Opinion
G053116
09-22-2017
In re Marriage of JIMMY LE VU and LAURA AMY FEARN. JIMMY LE VU, Respondent, v. LAURA AMY FEARN, Appellant.
Westover Law Group and Andrew L. Westover for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 12D001228) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sherri L. Honer, Judge. Affirmed. Westover Law Group and Andrew L. Westover for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Laura Amy Fearn appeals from an order denying her request for a renewed domestic violence restraining order under Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a), against her former husband, Jimmy Le Vu. (All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.)
We affirm. For the reasons we explain in detail post, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fearns renewal request.
BACKGROUND
I.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS LEADING UP TO FEARNS REQUEST FOR A RENEWED
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDER.
In our prior opinion (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn (Jan. 13, 2016, G050313) [nonpub. opn.]), we set forth relevant background facts as follows: "Vu and Fearn were married on September 21, 2010. They had met six years before they were married and, during that time period, they had an "on again, off again" relationship. (Capitalization omitted.) [¶] At the time Vu and Fearn married in 2010, they had a son who was almost three years old. Their second son was born in October 2011. After 16 months of marriage, Vu and Fearn separated on February 1, 2011. In February 2012, Vu filed a petition to dissolve the marriage."
In April 2014, following the first phase of trial addressing custody and visitation issues, judgment was entered (the April 2014 judgment) in which the court stated: "[T]his is a case with long-standing high conflict and acrimony between the parties." (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.) The court also stated it "found both Vus and Fearns credibility to be questionable at times. It found both parties have committed acts of Domestic Violence against the other in the past. The court acknowledged there was a then current protective order for domestic violence against Vu, which was to expire on April 3, 2015, but explained: The child custody investigator noted in the December 27, 2013 report that there is no reason to believe that [Vu] poses a risk to the minors at this time. The court agrees and finds accordingly. [Vu] has completed parenting classes and an anger management course. The reported scores for [Vu] from the anger management classes suggest he benefited from the program and therefore he has satisfied the requirements pursuant to FC 3044. The court finds that [Vu] has completed classes to overcome the presumption against custody and timeshare orders pursuant to Family Code 3044. The court found it was in the childrens best interest to award joint legal and physical custody to Vu and Fearn." (Ibid.)
In our prior opinion, we further stated: "As to visitation, referred to by the court as timeshare, the April 2014 judgment provided for a timeshare schedule, conditioned on it being consistent with reunification counselor Dr. Amy Starks recommendation, which increased the amount of time Vu had visitation with the children. The judgment was, as follows: (1) Vu would visit with the children for three hours on Wednesdays for the first two weeks after the last counseling session with Dr. Stark; (2) a six-hour Saturday visit would be added for each of the two following weeks; and (3) Vu would have visits with the children on the first and third weekends of each month thereafter. The court stated that although it was a close call regarding Vus motivation to act as a dedicated and focused parent for the children, the court was persuaded by Vus trial testimony and the findings from the child custody investigation. The court also found that Vu and Fearns conflict has restricted and hindered [Vu]s ability to act as a parent for [the children]. The court stated the then-existing restraining order shall be modified to reflect that [Vu] shall be given orders for peaceful contact for purposes of custody and visitation exchanges." (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.)
In June 2014, judgment was entered following the second phase of trial addressing issues related to support, attorney fees, and division of debt (the June 2014 judgment). In the June 2014 judgment, the trial court summarized Vus and Fearns respective criminal and domestic violence histories, as set forth in our prior opinion:
"In 2003, Fearn was convicted of assault, and was arrested for contempt and assault and battery. [¶] The court noted: A criminal protective order was in effect from September 24, 2007 through November 26, 2007 restraining [Fearn] and protecting [Vu] and minor. On March 15, 2007, a five-year domestic violence protective order was issued against Fearn in favor of Vu, on the ground Fearn had threatened to physically harm Vu and his family; Fearn had admitted to her criminal past at the hearing on that date. The domestic violence protective order was dismissed based on Vu and Fearns stipulation at a time when the parties attempted to reconcile.
