in relevant part: "Where an injury causes the death of a person the damages recoverable for such injury are limited to those accruing before death and shall not include damages for or by reason of death."
In contrast, General Statutes § 52-555(a) provides in relevant part: "[S]uch executor or administrator may recover from the party legally at fault for such injuries just damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses." The Connecticut courts have interpreted this section to include the decedent's pain and suffering. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986); see also McCoy v. Rauci, 156 Conn. 115, 239 A.2d 689 (1968) (holding that the consideration of pain and suffering was not in error). Therefore, there is an outcome determinative conflict between applicable laws of the states with a potential interest in the case and this court must perform a conflict of laws analysis under Connecticut law. Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977), overruled on other grounds by O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, CT Page 16038 201 Conn. 632 ("[i]n determining the governing law, a forum applies its own conflict-of law rules").
Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws for determining choice of law in tort actions involving out-of-state motor vehicle accidents. Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 350. The court has
summarized the most significant relationship test set forth in §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) as follows. Subsection (1) of § 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that [t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 . . . Subsection (2) of § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in turn, provides: When there is no [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of a particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 351.
The court has also relied on the Restatement to determine the specific contacts to consider in applying the most significant relationship rule.
For assistance in our evaluation of the policy choices set out in §§ 145 (1) and 6 (2) . . . we turn . . . to § 145 (2) . . . which establishes black-letter rules of priority to facilitate the application of the principles of § 6 to tort cases . . . Subsection (2) of § 145 . . . provides: Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 801-02, 830 A.2d 752 (2003), cited in Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 352. Finally,
[a]s O'Connor informs us . . . it is the significance, and not the number, of § 145(2) contacts that determines the outcome of the choice of law inquiry under the Restatement [Second] approach. As the concluding sentence of § 145(2) provides, [t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted).
Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 353.
We commence our analysis under the significant relationship rule by reviewing the specific contacts that each jurisdiction has to the facts and circumstances underlying the present action. In doing so, we are guided by the contacts enumerated in § 145(2). This court will first consider where the injury occurred, where the relationship between the parties is centered and where the conduct causing the injury occurred. Although location was once the determinate factor in Connecticut's conflict of laws analysis pertaining to torts, over the past thirty years the courts have diminished its influence. See Simaitis v. Flood, 182 Conn. 24, 437 A.2d 828 (1980); see also O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 632; Jaiquay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 350. In this case, it is clear that the automobile accident, which resulted in the death of the plaintiff, occurred within the state of New York. For this reason, it follows that the relationship between these parties is also centered in New York. Finally, at this point in the litigation, it is impossible for this court to make a determination as to where the conduct causing the injury occurred because that issue is controverted by the parties.
Next, the court must determine what, if any, interest New York has regarding these contacts. Case law suggests that a state has an interest in deterring drivers from driving recklessly within its geographical boundaries. Jaiquay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 354. The Supreme Court, however, has held that this interest can be overcome by other factors. Connecticut case law provides numerous instances where the mere situs of an automobile accident was not enough to apply the law of that state pursuant to the significant relationship test. See Jaiquay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 323; see also Snyder v. Seldin, 81 Conn.App. 718, 841 A.2d 701 (2004). In Jaiquay, the Supreme Court found that,
In Jaiquay, the Supreme Court reasoned,
[i]n particular, the plaintiff contends that Connecticut has a strong interest in deterring drivers from speeding and driving recklessly on its roads and highways. Although Connecticut does have such an interest, we agree with the defendants that its interest in that regard is diminished when the offending conduct occurs during a brief entry into the state and when any accident that occurs as a result of the undue speed or recklessness does not involve a Connecticut resident . . . Moreover, Connecticut's interest in deterring and punishing reckless driving is largely satisfied by [the defendant's] conviction of negligent homicide in this state. (Citation omitted.)
Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 354.
[a]lthough the accident and the conduct causing it occurred in Connecticut, that is Connecticut's only contact with the matter. Moreover, the sole reason why Vasquez drove the pickup truck into Connecticut from his point of departure in New York was to reach a destination in New York; no one in that vehicle was performing any work in Connecticut or engaged in any other activity that had any connection to Connecticut. Consequently, it was mere happenstance that the accident occurred in Connecticut.
Id., 353.
Similarly, in Snyder, the Appellate Court held that,
the place where the injury occurred might be one factor to consider, it is not dispositive of the issue and clearly does not outweigh [the other state's] interests.
Snyder v. Seldin, supra, 81 Conn.App. 723.
