Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County No. CIV246268 of Ventura, Frederick J. Bysshe, Jr., Judge
Law Offices of Lindsay F. Nielson and Paul R. Huff for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Goldenring & Prosser, Peter A. Goldenring and James E. Prosser for Intervener and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Appellants are property owners in a common interest development governed by a declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). They brought an action against the homeowners association challenging the association's denial of a permit for a two-story residence because the proposed residence would block the view of an adjacent property owner. The adjacent property owner intervened in the action. The trial court upheld denial of the permit and awarded attorney fees to the association and the intervener under Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (c), which authorizes an award to the prevailing party in an action to enforce the governing documents of a common interest development. The property owners appeal that portion of the judgment awarding $49,650 in attorney fees to the intervener. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise stated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, appellants David R. and Corrine J. Larson (the Larsons) applied to respondent Las Posas Hills Homeowners Association (Association) for a permit to build a two-story residence on a lot in Las Posas Hills. The Association's architectural review committee denied the application for various reasons, including that the proposed residence would violate the CC&Rs because the "proposed improvement substantially blocks the view from the interior of an adjacent residence." The adjacent residence is owned by respondent Michael A. Rolls.
The Larsons appealed denial of the permit to the Association's Board of Directors. The Board made findings substantially similar to those made by the architectural committee and denied the appeal. On May 30, 2006, the Larsons sent a letter to the Association proposing to settle the dispute by mediation. The Association declined to do so.
On January 31, 2007, the Larsons filed a complaint against the Association asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, nuisance, declaratory relief and writ of mandate. The Larsons did not name Rolls as a defendant in the lawsuit. On April 20, 2007, the Larsons filed a first amended complaint. Again, the only party named as a defendant was the Association.
Rolls had been told by the attorney for the Association that his interests would be fully protected by the Association in the lawsuit. However, in early January 2008, the Association's attorney advised Rolls that he should find an attorney and consider joining the litigation. Rolls retained counsel and, on February 14, 2008, made an ex parte application for leave to intervene pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387. Over the objections of the Larsons, the trial court granted Rolls leave to intervene. Rolls filed his complaint in intervention on February 28, 2008.
A bench trial commenced on February 4, 2009, and continued over five days. At the conclusion of the Larsons' presentation of evidence, the Association and Rolls made a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Association and Rolls. The judgment also awarded the Association and Rolls attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 et seq., California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700 et seq., and section 1354, subdivision (c).
The Association filed a motion requesting $191,324 in costs and attorney fees. Rolls filed a separate motion for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $81,567. The Larsons opposed the Association's motion on the ground that the fees requested were excessive. The Larsons proposed that the Association receive only $44,088.73 in attorney fees. The Larsons opposed Rolls' motion on the ground of excessiveness and on the additional ground that section 1354, subdivision (c), does not authorize an award of attorney fees to a prevailing intervener. The trial court substantially reduced the fees requested and awarded the Association attorney fees in the amount of $71,637.52 and Rolls attorney fees in the amount of $49,650.
The Larsons appeal only the award of attorney fees to Rolls. They contend, as they did in the trial court, that section 1354, subdivision (c), does not authorize an award of attorney fees to a prevailing intervener and that the amount of fees awarded is excessive because there was duplication of effort by the attorneys for the Association and Rolls.
DISCUSSION
A. An Intervener is a Party to the Action and is Entitled to Attorney Fees if he Prevails
California generally follows the "American Rule" which states that, regardless of which party prevails in litigation, each party shall bear its own attorney fees unless otherwise provided by contract or statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) The Larsons' property is in a common interest development governed by the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act (§ 1350 et seq.). Section 1354 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in an action to enforce the governing documents of the development. Section 1354 states:
"(a) The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development. Unless the declaration states otherwise, these servitudes may be enforced by any owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by both.
"(b) A governing document other than the declaration may be enforced by the association against an owner of a separate interest or by an owner of a separate interest against the association.
"(c) In an action to enforce the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs."
The Larsons do not contend that Rolls did not "prevail." Rather, they argue section 1354 does not authorize an award of attorney fees to Rolls because he was not seeking to "enforce the governing documents" and the statute does not expressly state that interveners are entitled to attorney fees. As we are called upon to interpret a statute, our review of these contentions is de novo. (In reConservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213-1214.)
"'An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a party to an action or proceeding between other persons....'... The purpose of allowing intervention is to protect others potentially affected by a judgment, thus obviating delay and multiplicity of suits. [Citations.] The intervener becomes a party to the action, with all of the same procedural rights and remedies of the original parties. [Citations.] 'Upon being permitted to intervene, the intervenor is to be regarded as a plaintiff or as a defendant in the action (unless he seeks something adversely to both) according as is the party for whose success he seeks to intervene....' [Citations.]" (Catello v. I.T.T. General Controls (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1013-1014.) Under California law, an intervener is considered a full-fledged party to an action by virtue of the order authorizing the intervention. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006)37 Cal.4th 1169, 1183, fn. 6.)