"Vu, on the other hand, was charged with battery and violation of a domestic violence restraining order, but those charges were dismissed in 2008. In April 2012, a three-year restraining order was issued against Vu and was still in effect at the time the June 2014 judgment was entered. The court noted temporary restraining orders issued against Vu, protecting Fearn and the children, which were in effect from October 23, 2007 through December 13, 2007, and from March 1, 2012 through April 2, 2012. The court also noted a criminal protective order was issued restraining Vu from Fearn, beginning December 7, 2005 and ending September 23, 2008. In 2009, a civil harassment order was issued against Vu, relating to a female not related to this case.
"The child custody investigator raised credibility issues with both [Vu] and [Fearn]. The investigation report noted allegations of domestic violence and neglect had been determined to be unfounded or inconclusive except for one instance in 2007 when the oldest child witnessed Vu punch a wall. The investigator concluded that due to the actions of [Fearn] in disregarding a restraining order, the absence of recent acts of domestic violence, police reports or social services investigations that no safety concerns were found to be present at the time of the investigation in December 2013. [¶] [Vu] has completed a Batterers Intervention Class and his progress report showed that he benefitted from the classes." (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.)
Fearn filed a notice of appeal from both the April 2014 judgment and the June 2014 judgment. (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.) In her appeal, Fearn argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by awarding joint legal and physical custody of their two children in light of Vus history of domestic violence and a then-existing restraining order against him. (Ibid.)
We affirmed, noting the record reflected the trial courts careful consideration of Vus and Fearns histories of domestic violence, and its agreement with the child custody investigators opinion that Vu did not pose any threat to the safety of the children. (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.) We also noted that Fearn did not argue the evidence was insufficient to support the courts findings on those issues. (Ibid.)
II.
FEARN FILES A REQUEST FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESTRAINING
ORDER, THE TRIAL COURT DENIES THE REQUEST, AND FEARN APPEALS.
In February 2015, Fearn filed a notice of hearing to renew the then-existing restraining order against Vu (the 2012 restraining order), which was scheduled to expire on April 30, 2015 (the renewal request). Fearn requested that the trial court make the 2012 restraining order permanent or, alternatively, that it be renewed for five additional years. In support of the renewal request, Fearn asserted that she had moved multiple times and had not disclosed her address to keep herself and her children safe. She also stated that while the divorce proceedings were pending, in the context of custody exchanges there were a "few visits" at which Vu berated her, called her unspecified derogatory names, and told her he would find out where she lived. She stated that Vu had obtained one of her prior addresses through the United States Postal Service. She further stated he "has threatened to kill [her] in the past with a gun" and he had guns in his home.
Vu filed a written response stating he opposed the renewal request because Fearn was not afraid of him but "only want[ed] to maintain the restraining order to use it against [him] for purposes of custody and visitation." He further stated Fearn had voluntarily contacted him since the issuance of the subject restraining order.
In October 2015, at the hearing on the renewal request, the trial court stated it had reviewed the record relating to the parties past restraining orders, the parties declarations, and their testimony. The court stated, "this really boils down to credibility issues as to whether Ms. Fearns alleged apprehension of risk, significant risk of future harm is genuine and reasonable." The court stated it was concerned about the conduct of both parties and found inconsistencies in Fearns testimony supporting her argument she was currently experiencing apprehension or fear that Vu might harm her. The court denied the renewal request, stating that after the court "spent a lot of time" reviewing the matter, it found Fearn failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she entertained a "reasonable apprehension" of future abuse.
The court added, however, that its ruling was without prejudice to the right of either party to file another request for a domestic violence restraining order in the future should cause arise.
Fearn appeals from the order denying the renewal request.
DISCUSSION
Fearn argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying the renewal request, which she brought under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (§ 6200 et seq.). Fearns argument is without merit.
