Opinion
Cause No. IP00-1252-C-H/G
September 25, 2001
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
When plaintiff Louis R. Lawson entered the custody of the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), his hair was cut to a standard length dictated by DOC policy and procedure. Lawson claims that the standard haircut violated his religious principles and thus his First Amendment rights. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he seeks damages from defendant Major Cheatham, who refused his on-the-spot request for a religious exemption.
Defendant Cheatham has moved for summary judgment. He argues that the DOC's haircut regulation is neutral with respect to religion and did not violate Lawson's constitutional rights. Lawson has responded to the defendant's motion with evidence and argument. For the reasons explained below, defendant Cheatham is entitled to summary judgment.
I. Summary Judgment Standard Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A "material fact" is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party on the question. Id. "Summary judgment is not a discretionary remedy. If the plaintiff lacks enough evidence, summary judgment must be granted." Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
A party moving for summary judgment initially has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact in evidence of record. If the moving party carries this burden, the opposing party then must "go beyond the pleadings" and present specific facts which show that a genuine issue exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits for summary judgment motions "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and . . . show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Conclusory statements or indications of opinion or belief offered without any factual support are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). "Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted." Hadley v. Du Page County, 715 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983).
Because Lawson is proceeding without counsel, he received the notice required by Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). Lawson was notified of the nature of the defendant's motion, of the proper manner in which to respond, and of the consequences of failing to respond. Lawson has responded with an affidavit and a memorandum discussing his claim.
II. Undisputed Facts
On the basis of the pleadings and the expanded record, the following facts reflect the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to Lawson and are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.
Lawson is presently an inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility. He entered DOC custody at the Reception Diagnostic Center (RDC), a DOC facility in the Southern District of Indiana.
Lawson became a Rastafarian in early 1995. Since that time, he has adhered diligently to the tenets of that religion. Those tenets forbid Rastafarians from cutting their hair.
The RDC is a central intake facility for the DOC. All offenders are processed at RDC before being transported to the correctional facility to which they are assigned. Intake and processing procedures include photographing and fingerprinting inmates, issuing identification cards, and medical screening, as well as haircuts.
At intake, an offender with longer hair has it cut to a length of three and one-half inches. There are no exceptions to the requirement of the intake haircut.
On June 9, 2000, Lawson entered RDC with shoulder-length dreadlocks. Defendant Cheatham is employed by the DOC as a Correctional Major at the RDC. When Lawson arrived at RDC, he told defendant Cheatham that he was Rastafarian and that he had a First Amendment right to refuse to have his hair cut.
According to Lawson, Cheatham responded by laughing at him and telling him that RDC had the right to cut his hair. Lawson still refused. Cheatham then told Lawson that if he refused, he would be placed in disciplinary segregation, would be reduced in his ability to earn good-time credits, and would eventually have his hair cut by force while in restraints. Lawson then agreed to submit to the haircut and later filed this lawsuit for damages.
Approximately 10,000 offenders come through RDC each year. The majority come from other custody facilities such as county jails. Because the RDC staff are not aware of the levels of cleanliness of the facilities from which the offenders are transported, and in order to prevent the introduction of parasites such as lice and crabs into DOC facilities, offenders are given short haircuts.
The intake haircut also responds to two security concerns: First, a standard haircut permits DOC to obtain a good physical description and photograph of the offender, which may be useful in the event of an escape.
Second, the requirement reduces the risk that offenders will smuggle contraband in their hair. RDC staff have found razor blades, safety and straight pins, pocket knives, and other sharp objects in offenders' hair.
After an offender's hair is cut upon intake, he is permitted to grow it back. Barber services are available at DOC facilities, but offenders are not required to use those services.
III. Conclusions of Law
This court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action and the parties to the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) 1343(a). Lawson brings his claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lawson must establish two elements to recover on his § 1983 claim. First, he must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Second, he must establish that the persons depriving him of his rights acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
This second element is not disputed here.
