Opinion
4-22-0522WC
05-22-2023
HANNAH LARSON, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Quad City Skydiving Center, Inc. Appellees.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit, Henry County, Illinois Circuit No. 20-MR-48 Honorable James Cosby, Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman, Hutchinson, Cavanagh, and Barberis
ORDER
HOLDRIDGE, PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 (1) The Commission correctly reviewed the claimant's claim under the manifest weight of the evidence standard rather than de novo; and (2) the Commission's finding that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an employer/employee relationship between the parties at the time of the accident was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Hanna Larson (the claimant), filed a complaint for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2014)) against the respondent, Quad City Skydiving Center (QCS), for injuries she sustained on June 29, 2014, while flying a plane owned and operated by QCS in furtherance of its business. After conducting a hearing, an arbitrator found that the claimant was an employee of QCS at the time of the accident and awarded her benefits.
¶ 3 QCS appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission). The Commission found that the claimant had failed to prove that she was an employee of QCS at the time of the accident and reversed the arbitrator's decision, with one Commissioner dissenting. The Commission concluded that the claimant flew planes for QCS on a volunteer basis and that she had failed to demonstrate the existence of an employment contract supported by mutual consideration.
¶ 4 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Henry County. The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision, finding that the claimant had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she had an implied contract for hire with QCS at the time of the accident.
¶ 5 This appeal followed.
¶ 6 FACTS
¶ 7 On two or three occasions, the claimant piloted a Cessna 182 owned by QCS for the employer's skydiving operations. Her duties included flying skydivers up to 10,000 feet, allowing them to jump out, and then landing the plane at QCS's facility.
¶ 8 On June 29, 2014, the claimant was flying for QCS when the plane crashed during a landing attempt. The claimant sustained blunt force trauma to her face causing lacerations and a broken nose. Her injuries ultimately required two reconstructive nasal surgeries as well as numerous sutures.
¶ 9 The claimant testified that she was not paid by QCS. She had agreed to fly for QCS without payment or monetary compensation so she could accumulate flight hours that she needed in order to become certified to fly jets as a commercial airline pilot. At the time she flew for QCS, the claimant already had a commercial pilot's license, but she was seeking to earn a "flight instructor" rating so she could obtain an "airline transit certificate," which would authorize her to fly jets.
¶ 10 The claimant learned about the opportunity to fly for QCS from her friend, Brandon Larson (Brandon). Brandon had flown for QCS on occasion. He knew that the claimant wanted to increase her flight time, and he told her that QCS was looking for an additional pilot. Brandon recommended the claimant to Dennis Jensen (Jensen), the owner and operator of QCS.
¶ 11 The claimant later met with Jensen about the possibility of her flying for QCS. She told Jensen that she was working at the Texas Roadhouse and that she should be able to fly for QCS on Sundays, provided that her employer allowed her to take Sundays off. Jensen told her that she could fly five to eight hours each day she flew, depending on the number of jumpers QCS had at the time. The claimant testified that she and Jensen agreed that she would fly for QCS for approximately five to eight hours on Sundays.
¶ 12 The claimant testified that Jensen provided the airplane and fuel. The claimant used QCS's equipment but used her own headset, which is customary in the aviation industry. Jensen directed the claimant as to how to fly the plane. He told her the route to fly and the general areas to avoid due to noise complaints from neighbors. He told her at what altitude to fly, where the skydivers should jump, and what to do while descending the plane. He told her how much fuel to use. Jensen stated that she made no decisions as to where to fly, where to go, what time to be there and what time to leave without guidance from Jensen. She had to stay until the jumps were completed, and QCS told her when she could leave.
