Summary
dismissing claim of malicious prosecution against Morgenthau on absolute immunity grounds
Summary of this case from Fox v. City of New YorkOpinion
00 Civ. 2704 (JSM)
June 11, 2002
OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action against the City of New York, its Police Department, individual police officers, and the District Attorney of New York County, Robert M. Morgenthau, asserting various claims of violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also joins as a defendant Lorenzo Myles who he alleges assaulted him on June 8, 1997.
The complaint alleges that on June 8, 1997, Plaintiff, a maintenance worker at an apartment building located at 220 West 133rd Street, was assaulted by Myles, a tenant in that building, who apparently was angry because Plaintiff had reported his illegal connection to the building's cable television system. Apparently Myles went to the police and on June 27th, a police officer asked Plaintiff to come to the police station where he was arrested on the charge that he assaulted Myles on June 8th.
Plaintiff was arraigned on the assault charge on July 28th and at that time an order of protection was entered prohibiting him from having contact with Myles. While the charges were pending, Myles refused to pay his rent, allegedly because of the assault.
On March 13, 1998, three affidavits from witnesses to the incident on June 8th, who swore that Myles was the assailant, were submitted to District Attorney Morgenthau's office.
According to the Complaint, on June 5, 1998, Myles lost his case in Civil Court and was ordered to pay his back rent. Myles thereafter claimed that Plaintiff violated the order of protection on June 7, July 5 and July 20, 1998.
On July 22, 1998, Plaintiff was arrested at the direction of the District Attorney's office on charges that he violated the order of protection.
On November 4, 1999, Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges relating to the alleged assault and the violations of the order of protection.
District Attorney Morgenthau now moves to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that he has absolute immunity for all actions he takes in the prosecution of criminal cases.
DISCUSSION
The parameters of a prosecutor's immunity were set forth in the opinion of the Second Circuit in Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995) as follows:
State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for that conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995 (1976). . . . Prosecutorial immunity from § 1983 liability is broadly defined, covering "virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate." Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994).
Absolute immunity is not limited to the duties a prosecutor performs in the courtroom, but is afforded to all "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State." Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original) (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615). All of those acts "are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity." Id. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions as to whether or not to prosecute. Prosecutors have absolute immunity in filing criminal information and procuring arrest warrants. Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1209 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1987).
Here, Plaintiff's claims as to Mr. Morgenthau all relate to his role as prosecutor. Whether or not one agrees with the decision of his office to proceed with charges against Plaintiff in the face of affidavits by three eyewitnesses that it was Myles who was the assailant, it was clearly one made in the role of prosecutor and, therefore, immune from judicial scrutiny. As the Second Circuit noted in Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994):
[A]bsolute immunity protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability for virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with his function as an advocate. This would even include . . . allegedly conspiring to present false evidence at a criminal trial. The fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because "[t]he immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it." Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (holding without discussing San Filippo that prosecutor was immune from § 1983 liability for knowingly presenting false testimony). As much as the idea of a prosecutor conspiring to falsify evidence disturbs us . . . there is a greater societal goal in protecting the judicial process by preventing perpetual suits against prosecutors for the performance of their duties. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426-428, 96 S.Ct. at 944.
Plaintiff attempts to get around the problem of absolute immunity by alleging that Mr. Morgenthau has failed to properly train the Assistant District Attorneys in his office so that a pattern has developed in which individuals are prosecuted even though there is evidence that they are not guilty. However, it would defeat the purpose of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, "preventing perpetual suits against prosecutors for the performance of their duties," to permit a plaintiff to avoid the bar of that doctrine through the simple expedient of alleging that the prosecutor's conduct in his case was but one of several similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the complaint as to District Attorney Morgenthau is granted.
SO ORDERED.