In addition, Cheatham has invoked the defense of qualified immunity on the ground that, even if the DOC policy he was enforcing violated Lawson's constitutional rights, the law to that effect was not clearly established when Lawson arrived at RDC and was given his haircut. The standard for qualified immunity is whether a reasonable official in the defendant's situation would have realized that his actions were violating the Constitution, which must ordinarily be shown by demonstrating that the law was clearly established at the time of the action in question. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1207-09 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; instead, it is a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). Lawson asserts his claim under the First Amendment, which provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Prisoners retain their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion during their incarceration. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
Nevertheless, lawful incarceration both requires as a practical matter, and permits as a matter of constitutional law, some restrictions on constitutional rights, including the right of free exercise of religion. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (upholding restriction on prisoners' receipt of certain publications); O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (upholding restriction having effect of limiting one form of religious practice). Limits on free exercise rights derive both from the fact of incarceration as well as from valid penological objectives, such as security within the institution, deterrence of crime, and rehabilitation of prisoners. Id.; see also Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing constitutional standards for limits on inmates' religious practices).
In O'Lone, the Supreme Court explained the standard that courts should apply when prison regulations are alleged to have infringed a prisoner's right to free exercise of religion:
To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a "reasonableness" test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., [ 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)]. We recently restated the proper standard: "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, [ 482 U.S. at 89].482 U.S. at 349 (holding that prison work policies preventing one form of Muslim observation served legitimate penological goals and did not violate First Amendment).
The reference in O'Lone to the Turner standard is especially instructive, for the Turner Court identified several factors that affect the determination of reasonable relation to legitimate penological interests. First, there must be a logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal, which goal must be legitimate and neutral as to religion. Second, if prisoners still have other means to exercise the belief or practice in question, that would weigh in favor of the regulation. Third, the court must consider the effect that accommodation of the prisoner's asserted right would have on guards, other inmates, and scarce prison resources. Fourth, the "absence of ready alternatives" weighs in favor of a regulation, while "obvious, easy alternatives" may show that the regulation is not reasonable but is instead an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. 482 U.S. at 89-90. Such consideration of alternatives is not, however, a "least restrictive alternative" test, but if a prisoner can point to "an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests," such alternative would tend to show the regulation is not reasonable. Id. at 90-91.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the application of this standard to prison haircuts for Rastafarians in Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1988), but the Reed decision did not resolve the issue. The district court in Reed had upheld a haircut requirement, but the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for further consideration. The appellate court said the haircut regulation was "plausibly supported" by safety and security considerations, and noted that other courts had upheld similar requirements. Id. at 963, citing Brightly v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 612 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing injunction against policy requiring prisoners to shave and keep hair short); Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338, 343-47 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing injunction against policy prohibiting beards; applying deferential reasonableness standard); Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921, 924-29 (3d Cir. 1985) (reversing injunction in favor of Rastafarian inmate against limit on hair and beard length); and Dreibelbis v. Marks, 742 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of injunction for limit on hair and beard length). Nevertheless, in Reed the Seventh Circuit remanded for further consideration because the district court had relied on some improper considerations. Also, DOC had waived the haircut requirement on religious grounds for some Native Americans, which tended to undermine the argument that another religious exemption would undermine penological goals. 842 F.2d at 964. The policy in Reed applied to prisoners at any time during their sentence, while the policy at issue here requires only the haircut upon intake.
Reed v. Faulkner simply ordered a remand for further consideration, and there is no later decision available in the case. The case therefore does not control the result of this case on the merits, although it obviously states the applicable standard and provides important guidance. Lawson cites decisions from other circuits finding that prison regulations requiring inmates to cut their hair or shave their beards in violation of their religious beliefs violate the offenders' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Longstreth v. Maynard, 961 F.2d 895, 903 (10th Cir. 1992) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction; plaintiffs had raised "substantial questions" about constitutionality of haircut policy); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction in favor of Rastafarians against intake haircut policy; no safety issue had been raised and under Turner standard, court viewed "ponytails" as reasonable alternative to provide adequate identification photographs); Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming injunction against haircut policy because "less restrictive alternatives" were available); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1975) (affirming injunction against policy barring prisoner from wearing long braids, which was not based on genuine penological grounds).
