Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 2002-074213.
Dondero, J.
Plaintiff Yok Hing Law appeals the trial court’s judgment finding in favor of Maria Rita Corral and Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. (Ryder) (collectively referred to as defendants). The court concluded plaintiff is foreclosed from pursuing the underlying action for personal injuries because she previously signed settlement documents releasing defendants from all liability. We agree and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on November 29, 2001. One of the other vehicles was a Ryder truck. Ryder turned its defense over to its insurance carrier, which assigned the matter to David Morse & Associates, claims adjusters. The adjuster who was assigned to the claim was John Solomon. He was instructed to contact plaintiff and settle the matter. A note on his assignment sheet indicated that he might need to obtain a Chinese language interpreter.
Solomon spoke to plaintiff on the telephone regarding a proposed settlement. She had a strong Chinese accent, but she spoke English well. He explained to her that he was calling to settle the claim and that he would need for her to sign a release. They set up a time for him to come to her house. During their conversation, she spoke English “flawlessly.” At no time did she request that he bring a Chinese language interpreter with him.
At trial, plaintiff testified that she had studied English before coming to the United States from Malaysia. She attended five colleges in the United States while attempting to obtain a master’s degree. Among these colleges were Northwestern, Hayward State University, San Jose State University, Mission Community College, and DeAnza Community College. She also studied for, took, and passed the test to become a licensed real estate salesperson in California. She had previously handled some real estate transactions. The contracts for these transactions were written in English.
On September 12, 2002, Solomon went to plaintiff’s home to settle the claim. By this time, almost 10 months had elapsed since the accident. Solomon testified that plaintiff answered the door and did not appear to have any physical problems. However, while he was there, she periodically threw out her arms and made a screeching noise. He asked her whether those symptoms were related to the car accident. When she didn’t respond, he decided not to ask her again. As there had been no mention of medical damages up until this time, he did not see any reason to limit the release form to property damages only. He testified that if he had felt she had a personal injury claim, he would not have sought a full and complete release.
Solomon presented plaintiff with two documents for her signature, both of which are in English. One is entitled “Release of All Claims” (Release) and the other is entitled “Explanation of Waiver of Civil Code section 1542” (Waiver). He explained the content of the forms to her and she appeared to understand. She did not seem to have any difficulty speaking English. While he was there, she used her telephone to speak with someone at a law firm. She read both the Release and Waiver forms over the telephone, appearing to translate the documents into Chinese. After she hung up the phone, plaintiff signed both documents. They later drove to a convenience store so that she could make copies of the papers. During the entire time he was with her, plaintiff never mentioned any medical bills or physical injuries.
Plaintiff testified somewhat differently concerning her interactions with Solomon. She stated she had been assured that an interpreter would be present at the meeting. She also stated she did tell him that she had medical bills. She denied he explained the settlement forms to her. She testified that he told her he was there to settle the property damage claim only, and that he gave her a medical release authorization form and told her they would discuss her medical claims after he had obtained her medical records.
Plaintiff’s husband testified that he asked Solomon to verify that the settlement was only for property damage and that Solomon confirmed it was. Solomon, however, testified that he never spoke to plaintiff’s husband.
Subsequently, plaintiff received a settlement check from Ryder for $6,294.47. On the back of the check is printed the following language: “The endorsement of this check must be in ink and same constitutes a complete release and receipt in full settlement of all claims for loss on date shown on the face of this check for the company or companies designated thereon.” Plaintiff signed the check and deposited it in her account.
On December 2, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants. Neither the complaint nor defendants’ answers are included in the record on appeal. The parties do not dispute, however, that defendants raised in their answers the affirmative defense that plaintiff had fully released and waived any rights to recover against defendants by her prior execution of the Release and the Waiver.
Trial commenced on October 18, 2007. The matter was tried on a bifurcated basis, with the parties agreeing to a court trial on the issue of whether the Release, Waiver, and settlement check precluded plaintiff from maintaining her personal injury action.
After the court trial was completed, the court concluded plaintiff had knowingly signed the release and settlement forms and that she therefore could not pursue a bodily injury claim against defendants. The court indicated it did not give credence to plaintiff’s assertion that she did not understand the forms due to her allegedly limited English language skills.