¶ 13 The claimant testified that the benefit she received from flying for QCS was that was she didn't have to pay for accumulating flight hours. To gain flight hours, she would normally have had to be employed as a pilot, attend a flight school, or rent an airplane. The latter two options would require hourly fees. Had she not flown for QCS, the best way for the claimant to accumulate flight hours would have been to go to a flight school and rent an airplane, which would have cost $195 per hour. Every hour that the claimant flew for QCS saved her the $195 that she would have had to pay to rent a plane. The claimant testified that she told Jensen that flying for QCS would benefit her by allowing her to accumulate flight hours free of charge, and that Jensen told her that he benefited from the fact that she could fly his plane while he was instructing another pilot.
¶ 14 On cross-examination, the claimant admitted that she was "volunteering" to do something which gave her an "incidental benefit." She did not sign a contract. She agreed to be an unpaid pilot. She neither received nor expected any money. She "never received any kind of a tax document from Quad City Skydiving indicating that she had received any sort of monetary benefit or any other type of benefit from them." QCS gave her the opportunity to fly when she was available. The claimant assumed the relationship would last the entire summer, but admitted there was no defined time frame.
¶ 15 The claimant further testified that the recording of flight hours in her flight log book was solely her responsibility and choice. QCS did not check those hours or otherwise act to ensure that they were accurate. Keeping the log book was something that the claimant did herself, but if anyone ever questioned whether her hours were accurate, they could check with whoever owned the plane she had flown in a given instance.
¶ 16 Jensen testified on behalf of QCS. He has owned the skydiving business for 20 years and has never paid any pilots who flew for QCS. He only used volunteer pilots and has had no employees. None of his pilots have ever expected payment for their services.
¶ 17 Jensen testified that the claimant's relationship with QCS was no different than the relationship the company had with its other volunteer pilots. The claimant never received any compensation or any benefits at from QCS for her flights. She voluntarily chose to fly on Sundays. There was no written employment agreement. The terms of Jensen's arrangement with the claimant were identical to the arrangements he had with other pilots. Jensen never promised the claimant a specific number of flight hours. Jensen did not obtain workers compensation insurance or withhold any federal or state taxes for the claimant or for any of his pilots because he had no employees. On cross-examination, Jensen agreed that he benefitted from his arrangement with the claimant because it provided him with someone to fly his skydivers.
¶ 18 Jensen denied controlling the manner in which the claimant flew. He stated that the claimant was already qualified to fly the Cessna 182 and he only gave instructions regarding things the tower wanted and ways to best preserve the plane and avoid damaging the engine.
¶ 19 Jensen acknowledged that he knew the claimant wanted to accumulate flight hours toward her commercial pilot's license. However, he testified that logging flight hours is something that voluntary pilots choose to do in order to further their careers. They were not required to do so by QCS.
¶ 20 Brandon testified on behalf of QCS. Brandon stated that he is currently a corporate pilot and flew for QCS in 2013. He flew for two jump seasons (two years) and was never paid. He never had an expectation of being paid while he flew for QCS. He logged hours but did not consider that a benefit provided by QCS. His relationship with QCS was simply an opportunity for him to log additional flight hours and gain experience. Under cross-examination, Brandon agreed that flight hours are helpful and are an essential need for pilots.
¶ 21 Brandon testified that he referred the claimant to QCS because he thought it would be a good opportunity for her to gain more flight experience. He advised the claimant that it was an unpaid opportunity to fly skydivers and get flight time experience.
¶ 22 Jesup Miskinis also testified on behalf of QCS. Miskinis flew for QCS for two years from 2002-2004. He never received any compensation or any additional benefits. Everything was voluntary, and he told QCS when he was available for flights.
¶ 23 Gary Aho also testified on behalf of QCS. Aho stated that he has voluntarily flown for QCS since 2010. He was never paid by QCS and he had no expectation of being paid. The only benefit he ever received was attending an annual banquet.
¶ 24 The arbitrator found that the claimant was an employee of QCS at the time of the accident. The arbitrator concluded that, although there was no written agreement between the parties, there was an oral offer by QCS and an oral acceptance of the offer by the claimant. The arbitrator therefore found that there was an oral implied contract between the parties.