I.
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RENEWALS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RESTRAINING ORDERS AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The Domestic Violence Prevention Acts purpose "is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence." (§ 6220.) The term "abuse" is defined in section 6203 as intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury (id., subd. (a)(1)); committing a sexual assault (id., subd. (a)(2)); placing a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or another person (id., subd. (a)(3)); or "behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320" (id., subd. (a)(4)).
Section 6320 in turn permits the court to enjoin "molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party." (Id., subd. (a).) As a result, abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act includes physical abuse or injury, as well as acts that "destroy[] the mental or emotional calm of the other party." (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497; see § 6203, subd. (b) ["Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault"].)
Section 6345, subdivision (a) provides for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act: "In the discretion of the court, the personal conduct, stay-away, and residence exclusion orders contained in a court order issued after notice and a hearing under this article may have a duration of not more than five years, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. These orders may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the issuance of the original order, subject to termination or modification by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party."
With regard to renewal requests, "[t]he key consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse. A trial court should renew the protective order, if, and only if, it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected party entertains a "reasonable apprehension" of future abuse." (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 397.)
We review the trial courts ruling on a request to renew a domestic violence restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 396.) "An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.] But, the exercise of discretion is not unfettered in such cases. [Citation.] "All exercises of discretion must be guided by applicable legal principles, however, which are derived from the statute under which discretion is conferred. [Citations.] If the courts decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.] Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. [Citation.]" [Citation.] The question of whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law [citation] requiring de novo review [citation]. [Citation.] [¶] In reviewing the denial of a DVRO request, we determine whether the trial court "applied the correct legal standard to the issue in exercising its discretion, which is a question of law for this court."" (Id. at pp. 396-397.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE
RENEWAL REQUEST.
Our record shows the trial court was aware of and applied the correct genuine and reasonable apprehension of future abuse legal standard in exercising its discretion to deny the renewal request. Fearn does not argue otherwise.
At the hearing on the renewal request, the trial court properly noted that, in assessing the risk of future abuse, the court ordinarily should consider the evidence and findings on which the initial order was based. In addition to considering evidence presented at the October 2015 hearing on the renewal request, the court expressly identified the categories of documents it reviewed in ruling on the renewal request as including: (1) every request for a domestic violence restraining order filed in the case by either party; (2) every temporary or permanent domestic violence restraining order issued in the case; (3) every minute order relating to the issuance or denial of the domestic violence restraining order; (4) the transcript of the April 2012 hearing relating to the issuance of the 2012 restraining order; (5) the court-ordered custody reports; (6) all exhibits admitted into evidence; (6) the April 2014 judgment; (7) the June 2014 judgment; and (8) the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System report of Mr. Vu regarding his criminal background and prior restraining orders.
Fearn does not argue that the scope of the documents the trial court considered in ruling on the renewal request was in any way improper. Nevertheless, only a very small fraction of the above-identified documents were included in her appellants appendix or otherwise made part of the appellate record; those documents included copies of some of the temporary and permanent restraining orders that had been issued in this case and a copy of the April 2014 judgment. Our review of the trial courts ruling is therefore significantly hindered as it is limited to a small, select subset of the documents which the trial court considered. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140- 1141 [it is the appellants burden to provide an adequate record to assess error and an appellants failure to designate an adequate record on appeal warrants affirmance of the judgment].)
At the hearing on the renewal request, the court stated the case boiled down to credibility issues as to Fearns contention she suffered a "genuine and reasonable" apprehension of future abuse and further stated Fearns credibility was lacking. The court stated in its review of the case, it found Fearn had "added significant additional information regarding sexual abuse, coercion, and/or sexual deviation on the part of Mr. Vu that was never raised before by Ms. Fearn in the numerous years in which these parties have litigated this case, and in the numerous filings of both parties regarding a request for [a] restraining order."