Judgment in favor of defendants was entered on December 3, 2007. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Plaintiff contends there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the Release and Waiver are valid or that they operate to bar her present claims. “When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874 (Bowers).) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance,... that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
“When considering a claim of insufficient evidence on appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence, but rather determine whether, after resolving all conflicts favorably to the prevailing party, and according the prevailing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, there is substantial evidence to support the judgment.” (Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 454, 465.) “The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, supra 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 652.) That there was some evidence in conflict with the trial court’s finding, or evidence that could have supported a contrary finding, does not alter the result on appeal. “[I]t is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874, italics omitted.)
II. Law Regarding Releases
We first review the basic principles governing releases. A release has been defined as the abandonment, relinquishment, or giving up of a right or claim to the person against whom it might have been demanded or enforced. (Pellett v. Sonotone Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 705, 711.) “In general, a written release extinguishes any obligation covered by the release’s terms, provided it has not been obtained by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. [Citations.] [¶] ‘ “The general rule is that when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is, in the absence of fraud and imposition, bound by its contents, and is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding....” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366–1367 (Skrbina).)
The terms of a release must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in setting forth to an ordinary person untrained in the law that the intent and effect of the document is to release one party’s claims, and to indemnify another party from and against any liability to others that may occur in the future as a proximate cause of one’s negligence. (Ferrell v. Southern Nevada Off-Road Enthusiasts, Ltd. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 309, 318.) Where settlement documents contain the language of Civil Code section 1542, such language “establishes unambiguously the parties’ intent that the release cover possible civil claims.” (Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299, 307 (Jefferson).)
Section 1542 provides: “A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
Ordinarily, “a releaser who has no disability preventing him from reading the release is bound by its clear provisions.” (DuBois v. Sparrow (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 290, 298.) However, if the releaser is “under a misapprehension, not due to his own neglect, as to the nature or scope of the release, and if this misapprehension was induced by the misconduct of the releasee, then the release, regardless of how comprehensively worded, is binding only to the extent actually intended by the releaser.” (Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97, 103, fn. omitted, (Casey).)
III. The Release and Waiver are Valid
The Release in the present case appears to be a standardized form. It purports to release defendants “from any and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 29th day of November, 2001, at or near Fremont, Calif.” (Italics added.) The form includes an express waiver of rights under Civil Code section 1542 (section 1542). Section 1542 is quoted on the form.
The Waiver is printed on the letterhead of David Morse & Associates. It states, in part: “In addition to the claims of which you are now aware, this settlement would also include any claims which could hereafter come to your attention.” It notes that the final settlement papers include a waiver of section 1542, which it also quotes. The form further states: “By signing the final settlement papers, you agree to waive the benefits of that Code Section so that this settlement will constitute a full and final settlement of all your past, present and/or future claims, known and unknown, that have arisen, or might arise hereafter, as a result of these facts.”
Plaintiff does not contend that the language and scope of the two documents is ambiguous. Nor are there any allegations of fraud, deception, misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence. Instead, plaintiff claims substantial evidence is lacking to support a finding that there was a meeting of minds when she executed the Release and Waiver. She contends, relying on Casey, supra, that the parties did not intend for the settlement to include bodily injury claims. We are not persuaded.
Plaintiff unconvincingly suggests that even if Solomon did not intend to employ high-pressure tactics, she felt “very scary” when dealing with him. She does not cite to any authority for the proposition that a subjective feeling of intimidation is sufficient to void an otherwise valid settlement agreement.