In Hines v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 358-59 (4th Cir. 1998), however, the Fourth Circuit upheld a grooming policy requiring inmates to shave and to keep their hair short. The Hines court acknowledged that the standard applied in Gallahan was not consistent with the Supreme Court's later decision in O'Lone, so Gallahan now offers little support for Lawson.
On the merits, it appears that the DOC haircut policy probably satisfies the reasonable relation test from O'Lone, Turner, and Reed, but the court can decide Lawson's claim for damages based on the doctrine of qualified immunity without conclusively resolving the issue on the merits. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (court should decide sufficiency of allegations on constitutional merits as first step in resolving defense of qualified immunity); Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001) (first step of qualified immunity analysis requires determination only of whether plaintiff has alleged constitutional violation, not whether he has proven one); cf. Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001) (reading Wilson and other cases as instructing circuit courts, within unspecified limits, "to decide the merits of an appeal even if there is a good immunity defense"). In this case, Lawson has at least alleged a constitutional violation, for the court must consider evidence to determine whether the DOC policy satisfies the reasonable relation test.
The DOC policy appears to serve hygiene and security concerns, which are obviously legitimate penological goals that are reasonable and religion-neutral. The undisputed facts show that the haircut policy is reasonably related to those goals. On the other hand, the DOC policy does not allow any alternative means for a Rastafarian prisoner to adhere to the teaching prohibiting haircuts. That fact tends to weigh in favor of Lawson's claim. The fact that the policy requires only one haircut upon intake makes it less intrusive than a hair-length policy that applies throughout a prisoner's sentence.
Lawson proposes that the security concern about identification photographs be accommodated by using ponytails, as the Second Circuit said in Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d at 577. That proposed accommodation does not address the evidence of dangerous contraband being hidden in long hair, nor does it address the hygiene issue and the control of lice and other parasites.
The court assumes for the sake of argument (although Lawson has not offered actual evidence on the points) that very close searches of inmates' hair and close supervision of showers and shampoos with medications to kill parasites might be alternative ways to address those concerns. Under the deferential reasonableness standard, however, the court would also have to weigh the burdens such alternatives would impose on staff and prison budgets. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Under the Turner standard, it does not appear that Lawson has raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the constitutionality of the intake haircut policy.
Even if there were room for reasonable disagreement on the merits, however, defendant Cheatham is plainly entitled to qualified immunity in this case. As the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Reed indicates, federal courts around the country have divided on whether the First Amendment requires prisons to modify their haircut and grooming policies to accommodate religious beliefs. 842 F.2d at 963. Especially as applied to a policy requiring only one haircut upon intake, the law on Lawson's claim was not and still is not even close to being "clearly established" in Lawson's favor. See, e.g., Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff has burden of showing that rights were clearly established under the circumstances presented to the defendant); Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (in case asserting that failure to treat "humanism" equally as religion in prison violated First Amendment, affirming summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds without deciding merits; it "makes no sense to say that in order to determine whether one is entitled to immunity from trial we must first hold the trial").
Under these circumstances, with the federal courts divided on the legal viability of Lawson's claim, an official in defendant Cheatham's position simply could not have been expected to know that enforcement of the intake haircut policy would actually violate Lawson's First Amendment rights.
III. Conclusion
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. Final judgment for the defendant shall be entered. The costs of this action are assessed against the plaintiff, Louis R. Lawson.
So ordered.
FINAL JUDGMENT
The court, having this day granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff Louis R. Lawson take nothing by his complaint against defendant Major Cheatham, and that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The costs of this action are assessed against the plaintiff.