Summary
In Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Neb. 725, 728, 408 N.W.2d 256, 258 (1987), we stated that the word "`within'" means "`inside of'" and that thus, a person is inside the age of 20 years until he or she turns 21.
Summary of this case from Brown v. KindredOpinion
No. 85-649.
Filed June 26, 1987.
1. Statutes. This court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 2. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Recognition that legislators typically vote on the language of a bill generally requires the Nebraska Supreme Court to assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. 3. Statutes. In the absence of anything indicating to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. 4. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. It is not within the province of this court to read a meaning into a statute which is not warranted by the legislative language; neither is it within the province of this court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. 5. Words and Phrases. The word "within" indicates enclosure or containment and means "inside of." 6. Statutes: Words and Phrases. One is "within the age of twenty years" until he or she becomes 21 years old. 7. Statutes. A heading, caption, or catchline is supplied in the compilation of the statutes and does not constitute any part of the law.
Appeal from the District Court for Butler County: WILLIAM H. NORTON, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
George H. Moyer, Jr., of Moyer, Moyer, Egley Fullner, for appellant.
Gerald L. Friedrichsen of Fitzgerald Brown, and John M. Thomas, for appellee.
KRIVOSHA, C.J., BOSLAUGH, HASTINGS, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.
Plaintiff-appellant, William Lawson, appeals from the summary judgment dismissing his action against defendant-appellee, Ford Motor Company. While Lawson's five assignments of error include constitutional challenges to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-224(2) (Reissue 1985), which bans product liability suits not commenced within 10 years after the product was first sold for use, they present the single question of whether the trial court erred in concluding that his action was time barred. Since we conclude the trial court misapplied the statute, we reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings without reaching the constitutional issues.
On June 11, 1978, Lawson was involved in a collision while driving a truck manufactured by Ford and first sold for use in 1966. Lawson was born on October 25, 1959, and filed this suit on June 9, 1982, alleging, among other things, that the gasoline tank on the truck was unreasonably dangerous because of the manner in which Ford designed, manufactured, and installed it.
Section 25-224(4) provides that notwithstanding the 10-year ban imposed by 25-224(2), "any cause of action or claim which any person may have on July 22, 1978, may be brought not later than two years following such date."
The foregoing 2-year period of limitation, however, is extended by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 (Reissue 1979). See Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984), discussed later in this opinion. Section 25-213 provides in relevant part that
if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter [25] . . . be, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty years, insane or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter after such disability shall be removed. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since the collision occurred on June 11, 1978, Lawson had his cause of action "on July 22, 1978." On the day Lawson brought this suit he was 22 years and 227 days old. The controlling question therefore is whether that age falls inside the 2-year period from the time Lawson ceased being "within the age of twenty years."
The task is one of determining the meaning of the phrase "within the age of twenty years." There are a number of well-established rules applicable to the performance of that task. The first of these is that we do not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. See, State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986); Galyen Petroleum Co. v. Svoboda, 222 Neb. 268, 383 N.W.2d 49 (1986); Sorensen v. Meyer, 220 Neb. 457, 370 N.W.2d 173 (1985). Recognition that legislators typically vote on the language of a bill generally requires this court to assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); thus, in the absence of anything indicating to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Burke, ante p. 625, 408 N.W.2d 239 (1987); State v. Carlson, supra; Midwest Messenger Assn. v. Spire, 223 Neb. 748, 393 N.W.2d 438 (1986). Finally, it is not within the province of this court to read a meaning into a statute which is not warranted by the legislative language; neither is it within the province of this court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. Sorensen v. Meyer, supra.
The word "within" indicates enclosure or containment, as in "his heart sank within him." It means "inside of," such as in "the water is stored within the soil." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 2627 (1981). Thus, one is "within the age of twenty years" until he or she becomes 21 years old. Accordingly, Lawson had 2 years from October 25, 1980, or through October 24, 1982, during which to institute his action. Since this action was commenced prior to October 24, 1982, it is not time barred.
While at first blush it might appear that the statute has been construed otherwise in the past, such is not in fact the case. In the early cases which discuss the attainment of majority, the ages of the children involved were so well within the time periods that it was not necessary for the opinions to expressly construe the word "within" as it operates in 25-213. Howe v. Blomenkamp, 88 Neb. 389, 129 N.W. 539 (1911); Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903) (syllabus point in opinion upon rehearing). See, also, Holmes v. Mason, 80 Neb. 448, 114 N.W. 606 (1908) (silent as to ages of children involved).
The foregoing analysis of the meaning of "within" comports with our holding in State v. Carlson, supra, which rules that the phrase "fourteen years of age or younger," as used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-320.01 (Reissue 1985), includes those persons who have not reached their 15th birthday. We are not unmindful of the fact that in Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1982), the federal circuit court, in holding that 25-213 tolled the application of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1985) (which establishes time bars for professional negligence actions), said that the 13-year-old plaintiff could bring the action which accrued while "she was under 20 years of age" at any time "before she reached age 20 or within two years thereafter." 679 F.2d at 1264. That dictum, stated before our decision in Carlson, does not, however, correctly reflect Nebraska law. Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984), in answer to a specific question certified to us by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, ruled that 25-213 tolls the running of the 2-year provision of 25-224(4) in cases brought during a plaintiff's infancy. It is to be noted, however, that the question posed in Macku concerned itself only with whether an infant was required to commence an action not later than 2 years following July 22, 1978. That is different than asking the meaning of the phrase "within the age of twenty years."
Ford argues that when read in the context of the subsequent language in 25-213, "such disability," the questioned phrase must necessarily be interpreted as in effect reading "an infant." It is Ford's claim that only infancy compares to the other designated disabilities.
However, the foregoing argument is unsound; "such disability" simply refers to the conditions previously mentioned in the sentence, that is, being within 20 years of age, being insane, or being imprisoned. We recognize that the caption to 25-213 reads: "Actions by infants, persons insane or imprisoned; tolling of limitation." Such a heading, caption, or catchline is supplied in the compilation of the statutes and does not constitute any part of the law. State v. Holmes, 221 Neb. 629, 379 N.W.2d 765 (1986); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-802(8) (Reissue 1984). See, also, Cosentino v. City of Omaha, 186 Neb. 407, 183 N.W.2d 475 (1971). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-101 (Reissue 1984) states all persons "under nineteen years of age are declared to be minors; but in case any person marries under the age of nineteen years his minority ends." Thus, minority, or infancy, depends not only upon one's age but upon one's marital status. Section 25-213 concerns itself only with age; it makes no reference to marital status. Thus, the tolling of chapter 25 periods of limitation is tied to the plaintiff's age, not to his or her status as an infant.
The judgment of dismissal is erroneous and is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
WHITE, J., not participating.