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that the settlement of a property damage claim arising from an automobile accident did not bar a claim for later-discovered personal injuries. The plaintiff in that case did not believe he had suffered undue physical harm immediately after the accident. Some two months after signing a release in exchange for the estimated property damages, he went to a physician and was diagnosed with a ruptured disk and a fractured vertebra in his neck. (Casey, supra, 59 Cal.2d 97, 102.) In response to his argument that the release should be rescinded because he thought it only applied to property damage, the Supreme Court observed the evidence did not show he was incapable of reading and understanding the agreement or that he was prevented from exercising his independent judgment, noting that “even a cursory reading of the release would indicate that it relates to claims for personal injuries as well as for property damage.” (Id. at p. 104.) The court concluded the plaintiff’s “mistaken belief that the release related only to claims for property damage does not entitle him to rescind the release under the circumstances of this case.” (Id. at p. 105.) Thus, Casey does not support plaintiff’s contention that she is exempt from the release because she intended to release her property damage claim only.
The Supreme Court in Casey ultimately concluded that in order to find a waiver of section 1542, there must be a factual showing that the parties intended to settle future unknown claims. (Casey, supra, 59 Cal.2d 97, 113–114.) Such a factual showing is accomplished when the parties attach a specific release citing section 1542. (See Jefferson, supra, 28 Cal.4th 299, 307.) As noted, both the Release and the Waiver in the present case include the text of section 1542.
IV. The Trial Court’s Finding is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Although the intent of the parties determines the meaning of a settlement agreement, the relevant intent is objective – as evidenced by the words of the settlement – and cannot be determined by one party’s unexpressed subjective intent. (United Commercial Ins. v. Paymaster Corp. (9th Cir. 1992) 962 F.2d 853, 856; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 802, fn. 9.) While plaintiff argues that both she and Solomon intended to settle her property damages claim only, substantial evidence supports a contrary conclusion. In particular, Solomon testified that while he intended to settle a property damage claim, he did not intend to limit the scope of the release to property damage only. He stated that he would have sought to settle any medical claims if he had believed such claims were present. Further, although section 1542 protects individuals from relinquishing unknown claims, both the Release and the Waiver include the language expressly waiving plaintiff’s rights under the statute. Therefore, the agreement’s plain terms provide the necessary showing to release defendants from liability for all known and unknown claims alleged in plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Meyer v. Haas (1899) 126 Cal. 560 (Meyer) and Wetzstein v. Thomasson (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 554 (Wetzstein) is unavailing. In Meyer, the plaintiff who signed a release did not speak English well and could not read English at all. (Meyer, supra, at p. 561.) Further, the agent who obtained the release misled the plaintiff into believing that the document pertained to lost wages only. (Id. at pp. 562–563.) The release was accordingly held to be void. (Id. at p. 563.) Similarly, in Wetzstein, releases signed by the plaintiff and her husband were deemed void where the adjuster had visited her multiple times immediately after the accident and had repeatedly pressured her to sign without explaining the full legal effect of the documents to her or allowing her to obtain competent advice. (Wetzstein, supra, at pp. 557–559.)
In contrast, the evidence in the present case fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff fully understood the settlement documents and that she agreed to their terms. Plaintiff had attended five different institutions of higher learning in the United States and had obtained a professional license using her English language skills. Even if her English skills were not as good as her background would suggest, it is undisputed that she telephoned someone at a law firm and discussed the Release and Waiver in Chinese before she signed them. Her assent was later reinforced by her endorsement of the settlement check. Further, Solomon did not visit her until approximately 10 months after the accident, and the evidence does not show that he applied undue pressure to secure her signature. Accordingly, we conclude there is substantial evidence that the parties intended to settle all claims arising out of the November 2001 accident, including any bodily injury claims.
Plaintiff’s assertion that “her academic background should be viewed in light of her adverse physical condition after the accident” is nonsensical.
We decline plaintiff’s invitation to “visit the issue of witness credibility and to evaluate facts as [we see] fit.”
Finally, plaintiff claims that the trial court abused its discretion “by failing to adequately weigh all evidence that is relevant to the intent of the parties to the transaction.” She specifically faults the court’s reliance on the language of the documents themselves. As noted above, however, it is entirely proper for courts to rely on documents signed by the parties as evidence of intent. It is settled that where a party to a release voluntarily signs a written release, absent fraud, deception, misrepresentation, or undue influence, there is an indication that the release was entered into knowingly and the signer is estopped from claiming the terms were contrary to his intention or understanding. (Skrbina, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366–1367; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Margulies, J.