Opinion
No. 58022-1-I.
May 7, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-2-33967-5, Michael Heavey, J., entered February 10, 2006.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Coleman, J., concurred in by Appelwick, C.J., and Becker, J.
James and Judy Larson sued Highline Water District under Title 80 RCW for flood-related damage to their home, and Highline moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) Title 80 RCW does not apply to Highline, as a municipal corporation and (2) the Larsons failed to comply with chapter 4.96 RCW's 60-day waiting period. The trial court denied summary judgment on the second ground and did not rule on the first. We conclude that the trial court should have granted summary judgment on both grounds Highline presented and, accordingly, reverse and dismiss with prejudice the Larsons' complaint against Highline.
FACTS
The Larsons allege that their home was flooded in October 2002, causing damage to their home and property. Their daughter, Tricia McFarland, claims that some of her personal property was also damaged when the Larsons' home was flooded. The Larsons and McFarland served a claim for damages on Highline Water District, a municipal corporation, on August 25, 2005. Fifty days later, the Larsons filed a lawsuit against Highline, alleging that Highline breached a "mandatory statutory obligation as a water company to furnish and supply a safe, adequate, and efficient, and in all respects just and reasonable, public water system" as required by RCW 80.28.010(2).
The respondents, the Larsons and McFarland, are referred to as "the Larsons" hereinafter for ease of reference.
Highline moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) this court has concluded that Title 80 RCW does not apply to municipal corporations and (2) the Larsons failed to comply with chapter 4.96 RCW, which requires a 60-day waiting period between the time a damages claim is filed and the commencement of legal action. The Larsons argued that this court's opinion that Title 80 RCW does not apply to municipal corporations was wrongly decided. The Larsons also explained that they did not wait 60 days because a claims adjuster for Highline's private liability insurer told them to proceed to file a lawsuit because they had provided insufficient documentation of their damages claim. They argued that because of the claims adjuster's statement, Highline should be equitably estopped from enforcing chapter 4.96 RCW's time requirements.
The trial court denied Highline's motion for summary judgment, orally ruling that Highline was equitably estopped from enforcing the 60-day waiting period. The trial court reasoned that — given that the purpose of the 60-day waiting period is to encourage settlement negotiations — the adjuster essentially terminated any settlement negotiations by telling the Larsons to file suit, thereby rendering waiting the full 60 days unnecessary. The trial court did not address Highline's argument related to Title 80 RCW. Highline moved for discretionary review by this court, and its petition was granted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and we perform the same inquiry as the trial court. Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., Inc., 108 Wn.2d 162, 169, 736 P.2d 249 (1987). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Ellis v. City of Seattle, 142 Wn.2d 450, 458, 13 P.3d 1065 (2000).
ANALYSIS
Applicability of Title 80 RCW
The Larsons' sole claim against Highline alleges a violation of its duties under RCW 80.28.010. Highline argues that because this court has concluded that Title 80 RCW does not apply to municipal corporations, such as Highline, the Larsons cannot maintain their suit against Highline as a matter of law.
In Silver Firs Town Homes, Inc. v. Silver Lake Water District, 103 Wn. App. 411, 420-23, 12 P.3d 1022 (2000), this court held that Title 80 RCW applies only to "water companies" as defined by statute and that it does not apply to municipal corporations operating as water districts. The Silver Firs court noted that Title 80 RCW authorizes the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) to regulate, inter alia, water companies, and provides a broad definition of a "water company." RCW 80.04.010. A WUTC regulation, however, clarifies that the commission regulates only investor-owned water companies. WAC 480-110-255. Thus, in light of this regulation, the court concluded that municipal corporations are not subject to Title 80 RCW.
The Larsons argue that Silver Firs is wrongly decided because RCW 80.04.010, which defines "water company," does not specifically exclude municipal corporations. Despite this argument, Silver Firs remains good law and the trial court was bound to apply it. Because Silver Firs makes clear that the Larsons could not maintain an action against Highline under Title 80 RCW, the trial court erred in not applying the case to dismiss the Larsons' complaint.
Compliance with Chapter 4.96 RCW
Highline argues that the trial court should have granted its summary judgment motion on its second ground, because the Larsons' failed to comply with chapter 4.96 RCW.
Chapter 4.96 RCW sets out the claim-filing procedures for lawsuits against a local government entity. A damages claim against a local government entity must be presented to the entity, and legal action cannot commence until 60 days after the claim is presented. RCW 4.96.020(4). The purpose of the 60-day waiting period is to allow the government entity to have adequate time to investigate claims and negotiate a settlement, if possible. Troxell v. Rainier Pub. Sch. Dist. 307, 154 Wn.2d 345, 351, 111 P.3d 1173 (2005). Strict compliance with these filing requirements is mandatory, even if enforcement seems "`"harsh and technical."'" Burnett v. Tacoma City light, 124 Wn. App. 550, 558, 104 P.3d 677 (2004) (quoting Shannon v. Dep't of Corr., 110 Wn. App. 366, 369, 40 P.3d 1200 (2002). If a lawsuit is commenced before the 60-day waiting period has expired, the action must be dismissed. Troxell, 154 Wn.2d at 348-49, 360-61; Sievers v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 97 Wn. App. 181, 184-85, 983 P.2d 1127 (1999).