¶ 25 The arbitrator further found that there was consideration for the parties' agreement. The arbitrator concluded that the claimant gave consideration by agreeing to fly Jensen's plane with his skydiving customers so that Jensen's business could operate. The arbitrator found that QCS gave as consideration the implied promise that the claimant could fly the company's plane and accumulate her flight hours. The arbitrator concluded that Jensen knew this was the claimant's desire because two of the other pilots who testified, Brandon and Miskinis, said that they flew for QCS in order to accumulate flight hours. The arbitrator rejected QCS's argument that there was no consideration given by QCS because the claimant did not receive any pay. The arbitrator noted that consideration to form a contract does not require pay. Rather, consideration is something of value given by the promiser. The arbitrator found that, in this case, QCS gave to the claimant "the opportunity to fly its plane and improve her credentials." After finding that the claimant was an employee of QCS's, and not an independent contractor, the arbitrator awarded the claimant benefits.
¶ 26 QCS appealed to the Commission, which reversed the arbitrator's decision. The Commission found that the claimant did not meet her burden of proving that an employer/employee relationship existed on the date of the accident. The Commission noted that there can be no employer/employee relationship, and therefore no liability under the Act, absent a contract for hire, either express or implied. It further explained that "a true employer-employee relationship does not exist in the absence of the payment or expected payment of consideration in some form by employer to employee." The Commission noted that, as a consequence of this, "the workmen's compensation statutes throughout this country have uniformly been construed to exclude from coverage purely gratuitous workers who neither receive, nor expect to receive, pay or other remuneration for their services."
¶ 27 The Commission relied heavily upon our Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Ill.2d 167 (1972). In that case, our supreme court held that a volunteer assistant teacher who was injured while performing her volunteer duties was not entitled to benefits under the Act because she was not an employee of the Board of Education. The assistant teacher was volunteering at a Chicago public school to fulfill a requirement for her college degree in elementary education. The Court held that there was no consideration between the parties that could give rise to an employment contract because (1) the assistant teacher's activities at the school "were strictly on a voluntary basis with no expectation of any monetary compensation," and (2) there was insufficient evidence that the school had agreed to hire the assistant teacher in the future in exchange for her volunteer work.
¶ 28 The Commission ruled that, like the assistant teacher in Board of Education, the claimant in this case admitted that she had no expectation of receiving payment for the hours she flew for QCS and she did not expect that the opportunity to volunteer at QCS would lead to future gainful employment by QCS. Instead, the claimant chose the volunteer opportunity because it presented a chance to gain the additional flight experience and training that she needed to obtain her airline transit certificate. The Commission found that the claimant failed to prove the existence of an employer/employee relationship on the date of accident because "there was no consideration, payment, or other compensation in exchange for [the claimant's] volunteering to fly [QCS's] plane." Accordingly, the Commission denied the claimant's claim for benefits.
¶ 29 Commissioner Tyrrell dissented. He concluded that there was consideration between the parties that gave rise an employment contract. Specifically, "the [claimant] received the benefit of obtaining additional flight hours without having to spend $192/hr. to rent a plane from a flight school," and "[QCS] received the benefit of eliminating the cost of paying pilots," which was essential to its business model. Commissioner Tyrrell noted that this arrangement enabled Jensen to train more skydiving groups-and thus make more money-because he did not have to personally fly the plane. In Commissioner Tyrrell's view, Board of Education is distinguishable because the school in that case employed regular, full-time teachers in addition to volunteers, whereas, in the instant case, QCS relies entirely on volunteer pilots to conduct its business. Commissioner Tyrrell also concluded that the claimant was an employee at the time of the accident rather than an independent contractor. He therefore concluded that the claimant was entitled to benefits under the Act.
