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holding that because individual off-the-clock claims potentially vary too widely, the questions of fact would most likely differ for each plaintiff, as each worked in different locations with different supervisors, and thus would be unduly burdensome to manage as a collective claim.
Summary of this case from Smith v. T-Mobile U.S., Inc.Opinion
No. 03-CV-4009.
April 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Misjoinder of Claims and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion will be granted.
Background
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant City of Philadelphia ("City"), alleging that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.. ("FLSA"), based on an alleged failure to pay Plaintiffs overtime wages for scheduled hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a single workweek. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiffs for unscheduled "off-the-clock" time, spent replenishing supplies before or after compensated hours, violates the overtime wage requirement under the FLSA. Plaintiffs seek to maintain both claims in a collective action against Defendant for FLSA overtime wage violations, as authorized by FLSA § 216(b). Plaintiffs are all current or former employees of Defendant who worked as Fire Service Paramedics. Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiffs filed numerous opt-in consent forms for Fire Service Paramedics to become plaintiffs in this action.
Defendant's Motion for Misjoinder of Claims
Defendant presently moves for misjoinder of Plaintiff's off-the-clock claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, and in the alternative for dismissal of the collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Defendant argues that, unlike the claim based on overtime compensation for regularly scheduled hours, the "off-the-clock" claim is based on allegations of hours worked beyond a regular schedule, requiring an individual case-by-case analysis for each Plaintiff. In order to meet the FLSA § 216(b) collective action requirement for plaintiffs to be similarly situated to each other, Defendant argues that this Court should look at variations in employment activities, oversight and instruction, whether plaintiffs worked in different geographic locations, and discretionary powers given to plaintiffs.
On the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that the "similarly situated" requirement under FLSA § 216(b) is unrelated to the requirements for class action plaintiffs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and is less strict than the requirements for joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). Urging this Court to adopt a lenient standard for the "similarly situated" requirement, Plaintiffs rely uponLockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 51 (3rd Cir. 1989), and argue that they are similarly situated for FLSA § 216(b) purposes because although they work in different locations: (1) all members of the collective action work(ed) in the Fire Department's Emergency Medical Services Unit; (2) their claims all arise from the same pattern, plan or practice of Defendant; and, (3) they all seek the same form of relief — unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs and attorneys' fees.
Discussion
Section 216(b) of the FLSA reads, in pertinent part, "[a]n action to recover . . . may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, however, "[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately." Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. In Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43 (3rd Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, the Third Circuit applied a three-prong test for determining whether plaintiffs are similarly situated under FLSA § 216(b): (1) whether they all worked in the same corporate department, division and location; (2) whether they all advanced similar claims; and (3) whether they sought substantially the same form of relief. See, Lockhart, 879 F.2d at 51 (citing Plummer v. General Electric Co., 93 F.R.D. 311, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). As a result, Plaintiffs pursuing a collective action under FLSA § 216(b) only need to show that their positions are "similar, not identical" to each other. Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, 118 F.R.D. 392, 407 (D.N.J. 1988), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 862 F.2d 439 (3rd Cir. 1988), aff'd, Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 110 S.Ct. 482 (1989).
In the instant matter, all current and prospective plaintiffs are or were employed as Fire Service Paramedics within the City Fire Department's Emergency Medical Services Unit. According to Defendant's Personnel Department, each of the current Plaintiffs, and potential opt-in plaintiffs, is classified as a "Fire Service Paramedic" and has the same general job description. However, Plaintiffs work in different unit types, different platoons, different locations, and have different supervisors. Unlike the Plaintiffs' first claim, alleging failure to pay overtime wages for scheduled hours worked in excess of 40 in a single workweek, the "off-the-clock" claim does not involve regularly scheduled time that is worked by all members of the class. Rather, each of the Plaintiffs may potentially claim that on any given day he or she arrived early or departed outside of their regularly scheduled hours and were not compensated for such. The circumstances of those individual claims potentially vary too widely to conclude that in regard to their "off-the-clock" claim, the Plaintiffs are similarly situated. The questions of fact will likely differ for each Plaintiff and will be unduly burdensome to both Defendant and to the Court in managing as a collective claim. Consequently, Plaintiffs' "off-the-clock" claim for unpaid work performed outside of their regularly scheduled hours will be severed from the collective claim for unpaid overtime for regularly scheduled hours. Plaintiffs' claims for "off-the-clock" unpaid work, will be dismissed without prejudice to each plaintiff filing said claim individually. The lead Plaintiff in this matter, Richard Lawrence, will be able to proceed in this civil action with his individual "off-the-clock" claim.
With regard to Plaintiffs' claims for unpaid overtime for regularly scheduled hours in excess of forty in a single work week, the court finds that the Plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of maintaining a collective action pursuant to FLSA § 216(b). Plaintiffs allege that they should be paid overtime for all weeks in which their regularly scheduled working hours exceed forty per week. This claim is the same for each Plaintiff. In its motion for misjoinder, Defendant does not assert that the Plaintiffs are not similarly situated for purposes of this claim. The Court, therefore, will permit Plaintiffs to maintain a collective active regarding their regularly scheduled hours claim. Defendant's alternative motion for dismissal of the entire action under FLSA § 216(b) will be denied.
Finally, in Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), the Supreme Court clearly stated that collective actions maintained under FLSA § 216(b) authorize a district court to issue court-approved notice to additional potential plaintiffs at its discretion. This Court concludes that court-supervised notice is appropriate in the interest of promoting judicial economy and an efficient resolution to the collective action claim in this case.
An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this ____, day of April, 2004, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, Defendant City of Philadelphia's Motion for Misjoinder of Claims is GRANTED, and Defendant City of Philadelphia's alternative Motion to Dismiss the entire collective action is DENIED. With the exception of the lead Plaintiff in this action, Richard Lawrence, all other Plaintiffs' claims for wages for hours for which Plaintiffs were allegedly not paid for either reporting early or departing after their regularly scheduled hours are severed from this action and dismissed without prejudice to each Plaintiff filing a separate action for said claim. If any said action is filed, it is to be randomly assigned.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Notice to Prospective Additional Plaintiffs and for Discovery is GRANTED to the extent that it applies only to the collective action claim permitted as a result of this Order. The form of Notice as set forth in Exhibit No. 6 to the Declaration of Robert A. Jones shall be revised to remove all references to the claims dismissed as a result of this order. Defendant shall provide to Plaintiffs' counsel, within fifteen (45) days of this Order, the last known names and addresses of all such similarly situated current and former employees who have worked as Fire Service Paramedics at any time from July 7, 2000 to the present date.