Opinion
September 18, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is granted.
The appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellants established that the plaintiff's car left its lane of travel, crossed the median into the opposite lanes, and struck the appellants' vehicle under circumstances precluding any possible negligence by the appellants (see, Moller v Lieber, 156 A.D.2d 434; Tenenbaum v Martin, 131 A.D.2d 660). Therefore, on the merits, the court should have granted the motion. While a trial court possesses great discretion in the management of its own calendar and has appropriate sanctions at its disposal, it was an improvident exercise of the court's discretion to refuse to entertain the appellants' motion solely because it was not made within the time constraints imposed by the court's preliminary conference order (see, CPLR 3212 [a]; Goldheart Intl. v Vulcan Constr. Corp., 124 A.D.2d 507). Furthermore, the mere fact that a summary judgment motion is made on the eve of trial is not in and of itself sufficient reason for denying the motion, especially in a case such as this where the motion is so clearly meritorious (see, Kule Resources v Reliance Group, 49 N.Y.2d 587; Carvel Corp. v Burstein, 99 A.D.2d 935, affd 62 N.Y.2d 638). Sullivan, J.P., Miller, Copertino, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.