¶ 30 The claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Henry County. The circuit court reversed the Commission's decision and reinstated the arbitrator's decision. The circuit court found that there was consideration between the parties because both parties benefitted from their agreement. Specifically, the claimant "benefited] $195 an hour" by not having to pay for her flight hours, and Jensen benefited because he did not have to pay a pilot. The circuit court found that Jensen knew it cost $195 per hour to rent a Cessna, and his business model was to hire pilots who needed flight hours for professional advancement. Accordingly, Jensen knew he was giving his pilots a benefit, and that he was also benefitting from the relationship. The circuit court found Board of Education distinguishable because (1) the claimant in that case received no benefit other than "resume building," and (2) she was merely a volunteer who assisted in various ways, whereas the claimant in this case was an actual pilot who flew Jensen's plane without assistance from anyone else. The circuit court found that the claimant had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she had an implied contract for hire with QCS at the time of the accident.
¶ 31 This appeal followed.
¶ 32 ANALYSIS
¶ 33 The parties dispute the standard of review that should govern our analysis. The claimant argues that we should review the Commission's decision de novo because the facts are undisputed and the case merely involves the application of the law to the undisputed facts. QCS counters that the manifest weight of the evidence standard applies because some of the relevant facts are disputed and, in any event, the undisputed facts support different reasonable inferences.
¶ 34 We agree with QCS. The central question in this appeal, i.e., whether an employer/employee relationship existed at the time of the accident, is a question of fact. Ware v. Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill.App.3d 1117, 1122 (2000). It can become a question of law only where there is no conflict in the evidence and but one conclusion can reasonably be drawn therefrom. Id.; Tooley v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Ill.App.3d 1054, 1056 (1992). Even in cases where the facts are undisputed, this court must apply the manifest-weight standard if more than one reasonable inference might be drawn from the facts. Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill.2d 542, 549, 161 (1991); Baumgardner v. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill.App.3d 274, 279 (2011). In this case, at least some of the relevant facts are disputed. For example, the claimant testified that the parties had an agreement that she would fly for QCS on Sundays, whereas Jensen testified that flying on Sundays was the claimant's choice. In any event, even if all the relevant facts are undisputed, they support more than one reasonable inference as to whether there was consideration given by QCS, among other issues.
¶ 35 Accordingly, we will disturb the Commission's decision only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Factual determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence only "when an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent-that is, when no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the [Commission]." Durandv. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Ill.2d 53, 64 (2006). The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's finding, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. Pietrzakv. IndustrialComm'n, 329 Ill.App.3d 828, 833 (2002).
¶ 36 Turning to the merits, QCS argues that the Commission's decision, which found that the claimant was not an employee of QCS at the time of the accident, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It asks us to overturn the circuit court's ruling reversing the Commission and to reinstate the Commission's decision.
¶ 37 Section 1(b)(2) of the Act defines an "employee" as "[e]very person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written * * *." 820 ILCS 305/1(b)(2) (West 2014). There can be no employer/employee relationship, and therefore, no liability under the Act, absent a contract for hire, express or implied. Pearson v. Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill.App.3d 932, 935 (2001). The underlying purpose of workers' compensation legislation in Illinois and in other States is to provide financial protection in various forms, including the restoration of lost wages, to workers whose earning power is interrupted or terminated as a consequence of injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment. Board of Education v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Ill.2d 167, 171 (1972). Consistent with the philosophy of the legislation, which assumes that a worker is gainfully employed at the time of his injury, it is generally recognized that a true employer-employee relationship does not exist in the absence of the payment or expected payment of consideration in some form by employer to employee. Id.; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1055. As a consequence, the workers' compensation statutes throughout this country have uniformly been construed to exclude from coverage purely gratuitous workers who neither receive, nor expect to receive, pay or other remuneration for their services. Board of Education, 53 Ill.2d at 171; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1055.