The Larsons acknowledge that they did not comply with the 60-day waiting period required by RCW 4.96.020(4), but argue that because a claims adjuster told them to file a lawsuit, Highline should be equitably estopped from enforcing the statutory time requirements. Equitable estoppel applies only where (1) one party makes an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with a later claim, (2) another party reasonably relies on the admission, statement, or act, and (3) the relying party would be injured if the first party were allowed to contradict or repudiate the admission, statement, or act. Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 599, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). Each of the elements of equitable estoppel must be proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Chem. Bank v. WPPSS, 102 Wn.2d 874, 901 n. 7, 691 P.2d 524 (1984).
Highline argues that the Larsons cannot establish the second element because they could not reasonably rely on the claims adjuster's advice that directly opposed the clear statutory filing requirements. Washington courts have held that equitable estoppel cannot apply where a party's statement contradicts clear statutory language because any reliance on such a statement would be unreasonable. See King v. Snohomish County, 105 Wn. App. 857, 21 P.3d 1151 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 146 Wn.2d 420, 47 P.3d 563 (2002); Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 36, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000); Overhulse Neighborhood Ass'n v. Thurston County, 94 Wn. App. 593, 972 P.2d 470 (1999); Davidheiser v. Pierce County, 92 Wn. App. 146, 154, 960 P.2d 998 (1998); Landreville v. Shoreline Cmty. College, 53 Wn. App. 330, 332, 766 P.2d 1107 (1988).
In King, the plaintiff was injured at a park and contacted the County Park Ranger to report the accident. The Park Ranger told the plaintiff to contact the county to make a claim for damages. The plaintiff filed a damages claim with the county, and a county claims adjuster contacted the plaintiff to obtain documentation about the injury before moving forward with the claim. Three years of discovery and litigation of this claim continued, and the day before trial, the county moved to dismiss because the plaintiff had not complied with the county code provision requiring all damages claims to be filed with the clerk of the county council. The trial court equitably estopped the county from enforcing this filing requirement. On appeal, the court held that the county should not have been equitably estopped from enforcing this filing requirement because the statute clearly set out the proper procedure:
Equitable estoppel cannot lie where a statute clearly states the procedure for service of process. The same rule applies to a clear procedural filing requirement. Thus, even if the actions of [the claims adjuster], or the Park Ranger, could have been construed by the Kings as a recommendation not to file a claim with the clerk of the council, the Lybbert reasoning makes clear that such reliance is unreasonable. Snohomish County Code is explicit that claims against the county "shall be filed with the clerk of the council." SCC 2.90.050. Because there is no basis to support the reliance factor of equitable estoppel, the trial court erred in denying the County's motion on the basis of equitable estoppel.
King, 105 Wn. App. at 864. The filing requirement here is equally clear. RCW 4.96.020(4) unequivocally requires a 60-day waiting period.
Here, the claims adjuster merely informed the Larsons' counsel that because of their insufficient documentation of the tort claim, they should proceed to file suit. This advice does not instruct the Larsons to ignore the 60-day waiting period requirement and file suit immediately. Thus, assuming that the claims adjuster had the authority to speak for Highline, her advice does not contradict Highline's attempt to enforce the statutory waiting period. The trial court should not have applied equitable estoppel against Highline because the first element — contradictory statements — has not been established.
And even if the claims adjuster's statement could be construed as advice to ignore the statute, the Larsons could not have reasonably relied on such advice because it contradicts the statute. Therefore, any reliance on the claims adjuster's statement was unreasonable and the second element of equitable estoppel has not been met. For these reasons, the Larsons have not established all the elements of equitable estoppel, and the trial court erred in applying the doctrine to deny Highline's summary judgment motion.
The trial court reasoned that the purpose of the 60-day waiting period had been fulfilled because the claims adjuster's comments demonstrated that settlement negotiations had ceased, but the Washington Supreme Court has rejected this line of reasoning. See Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 147 Wn.2d 303, 317-18, 53 P.3d 993 (2002). The Medina court stated that even if the purposes of the waiting period have been met, strict compliance with the filing requirement is still required.
Medina argues . . . that because the purposes of the waiting period have been met, once the County denied his claim, substantial compliance should be found. We disagree. To hold as Medina suggests would call into question all statutory and court rule time requirements because often the underlying purpose of the statute or rule may be achieved without regard to time requirements. All time requirements necessarily involve a judgment by the legislature or a court as to the amount of time necessary to achieve the legislative or judicial purpose. Here, the legislature adopted a 60-day waiting period, and Medina simply failed to comply.
Medina, 147 Wn.2d at 317-18. Therefore, even if the purpose of the 60-day waiting period had been fulfilled before the Larsons filed suit, the trial court should have dismissed their complaint because they failed to strictly comply with the statute.
Because summary judgment should have been granted on both of the grounds Highline raised, we reverse the trial court's order denying summary judgment. The Larsons' complaint against Highline is dismissed with prejudice.