Although neither of these cases involve facts that are identical to the case at hand, they both demonstrate that other more significant interests can overcome the interests associated with the geographic location of the accident. See e.g. Jaiquay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 323 ("[c]hoice of law must not be rendered a matter of happenstance, in which the respective interests of the parties and the concerned jurisdictions receive only coincidental consideration"). In moving away from the law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti, the Supreme Court has warned that "to employ the rule would bestow upon temporary visitors injured in [New York] all the relief which the [New York] . . . act affords, but deny that same relief to [New York] residents injured while on temporary business outside the state, even when all other incidents of employment . . . are in [New York]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 637-38. Accordingly, the court finds that New York has some interest in monitoring its own roads for the purposes of safety.
The significant relationship test dictates that a court must consider the domicile and the expectations of both parties in addition to geographical location. See O'Connor v. O'Conner, supra, 201 Conn. 657. "More [important than domicile], however, Connecticut has a strong interest in assuring that the plaintiff may avail [him]self of the full scope of remedies for tortious conduct that Connecticut law affords." Id., 657. In this case, the deceased was a domiciliary of Connecticut. As previously discussed, the applicable Connecticut damage provision provides a greater scope of recovery than its New York counterpart. Therefore, "[a]pplication of New York law on the issue of damages . . . would indeed impair Connecticut's interest in providing full compensation for its injured domiciliaries." Partman v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 43 Conn.Sup. 239, 649 A.2d 275 (1994) [ 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 247]. Accordingly, Connecticut has a strong interest in applying its own damage provision and thus permitting its domiciliary to recover the full amount of damages that its legislature has deemed appropriate. The court, therefore, gives this contact heavy weight in its conflict of laws analysis.
"The purpose of General Statutes § 52-599 is to prevent an action or right of action from being lost, under the common-law rule, by the death of the possessor . . . Under this statute, the cause of action which the decedent had, while he was alive, for his antemortem injuries, survives to his personal representative . . . So, if, for example, the plaintiff's decedent had sustained injuries and died thereafter from natural causes, his personal representative could prosecute the action for the personal injuries." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doucette v. Bouchard, 28 Conn.Sup. 460, 265 A.2d 618 (1970). Under Connecticut law, an individual injured in an automobile accident may recover damages for pain and suffering. See, e.g., Vajda v. Tulsa, 214 Conn. 523, 572 A .2d 998 (1990) ("[d]amages may be awarded for pain and suffering, past, present and future, resulting from the injuries so long as the evidence affords a basis for a reasonable estimate by the trier of fact of the amount"). In this case, if the decedent's recovery was limited by the New York statute, he would lose this right of action. If the plaintiff had survived the accident, the defendant could be liable for both pain and suffering. Under New York law, however, the defendant could not be liable of pain or suffering. Thus, only under Connecticut law is the plaintiff's full right of action preserved. Moreover, the court recognizes that under New York law the defendant seemingly receives a potential monetary benefit from the plaintiff's death.
Lastly, the court must consider the defendants' domiciles and what interest, if any, New York has with these parties. It is clear from the evidence that one defendant, NEMF, is incorporated in Delaware and the other defendant, Torcicollo, is both domiciled and employed in New York. Neither of these facts weigh in favor of applying New York law in this case. Although one defendant, the driver of the vehicle, is a New York domiciliary, New York's articulated purpose behind its wrongful death statute does not contemplate defendants. "The policy underlying [New York's] wrongful death [statute] is . . . to compensate the decedent's estate for loss suffered by his death." Weisberg v. Layne-New York Co., Inc., 132 App.Div.2d 550, 552, 517 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1987). "Damages in a wrongful death action are, by statute, limited to pecuniary injuries suffered by the distributees of decedent's estate . . . Such damages are limited to loss of support, voluntary assistance and possible inheritance, as well as medical and funeral expenses incidental to death . . . but do not include those damages which could have been recovered in a personal injury action had the decedent survived." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parilis v. Feinstein, 49 N.Y.2d 984, 406 N.E.2d 1059, 429 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1980). None of these articulated interests specify a desire to limit the liability of the defendant. Therefore, New York's interest in its domiciliary, Toricicollo, is given very little weight by this court.
After consideration of these contacts within the rubric of the significant relationship rule, the court finds that regarding damages, Connecticut has the dominant interest. Accordingly, Connecticut General Statute § 52-555 should govern the question of recovery in this case.