For example, the court noted that in Fearns May 11, 2006 request for a restraining order, which is not in the appellate record, Fearn alleged Vu tried to extort money from her and called her 30 times. In later papers, however, Fearn made allegations for the first time that, during the same time period, Vu "threaten[ed] to kill her and to kill her dog."
In discussing the reasons for its ruling on the renewal request, the court often referred to documents and transcripts from prior hearings that are not in the appellate record.
In another instance, the court observed that Fearn had provided her expert witness with information regarding Fearn "not being allowed to speak or have relationships with other men" but that information was contradicted by documents the court reviewed in the case showing Fearn had a relationship with a man identified as "Mr. Ly" who lived with both Fearn and Vu during their marriage.
The court also expressed concern that Fearn explained her contact with Vu in violation of then-existing restraining orders by stating she was facilitating the establishment of a relationship between Vu and their children. Yet Fearn "listed Mr. Ly as father of both of her children" and she had their oldest child refer to Vu as "Jimmy" and not "dad."
In her appellate brief, Fearn does not address, much less challenge, the inconsistencies pointed out by the trial court or the courts finding that her credibility was wanting. Instead, Fearn argues the trial court erred by denying the renewal request because (1) the 2012 restraining order was sufficient, in and of itself, to support the issuance of a renewed restraining order, and (2) Vu violated the 2012 restraining order. We address each argument in turn.
A.
Renewal of a Domestic Violence Restraining Order is Not Automatic.
Fearn does not challenge the trial courts credibility determinations, and specifically does not challenge or explain the courts observation that her actions, such as contacting Vu in violation of a restraining order, were inconsistent with having a genuine and reasonable fear of future abuse by Vu. Instead, quoting Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333, she argues in her appellate brief: "Those [contacts] are not relevant to the inquiry here. The very fact that the trial court issued the initial restraining order, after a hearing, can be sufficient to provide the necessary proof to satisfy [the renewal] test." Fearns argument ignores the applicable legal standard and incorrectly suggests the renewal of a domestic violence restraining order is automatic.
In order to secure a renewal of a domestic violence restraining order, section 6345 does not require a protected party to introduce or the court to consider evidence of actual acts of abuse the restrained party committed after the original order went into effect. "It would be anomalous to require the protected party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify renewal of that original order. If this were the standard, the protected party would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting the restrained partys abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that ineffectual order." (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 397.) In Lister v. Bowen, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at page 333, the appellate court held "the existence of the initial order certainly is relevant and the underlying findings and facts supporting that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test." (Italics added.) If, as Fearn suggests, the mere issuance of the original restraining order is alone sufficient to trigger a renewal of that order, without consideration of the underlying findings and facts supporting its issuance, the renewal of domestic violence restraining orders would be automatic. Fearn does not cite any legal authority supporting such a proposition. It is well-established, as set forth by the legal authorities cited ante, that a protected party has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse to secure a renewal of a domestic violence restraining order.
In her appellate brief, Fearn summarizes "[s]ome of the underlying conduct supporting the multiple restraining orders" which, she asserts, "include[s] pushing [Fearn] into a wall and hitting her . . . , handcuffing the minor child to his bed . . . , and throwing a newborn baby to the ground." Fearn solely cites her testimony at the October 2015 hearing on the renewal request as evidence of such incidents. Neither the appellate record nor our prior opinion establishes how or when these three alleged incidents were presented to the trial court in connection with prior requests for restraining orders.
Two of the three incidents involve alleged abuse by Vu against one of their children. Fearn testified at the renewal request hearing that the alleged handcuffing incident occurred in 2010, and the alleged incident where Vu threw himself and their younger child to the ground occurred in 2012. The April 2014 judgment, however, states the courts finding, in accordance with a child custody investigators report and recommendation, that there was no reason to believe Vu posed a risk to the children. As noted in our prior opinion in this matter, in her appeal from the April 2014 judgment, Fearn did not argue insufficient evidence supported that finding. (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.) The April 2014 judgment also stated that the reunification counselor recommended increasing visitation between Vu and the children, that a joint custody arrangement was in the best interest of the children, and that the then-current restraining order be modified to allow for peaceable contact for purpose of custody and visitation exchanges. (In re Marriage of Vu & Fearn, supra, G050313.)
