Opinion
No. 02-19-00362-CV
07-09-2020
WILLIAM LAVIN, Appellant v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 211th District Court Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19-5342-211 Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
William Lavin appeals from an order vacating a Kansas tax warrant filed by the Kansas Department of Revenue (the Department) under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). In the order, the trial court found that the tax warrant is unenforceable on its face because it compels action only by the Sheriff of Shawnee County, Kansas. Although the trial court's order resulted from Lavin's request to vacate the tax warrant, Lavin nevertheless appealed, seeking a ruling that the Department lacks personal jurisdiction to ever collect from him the sales taxes that are the subject of the tax warrant. We affirm.
In a single issue with multiple subarguments, Lavin asserts that although the trial court properly determined that the tax warrant was unenforceable, nevertheless, it should have also expressly sustained his challenge to personal jurisdiction. According to Lavin, rather than merely vacating the tax warrant, the trial court erroneously ruled that Kansas could assert personal jurisdiction over him, subjecting him to continued jeopardy on any corrected tax warrant. Lavin misunderstands the procedural posture of the proceedings.
After the trial court vacated the tax warrant, the Department obtained a new Alias Tax Warrant directed to the Sheriff or a peace officer of Denton County, Texas, and filed it in the trial court. But after Lavin filed a motion to vacate the new warrant, the Department withdrew the new warrant and nonsuited its attempt to enforce that warrant.
A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment under the UEFJA has the initial burden to present a prima facie case by filing a judgment that appears on its face to be a final, valid, and subsisting judgment. Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). Filing the foreign judgment "instantly creates an enforceable Texas judgment." Jahan Tigh v. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., 545 S.W.3d 714, 720-21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(c). The judgment debtor may challenge enforceability of the judgment by filing a postjudgment motion. See, e.g., Moncrief v. Harvey, 805 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, order). If the foreign judgment is valid on its face, the judgment debtor has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence one of five reasons why the foreign judgment should not be given full faith and credit. Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484. One of those reasons is the rendering court's lack of jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. Id. But whether the judgment is unenforceable on its face or whether the judgment debtor proves a reason the judgment should not be given full faith and credit, the result is the same: the foreign judgment may not be enforced against the judgment debtor in Texas. See Lawrence Sys., Inc. By & Through Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994, writ denied) ("The primary purpose for filing a foreign judgment in Texas is enforcement . . . ."); Moncrief, 805 S.W.2d at 23 (explaining that postjudgment motions by defendant in UEFJA actions seek to contest enforceability of foreign judgment, not adjudication of rights, because rights were adjudicated when judgment was originally imposed).
Here, the record shows that the trial court vacated the tax warrant because it is unenforceable on its face; thus, the trial court did not reach the personal jurisdiction issue, nor did it have to. Lavin contends that by manually striking out printed language in the order—that the trial court finds that Lavin "was not subject to personal jurisdiction of the State of Kansas in connection with the Tax Warrant filed by Plaintiff herein"—the trial court expressly denied the jurisdictional challenge. But with that language struck, the order shows only that the trial court found that the tax warrant was unenforceable on its face and therefore was vacated. See Point Lookout W., Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam) (reciting that judgment is to be construed as a whole to harmonize and give effect to all the court has written, considering both entire instrument and record).
Because Lavin was entitled to the same relief regardless of the reason—protection from enforcement of the tax warrant—he cannot show that the trial court's failure to make an express finding on personal jurisdiction harmed him. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.
Furthermore, by seeking a judgment resolving the personal jurisdiction question as to future tax warrants arising from the same tax dispute, Lavin seeks greater relief than what was authorized by the suit. Lavin did not file a counterclaim for affirmative relief, nor was he entitled to a different judgment. "By its very nature, the UEFJA does not contemplate or authorize the entry of a judgment replacing the foreign judgment." Jahan Tigh, 545 S.W.3d at 721. The new tax warrant is not at issue in this proceeding; thus, neither we nor the trial court can properly render an order as to its enforceability. See City of Crowley v. Ray, 558 S.W.3d 335, 348 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (noting that advisory opinions are improper and violative of the separation of powers provision of the Texas constitution).
We therefore overrule Lavin's sole issue and affirm the trial court's order.
Contrary to the Department's argument, we have jurisdiction over this appeal even if Lavin's arguments themselves do not have merit. See Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 483-84; see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c) ("A party who seeks to alter the trial court's judgment or other appealable order must file a notice of appeal."). Thus, we deny the request for dismissal in the Department's brief.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell
Justice Delivered: July 9, 2020