The defendant argues that Connecticut's law for resolving a conflict of law precludes this court from applying Connecticut law to the question of damages because neither party questions the application of New York law to the question of liability. In support of its claim, the defendant cites The Commonwealth Fuel Company v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 A. 794 (1925). In that case, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t would be strange to apply the law of Tennessee in determining the question of liability, and take the law of the forum to fix the measure of recovery." The plaintiff, in response to this argument, claims that this court can properly apply the law of Connecticut to the question of recovery pursuant to the principle of depecage.
"The principle of depecage has been described as the framework under which different issues in a single case . . . may be decided according to the substantive law of different states." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 252 Conn. 774, 783 n. 5, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of this doctrine in Reichhold, it never expressly adopted it. See Streeter v. Executive Jet Management, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 02 0179481 (Nov. 10, 2005, Sheedy, J.) ("[c]ontrary to [the defendant's] assertion, Connecticut did not expressly adopt the doctrine of depecage in Reichhold nor is it a universally accepted doctrine. This court questions whether prejudgment interest is a standalone issue capable of a choice of law analysis independent of the damages choice of law determination she earlier made and iterated when she charged the jury"). In Partman, however, the Superior Court seemingly followed this principle when it held that Connecticut law can be applied to the law of damages even if New York law applied to the law of liability. Partman v. Rent-A-Car, supra, 43 Conn.Sup. 241 ("insofar as Connecticut has a superior interest in applying its own law of damages, Connecticut law would apply to the issues of damages, even though New York law would apply to the issue of liability"). For the following reasons, this court follows the precedent of Partman and finds that the principle of depecage is applicable in Connecticut and that damages is a standalone issue capable of a conflict of laws analysis.
During the Supreme Court's continuing effort to distance Connecticut's modern conflict of laws approach from the traditional place of injury test, it has often looked to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws and followed its guidelines. See Jaiguay v. Vasquez, supra, 287 Conn. 350-51 n. 21 ("[w]e therefore reject the approaches that we identified in Simaitis in favor of the test from §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws that we adopt in the present case"). For this reason, this court shall do the same. In § 145, the Restatement says, "[t]he courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues under the local law of a single state." 1 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 145, comment (d), p. 417 (1971). Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court's adoption of § 145 and its recent practice of considering the Restatement (Second), the court finds that it may decide different issues in a single case applying the substantive law of different states.
In O'Connor, the Supreme Court endorsed the Restatement (Second) when it said,
[i]n deciding how to assess a replacement for lex loci, we recognize that the legal literature offers us various alternative approaches to the problems of choice of law . . . The Restatement Second approach, the product of more than a decade of research, incorporates some of the attributes of the latter two approaches, as well as others, in an attempt to provide formulations that were true to the cases, were broad enough to permit further development in the law, and yet were able to give some guidance by pointing to what was through would probably be the result reached in the majority of cases . . . A majority of the courts that have abandoned lex loci have adopted the principles of the Restatement Second as representing the most comprehensive and equitably balanced approach to conflict of laws. It is therefore our conclusion that we too should incorporate the guidelines of the Restatement as the governing principles for those cases in which application of the doctrine of lex loci would produce an arbitrary, irrational result. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 648-50.
The only question that remains is whether damages is an standalone issue for the purposes of the principle of depecage. The Restatement (Second) does not explicitly provide an answer, but it docs state that "[t]he law governing the right to exemplary damages need not necessarily be the same as the law governing the measure of compensatory damages. This is because situations may arise where one state has the dominant interest with respect to the issue of compensatory damages and another state has the dominant interest with respect to the issue of exemplary damages." 1 Restatement (Second), supra, § 172, comment (d), p. 513. If different states' laws can be applied to different categories of damages, it follows that each of these categories is a standalone issue arising out of the same case. If different categories of damages are standalone issues, then the overarching question of damages must be an issue separate from liability. Thus, pursuant to the principle of depecage, a court may determine that Connecticut law governs the question of damages, even if the parties have previously agreed that New York law governs the question of liability.
The Supreme Court once opined,
[w]e are not today concerned with a case that offends systemic policy concerns of another state or country, nor do the facts warrant an inference of justified expectations concerning the applicability of anything other than the law of the forum. Although the principles of certainty and ease of application must be taken into account, the Restatement cautions against attaching independent weight to these auxiliary factors, noting that they are ancillary to the goal of providing rational, fair choice of law rules.
O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 651.
For the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs and in the interest of providing a rational, fair conflict of laws analysis, it is the opinion of this court that Connecticut law is applicable to the question of damages in this case.