Opinion
Civil Action 00-0252-BH-C
June 2, 2000
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
When plaintiff filed his original complaint on March 24, 2000 (Doc. 1), he was an inmate at the Mobile County Metro Jail. On April 18, 2000, plaintiff provided the Court with a free-world address (Doc. 4). Recently, on May 12, 2000, plaintiff advised the Court that he is in federal custody at a federal prison camp in Pensacola, Florida (Doc. 7).
I. Complaint (Doc. 4).
The sole defendant to this action is Leonard Singleton, a nurse at the Mobile County Metro Jail ("metro jail"). Plaintiff complains that on January 12, 2000, he was returned to the metro jail after he had been assaulted at the Baldwin County Jail. Plaintiff asserts that upon his arrival at the metro jail, he was denied treatment for his injuries by defendant Singleton and defendant Singleton joked about the nature of Plaintiff's bruises. Plaintiff maintains that defendant Singleton told him that because he was a federal inmate, defendant Singleton could not charge him a monetary fee for "sick call" and, therefore, defendant Singleton would not allow plaintiff to harass defendant Singleton by abusing "sick call" and told plaintiff to buy Tylenol at the commissary. Plaintiff avers that he told defendant Singleton that he was indigent and that "sick call" was his only option, to which defendant Singleton allegedly retorted, "Too bad!" Further, plaintiff adds that he is H.I.V. positive, which is a serious and fatal illness, and that his condition is documented in his records. Plaintiff contends that defendant Singleton's refusal to take his complaints seriously and to allow a doctor to evaluate plaintiff places plaintiffs health and life at risk. Plaintiff asserts that defendant Singleton's actions were vindictive and that his personal prejudices interfered with his professional duties. For relief, plaintiff requests $5,000,000 in damages and an order preventing defendant Singleton from repeating his actions.
II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) .
Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This section authorizes the dismissal of an action if it is frivolous or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (ii). An action is "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
The predecessor to' this section was 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
III. Discussion
"In order to state a cognizable [medical] claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). "Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Id.
This constitutional standard has two elements. The first element requires that an inmate establish that he has a serious medical need.Hill v. DeKalb Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994). "Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). The second element requires that a plaintiff show that a defendant's actions constituted a deliberate indifference to the serious medical need. Hill, 40 F.3d at 1186. The deliberate indifference necessary for a constitutional violation does not include inadvertence or negligence in diagnosing or treating. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292.
Plaintiff s claim for failure to treat his injuries and some bruises from a prior assault at another jail does not indicate that plaintiff had a serious medical need. Plaintiffs allegations are generalized and, therefore, do not impart that plaintiff had a medical need sufficiently serious to warrant medical attention. Thus, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in regard to his claim for failure to treat his injuries from a prior assault.
Plaintiffs other claim is for not allowing plaintiff, who is H.I.V. positive, to be evaluated by a doctor. The Court recognizes that plaintiffs illness is grave. However, plaintiffs pleading of this claim gives no indication of the exact nature of plaintiffs condition at the time when defendant Singleton would not allow plaintiff to be evaluated by a doctor. Plaintiff needed to show that his condition was serious at that time or that he had an affliction related to his illness that was serious and, therefore, the medical attention of a doctor was warranted. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in regard to his claim for failure to refer plaintiff to a doctor for evaluation.
Plaintiffs pleading of his claims is vague and conclusory and is, therefore, subject to dismissal. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). Even though a court will show leniency to a pro se litigant, "this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . ., or to re-write an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action. . . ." (citations omitted)). GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff's lack of specificity in pleading his claims has prevented him from stating a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A properly pleaded § 1983 complaint complies with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)'s requirement that a plaintiff plead "'a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim' is and the grounds upon which it rests." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). "[S]ufficient detail must be given so that the defendant, and the Court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining, and can see that there is some legal basis for recovery." L.S.T. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995); accord GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1367 (holding that this Circuit has a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 claims which requires that a plaintiff provide specific facts in order to make out his claim). Otherwise, terms that are inherently vague can rest upon a variety of factual scenarios, and thereby deprive the court and a defendant of fair notice of the claim. Peterson v. Atlanta Housing Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993).
IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because plaintiffs complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.