In City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 87, the court held that a party that qualifies and enters an action as an intervener is vested with all the procedural remedies and rights of the original parties, including the right to seek attorney fees under section 1021.5. That statute, like section 1354, is silent as to the right of a prevailing intervener to an attorney fee award. (See also Crawford v. Board of Education (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1407 [interveners entitled to fees under section 1021.5 even though "legislative history of section 1021.5 is silent on the appropriate standard for awarding attorney's fees to interveners"]; and see Catello v. I.T.T. General Controls, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1013-1014 [interveners who were aligned with losing party were liable for costs to prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032]; Montgomery v. Bio-Med Specialties, Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1295-1296 [plaintiffs would have been entitled to receive attorney fees from interveners had plaintiffs prevailed under § 1717; therefore, interveners were entitled to recover their fees incurred in successfully defending against that claim].)
Rolls, as an adjacent property owner whose view would be blocked if the Larsons prevailed in the lawsuit and obtained the permit they sought, had a vital interest in the matter being litigated. (See, e.g., Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 ["Due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before governmental deprivation of a significant property interest"].) Our Supreme Court has held that an adjacent property owner is entitled to intervene in actions potentially affecting their property interests. (See Weiner v. City of Los Angeles (1968) 68 Cal.2d 697, 706 ["interveners, who own the lot next door to plaintiffs' lot... are parties in interest entitled to intervene in this litigation"].)
The Larsons' contention that Rolls' intervention was unnecessary because the Association would have, and did, protect his individual interests is not supported by the record. Rolls did not intervene until the Association itself advised him to do so. At the time he intervened, he could not know the outcome of the litigation.
The Larsons do not dispute that their lawsuit sought to overturn the Association's interpretation of the provision in the CC&Rs protecting the view of adjacent property owners. Thus, their contention that section 1354, subdivision (c), does not apply because Rolls was not seeking to enforce the CC&Rs is without merit. Section 1354, subdivision (a), by its express terms, authorizes enforcement "by any owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by both."
The Larsons also argue that awarding attorney fees to an intervener would have the undesirable effect of discouraging legal challenges to decisions made by homeowners associations, citing Blue Lagoon Community Assn. v. Mitchell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 472. The argument is without merit. In a subsequent opinion, the court that decided Blue Lagoon refused to expand its holding in that case beyond its narrow facts. In Kaplan v. Fairway Oaks Homeowners Assn. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 715, 720-721, the court explained: "In Blue Lagoon, the association brought a petition under Civil Code section 1356, which allows 'the superior court to reduce the percentage of affirmative votes necessary to amend a declaration where the property owners' association is unable to obtain approval of the proposed amendments by the percentage of votes required by the declaration.' [Citation.]... [T]he trial court refused the successful members' request for attorney fees under section 1354, subdivision (f) [now § 1354, subd. (c)].
"This court affirmed the denial of attorney fees.... We stated, 'When the limited purpose of section 1356 is fully understood it is obvious a petition brought under this section is not an adversarial proceeding. No defendants are named. No rights are sought to be protected. No wrongs are sought to be redressed. As such, it cannot be said that by opposing the petition the objectors were enforcing the governing documents and thus entitled to attorney fees and costs.' [Citation.]
"The action here, to determine the validity of an election, is qualitatively different from the petition at issue in Blue Lagoon. It was an adversarial action to enforce the governing documents and was designed to protect the members from allegedly improper action by the Association and preserve their rights to cumulative and proxy voting. By broadening the attorney fee provision in Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (f), the Legislature specifically eliminated any distinction between this type of enforcement action and one brought to enforce the placement of a fence or the painting of a garage. Nor can we perceive any reason to make such a distinction. The legislative policy underlying an attorney fee award to a prevailing party, be it homeowner or association, applies equally to both types of enforcement actions."
B. Appellants Have Not Met Their Burden of Showing the Attorney Fee Award Is Unreasonable
The Larsons contend that the award to Rolls is excessive because his attorney did nothing more than duplicate the efforts of the Association's attorneys. We review the amount of a fee award for abuse of discretion. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1175.) "California courts have long held that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each case." (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 452.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court may accordingly "consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award." (Ibid.) An attorney fee award "'will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence....'" (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894.)
Our Supreme Court has held: "'... The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. [Citations.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.'" (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.) Moreover, the "'experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.'" (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; accord, Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 752.) It is the appellant's burden to establish an abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.)
The Larsons claim the award to Rolls was excessive because his attorney's efforts were duplicative of those of the Association's attorney. However, they identify no specifics as to why the award is purportedly excessive. They do not take issue with the rates Rolls claims for his attorney, nor do they identify any specific tasks they contend were unfairly reported or duplicative. Accordingly, they have not carried their burden to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in accepting the hourly rates requested or crediting the work done by Rolls' attorney. Moreover, having observed the parties, the trial court was in a particularly good position to determine the reasonableness of the time spent by Rolls' attorney. The trial court exercised its discretion and reduced both the Association's and Rolls' requests by a substantial amount to account for what it perceived to be duplicative efforts.
As we conclude that Rolls' entitlement to fees is statutory, we do not reach the argument that the attorney fee provision in the governing documents also authorizes such an award.
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs and a reasonable attorney fee on appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.