Fearn testified at the renewal request hearing in October 2015 that the third incident of Vu allegedly pushing Fearn into a wall and hitting her occurred in 2007. Fearn provides no other underlying facts or findings of the trial court with regard to this incident.
Although the April 2014 judgment and our prior opinion confirm the trial courts prior findings that Vu and Fearn had each engaged in domestic violence against the other in the past, on the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by denying the renewal request on the sole basis of Vus past acts of abuse against Fearn.
B.
The Trial Court Previously Found Vu Had Not Violated the 2012 Restraining Order and
Fearn Did Not Prove Any Further Violations.
Fearn also argues the renewal request should have been granted because Vu had "violated the [2012] restraining order on multiple occasions regarding firearms and regarding [Fearn]s address" proving "she had, and continues to have, a reasonable apprehension of fear that [Vu] will resume his violent behavior." (See Lister v. Bowen, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 334 [a partys knowing violation of an existing restraining order supported courts renewal of the order]; Perez v. Torres-Hernandez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 399 ["It is reasonable for the court to conclude that a knowing violation of the restraining order made . . . the protected party, feel apprehensive about her safety"].) As explained post, the trial court did not find Fearns allegations regarding violations of the 2012 restraining order supportive of the renewal request because the court had already analyzed those allegations and concluded Vu had not knowingly violated that order.
Fearn argues in her appellate brief that Vu violated the firearms prohibition of the 2012 restraining order when he turned in a pistol to the Irvine Police Department on March 16, 2015. She further argues the childrens attorney found a single bullet in Vus home, and, later that same month, Vu turned in a second firearm which had been found in a warehouse used by Vus family store.
At the October 2015 hearing on the renewal request, the trial court addressed Fearns argument Vu violated the 2012 restraining order: "With respect to the gun issue: The Court did have concerns of compliance with the restraining order when Mr. Vu had made mention of guns in the home. [¶] Mr. Vu had explained though that he was not sure if there were guns in the home. He, himself, did not have access, but he resided with his parents and he did not know what his father had in his safe. Given that it was unclear whether there were guns in the home, the court had changed custody. [¶] The Court then had the parties come in. The Court ordered an emergency investigation. The Court had minors counsel go out and do an investigation of the home. And, yes, there were, indeed, guns located in the home. But those guns were all located in the safe that was belonging to Mr. Vus father. [¶] So although there had, indeed, been guns, the Court found that Mr. Vu was in compliance with the restraining order and all those guns had been removed. [¶] I understand that Ms. Edgar [minors counsel] found a single bullet during her inspection after the fact. But, again, the Court didnt find any intentional violations by Mr. Vu of the restraining order; that that was a—you had the police go through and look. The fact that somebody might have, in the entirety of the house, failed to locate one bullet wasnt sufficient either to show a violation. [¶] So the Court—I want to make sure that the parties are aware, the Court took the concerns extremely seriously, but, ultimately, after gathering all the information, the Court did not find there was a violation of the restraining order. There was no intention[ on the] part o[f] Mr. Vu to violate the restraining order."
At another point during the October 2015 renewal request hearing, the trial court reiterated that it had previously found there were no longer any firearms in Vus home "based on the emergency investigation that was conducted, and the search of the residence." The appellate record in the instant case does not include a transcript of the courts investigation into and resolution of whether Vu violated the 2012 restraining order by his alleged possession of firearms. We therefore do not know the circumstances by which Vu encountered those two firearms. The appellate record does show, however, this issue was investigated and litigated and the court ultimately found Vu had not violated the restraining order and there were no firearms in Vus home. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that Fearn had not proven a reasonable apprehension of future abuse based on alleged violations of the 2012 restraining order that had been refuted in court.
