Opinion
No. CIV S-11-1163 KJM-KJN PS.
July 11, 2011
ORDER
On July 8, 2011, plaintiff filed a third motion for a temporary restraining order, alleging that a trustee's sale of her property located at 7400 Franklin Boulevard, #2, Sacramento, California 95823 is scheduled for July 11, 2011, but that the deed of trust is materially flawed and that defendants do not have the legal authority to foreclose on plaintiff's property. (ECF 17.) This matter was not referred to the assigned magistrate judge as typically provided by Local Rule 302 due to the limited time frame for the issuance of an order. By minute order, defendants were given until 8:00 a.m. on July 11, 2011 to file an opposition to the motion. (ECF 18.) Defendants filed an opposition. (ECF 19 20.) For the following reasons, plaintiff's third motion for a temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
As will be discussed in detail below, insofar as plaintiff's claims are premised upon the allegedly invalid deed, plaintiff wholly fails to substantiate her claims as she has not attached the deed or any documentation relating to the loan.
The court notes that plaintiff's motion is defective for several reasons, none of which the court relies on in issuing the present denial. These include plaintiff's failure to provide a separate proposed temporary restraining order and proposed order as required by Local Rule 231(c)(6) and (7), instead of apparently combining the two orders into one proposed order; plaintiff's misleading declaration that she "has not previously applied for" a temporary restraining order; and plaintiff's identifying of the incorrect date for the trustee's sale — April 11, 2011 — in her memorandum of points and authorities.
I. STANDARD
II. ANALYSIS
65Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters 415 U.S. 423439Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 555 U.S. 7 129 S. Ct. 365374see Stuhlbarg Int'l. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush Co., Inc.240 F.3d 832839 Id. Parcay v. Shea Mortg. Inc.2010 WL 1659369
The court notes that the arguments set forth in plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities are not tethered to the allegations of her complaint (ECF 1); the court analyzes the arguments made in the memorandum. Suffice it to note that plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of the allegations in the complaint insofar as they are based on her assertion that the loan she received is not of real value due to the fact that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took the country's currency off the gold standard in 1933. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-17.) See, e.g., McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 201, 212-14 (D.Conn. 2010) (discussing the "vapor money" theory advanced here by plaintiff, stating it has been "universally and emphatically rejected by numerous federal courts for at least the last 25 years"); see also DeLaRosa v. Agents for Int'l Monetary Fund, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16111, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1995) ("The United States Congress has the power to make anything it wishes legal tender.").
When the court cites to specific pages of plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, the court is citing to the CM/ECF page numbers, not those provided by plaintiff.
Furthermore, plaintiff contends that the deed is defective because Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") was erroneously named the nominal beneficiary for Primerica, yet "nowhere within the four corners of this document is there a reference to an agency appointment, agreement, or expressed or implied agency of MERS to the lender." (ECF 17 at 11.) Plaintiff relies upon California Civil Code sections 2306, 2309 and 2932.5 to support this contention. Two of these sections are irrelevant to plaintiff's motion: Section 2306, which states "[a]n agent can never have authority . . . to do an act which is . . . to be a fraud upon the principal"; and section 2309, which states "[a]n oral authorization is sufficient for any purpose, except that an authority to enter into a contract required by law to be in writing can only be given by an instrument in writing." The language in the third section, section 2932.5, relied upon by plaintiff refers to the requirement that the assignment of the power of sale by the assignee be "duly acknowledged and recorded." Plaintiff's assertion in this regard is meritless for several reasons. For one, "[s]ection 2932.5 applies to mortgages, not deeds of trust." Parcay, 2010 WL 1659369, at *12. Aside from this defect, a requirement that the lender specifically reference an agency relationship when naming a nominal beneficiary simply does not exist. Although the deed is not in the record before the court, plaintiff's own assertion that MERS was named the nominal beneficiary in the deed supports the conclusion that MERS is indeed the nominal beneficiary.
Moreover, plaintiff contends that because Primerica did not file a deed of reconveyance assigning the conveyance to Citicorp Trust Bank ("CTB"), CTB "is a third party with no pecuniary interest in the mortgage loan and has no legal standing to foreclose" on plaintiff's home. (ECF 17 at 11.) Rather, she says, CTB's assignment as trustee is invalid because the substitution of trustee was signed by MERS, not Primerica, the lender. ( Id.) Plaintiff maintains, "[e]ven if MERS were a valid nominee, nowhere in the Deed of Trust or the Note does it state or even imply that a nominee of the Lender may [assign a trustee]." ( Id. at 12.) Thus, the notice of default and notice of trustee sale filed by CRT are defective. ( Id.) "`California Civil Code Section 2934a authorizes the beneficiary to substitute the trustee.'" Wurtzberger v. Resmae Mortg. Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51751, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2010) (quoting Martinez v. America's Wholesale Lender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23615, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2010)). "[A] typical deed of trust give [sic] [the benificiary] the power to assign the beneficial interest as nominee." Castillo v. Skoba, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92636, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2010). While plaintiff contends that neither the trust nor the note states that MERS may assign a trustee, as plaintiff has not attached either document, plaintiff "has failed to meet [her] burden of showing that the deed of trust does not give MERS the power to transfer the beneficial interest." Id. at *3.
This portion of plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities is unclear. First, plaintiff refers to CTB as the invalidly assigned trustee. (ECF 17 at 11.) However, later in this paragraph, plaintiff indicates that CR Title Services, Inc. ("CRT") was the invalidly assigned trustee. ( Id. at 12.)
See note 5 supra.
Plaintiff further contends that defendants are not the beneficiaries of the mortgage, but are acting as trustees of the REMIC [Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit] Loan Pool Trust. (ECF 17 at 12.) Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this contention. "The argument that parties lose their interest in a loan when it is assigned to a trust pool has . . . been rejected by many district courts." Lane v. Real Estate Indus. Group, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2010). On the current record, this court is not prepared to consider going against the prevailing trend.
Although "loss of a home is a serious injury . . . whether a particular foreclosure constitutes irreparable harm turns in part on the reasons for the foreclosure." Hester v. PHH Mortg., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84628, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 26, 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff has not "clearly explained the circumstances that led to [her] present predicament. . . ." Id. at *10. Furthermore, as plaintiff has provided no evidence to support any of her contentions, the balance of equities decidedly does not tip in her favor, nor would granting a temporary restraining order in this matter be in the public interest.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.