¶ 38 The relationship of an employer and an employee is a product of mutual assent. Board of Education, 53 Ill.2d at 172; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1056. Although the definition of "employee" contained in the Act is to be broadly construed, there can be no employer/employee relationship and there can be no liability for workers' compensation under the Act in the absence of a contract of hire, express or implied. Crepps v. Industrial Comm'n, 402 Ill. 606 (1949); Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1056. The relationship of employer and employee is a contractual relationship, the requisites to the formation of which are determined by an application of the principles governing the formation of other contracts. Crepps, 402 Ill. 606; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1056. The relationship is a product of a meeting of minds expressed by some offer on the part of one to employ or to work for the other and an acceptance on the part of the other. Crepps, 402 Ill. 606; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1056. Courts should give great weight to the parties' interpretation of the contract because they are in the best position to know what was intended by the language employed. Barney v. Unity Paving, Inc., 266 Ill.App.3d 1, 18 (1994).
¶ 39 The Commission's finding in this case that there was no mutual consideration that would give rise to a contract for hire is supported by the evidence. The claimant testified that she had agreed to fly for QCS without payment or monetary compensation so she could accumulate flight hours that she needed in order to obtain an airline transit certificate, which would authorize her to fly jets. She admitted that she was volunteering to do something which gave her an "incidental benefit." The recording of flight hours in her flight log book was solely her responsibility and choice, not something required, supervised, or verified by QCS. The claimant never received any tax document from QCS indicating that she had received any type of benefit from QCS.
¶ 40 Jensen also testified that he understood that the claimant was working as an unpaid volunteer. He never paid any of his pilots, and he considered the arrangement that he had with the claimant to be the same arrangement that he had with his other volunteer pilots. He never promised the claimant a specific number of flight hours. He did not obtain workers compensation insurance or withhold any federal or state taxes for the claimant or for any of his pilots or because he had no employees. Three of Jensen's former pilots (Brandon, Miskinis, and Aho) each testified that he had previously flown for QCS without receiving or expecting payment and without QCS giving them any other benefit.
¶ 41 As the Commission correctly concluded, this case is analogous to the situation presented in Board of Education, 53 Ill.2d 167 (1972). In that case, the claimant was studying at DePaul University seeking to obtain a degree in elementary education. At the suggestion of her academic counselor at DePaul, she applied to do volunteer work in the Chicago public schools in a volunteer program sponsored by the Board of Education of Chicago. The evidence strongly suggested that the performance of 100 hours of such volunteer work was a DePaul University requirement which students were expected to complete in the course of their academic training for a Bachelor of Science degree in elementary education. Id. at 172. After the claimant was injured while performing her volunteer duties, she claimed that she was an employee of the Board of Education and sought benefits under the Act.
¶ 42 Our supreme court ruled against the claimant. It held that, "[a]s between the claimant and the Board of Education, the element of consideration [was] completely lacking" because, (1) the claimant's activities at the school were strictly on a voluntary basis with no expectation of any monetary compensation, (2) there was no evidence that the Board of Education had committed to hire her in the future in exchange for her volunteer work or that such work was a condition precedent to future employment, and (3) the evidence suggested that the performance of 100 hours of volunteer work in the Chicago Public Schools was a requirement for her college degree which students were expected to complete. Id. Our supreme court further found that there was no mutual assent to an employer/employee relationship because neither the claimant nor the Board of Education regarded the claimant as an employee at the time she participated in the volunteer program.
¶ 43 Like the claimant in Board of Education, the claimant in this case worked purely on a voluntary basis with no expectation of payment or future employment. She performed this work to accumulate flight hours in order to obtain an airline transit certificate which would authorize her to fly jets. In like fashion, the claimant in Board of Education worked for the Board of Education to accumulate 100 hours of volunteer time in order to obtain her college degree and become an elementary school teacher. Based on these considerations, the Commission's finding that there was no consideration in exchange for the claimant's volunteering to fly QCS's plane was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 44 In reversing the Commission's decision, the circuit court found Board of Education to be distinguishable because QCS gave the claimant a financial benefit by saving her the $195 per hour plane rental fee she would have paid if QCS had not given her the opportunity to fly its plane for free. By contrast, in the circuit court's view, the claimant in Board of Education received no benefit other than "resume building." In addition, the claimant in this case, like all QCS's pilots, worked as a licensed pilot without assistance from any other employees in furtherance of QCS's business. By contrast, the claimant in Board of Education merely assisted other teachers who were full-time employees of the Board of Education.