Also at the October 2015 renewal request hearing, Vu testified he did not currently have access to firearms or ammunition in any location.
In her appellate brief, however, Fearn does not challenge the courts finding Vu did not intentionally violate the 2012 restraining order; instead, she argues Vus intent to violate the restraining order is irrelevant. Citing section 6389, subdivision (a), Fearn argues, "intent is not an element required to establish a violation of the firearm restriction" punishable by Penal Code section 29825. She argues the trial court misapplied the law by considering Vus intent.
The issue presented here, however, is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the renewal request, not whether Vu might be subject to punishment under Penal Code section 29825 for a violation of the 2012 protective order. As discussed ante, in the context of a renewal request, it is the intentional violation of a domestic violence restraining order that is relevant in the determination of whether a protected party feels reasonable apprehension about his or her safety. (See Lister v. Bowen, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 334; Perez v. Torres-Hernandez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.)
Section 6389, subdivision (a) provides: "A person subject to a protective order, as defined in Section 6218, shall not own, possess, purchase, or receive a firearm or ammunition while that protective order is in effect. Every person who owns, possesses, purchases or receives, or attempts to purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order is in effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825 of the Penal Code."
In her appellate brief, Fearn further argues that she experienced apprehension or fear of future abuse because Vu violated the 2012 restraining order by attempting to obtain her address through a records request to the United States Postal Service and by "stalking her in her neighborhood." At the October 2015 renewal request hearing, the trial court rejected Fearns argument Vu violated the restraining order by attempting to discover her home address, explaining the court had previously resolved this issue as well: "Attempts were made by Mr. Vus counsel to obtain the address of Ms. Fearn, and it was explained that those attempts were being made because of attempts of service of a contempt, which counsel believed needed to be personally served. And, so although she was aware that the Secretary of State would accept service on parties that had been part of . . . Safe at Home, that she was concerned that that wouldnt be sufficient service for a contempt; that it needed to be personally served. So the court found that there were no violations with respect to attempting to locate Ms. Fearns address." Fearn does not argue the courts findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.
No documents or transcripts from any hearing on the courts prior resolution of this alleged violation of the restraining order are contained in the appellate record.
Fearn also argues she proved a reasonable apprehension of future abuse by Vu because Vu had "stalk[ed] her in her neighborhood." At the October 2015 renewal request hearing, Fearns testimony in support of her argument was that on an unspecified number of occasions and on unspecified dates, she had seen Vus sister and then Vu himself "in [her] neighborhood." As discussed ante, the trial court found Fearns testimony suffered credibility problems; even if it was fully credited, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that evidence did not support a finding Fearn suffered a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.
Although she does not make this argument in her appellate brief, at the October 2015 hearing, Fearn asserted she was afraid Vu would follow her home after visits with their children. As pointed out by the trial court, there was no evidence Vu ever followed Fearn after visits. At the October 2015 hearing, the court stated: "With respect to . . . whether she currently experiences an apprehension of fear, it is interesting to the court to note that, although Ms. Fearn has indicated that she is extremely concerned about being followed by Mr. Vu, that she also has testified that all the time she supposedly looked in her mirror, she never found that she was actually being followed by him. And that she attempted to arrange numerous meetings with Mr. Vu regarding the children; and although she indicated she did that in public places, because she felt safer in public places, the court did note that it was interesting that she didnt seem to have a fear that—you know, she did that knowing there was a possibility, according to her, that he could be following her. So there is some inconsistencies." Vu directly testified at the October 2015 hearing he never followed Fearn home and did not know where she lives. --------
Our review of the record shows the trial courts thoughtful and thorough consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing on the renewal request and of relevant portions of the trial court record. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent did not file an appellate brief so no party shall recover costs on appeal.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: OLEARY, P. J. MOORE, J.