¶ 45 We do not find these distinctions to be dispositive. Like the benefits received by the claimant in Board of Education, the financial benefit that the claimant received in this case was incidental to the work she performed for QVS; it was not a benefit given by QCS to the claimant. Therefore, it could not have served as consideration by QCS that could give rise to a contract for hire. A person who agrees to work for another without pay in order to advance his personal interest or to receive an incidental benefit is not necessarily an employee. One "type of gratuitous worker is the volunteer who assists another person with a view in part to furthering *** his own *** interest." 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1967), sec. 65.01[3]. Larson explains:
"There is almost no limit to the variety of kinds of self-interest that may appear in this class of cases. *** It may be an effort to make an impression in the hope of getting a job. *** Or it may be self-improvement or self-advancement in some other
form. Thus, an army sergeant, who had offered to pilot coaches of a military school to various locations, while "on pass" from his regular army duties piloted an airplane in the military school's tactical maneuvers, dropping flour "bombs," and was fatally injured during this exercise. The court upheld the finding that he was not an employee of the military school, but might well have been serving his personal desire to obtain extra flying time with the expense paid by the military school." (Emphasis added); 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1967), sec. 65.01[3], pages 65-10, 65-11. (2014).See also Lance v. New Mexico Military Institute, 371 P.2d 995 (N.M. 1962) (licensed private pilot who flew for the respondent in order to obtain flight hours qualifying him to become a commercial pilot was not an employee where he was doing something to further his personal interest).
¶ 46 In addition, the facts in this case support a reasonable inference that the parties did not mutually agree to the formation of an employer/employee relationship. There can be no such relationship in absence of a contract of hire, express or implied. Crepps, 402 Ill. 606; Tooley, 236 Ill.App.3d at 1056. If the parties do not mutually understand their agreement to be a contract for for hire while the work is being performed, no employer/employee relationship is formed. Board of Education, 53 Ill.2d at 172 (no employer-employee relationship was intended or formed where neither the claimant nor the Board of Education regarded her as an employee at the time she volunteered for the Board); Wolverine Insurance Co. v. Jockish, 83 Ill.App.3d 411, 415 (1980) (where the parties' statements suggested that they "[did] not mutually assent to a contract of hire, but rather to a gratuitous undertaking ***, [the claimant] could not assert a legally enforceable claim to payment, arising from implied contract or otherwise"). "One cannot agree to be an unpaid volunteer and after the fact assert the existence of an implied contract of hire." Wolverine Insurance Co., 84 Ill.App.3d at 415. If there is no mutual assent to a contract for hire, "[a]ny payment which is made to the gratuitous worker is a reciprocal gratuity, not consideration for services rendered that might be enforced by a court of law." Id. at 416.
¶ 47 In this case, the claimant admitted that she was "volunteering" to do something which gave her an "incidental benefit," namely, the opportunity to log flight hours for free. Jensen testified that he has no employees and that he understood the claimant to be a volunteer, like all his other pilots. Brandon testified that, when he told the claimant about the opportunity to fly for QCS, he informed her that it was an unpaid opportunity to fly skydivers and get flight time experience. All of this suggests that neither party believed they were entering into an employer/employee relationship. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the QCS gave the claimant the benefit of accumulating flight hours for free, the provision of this benefit would have been a mutual gratuity, not consideration for the claimant's services. Wolverine Insurance Co., 84 Ill.App.3d at 416.
¶ 48 The Commission's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although there is evidence in the record supporting an opposite inference than the one drawn by the Commission, it cannot be said that the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent-i.e., that "no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the [Commission]." Durand, 224 Ill.2d at 64. We therefore affirm and reinstate the Commission's decision.
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Henry County and reinstate the Commission's decision.
¶ 51 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 52 Commission decision affirmed.